by MartinL » Mon Mar 31, 2008 6:24 pm
The role currently being carried out by Nimrod MR2 in Afghanistan is one which was not originally envisaged but it has been pressed into service because of a lack of an alternative.
The fact that we do not have anything more appropriate to carry out the missions currently being carried out does not mean that Nimrod is the best platform, it is just the best platform we have. Forming a key element of the RAF's ISTAR capability it has been covered seperately due to the nature of the programme.
Putting Wescam turrets on Nimrods of course provides a long range electro optical capability in Afghanistan but using the Nimrod also means we have to haul MAD, sonar buoy launching equipment, maritime surveillance radar and harpoon launch rails etc. It acts as a target acquisition platform and as an aerial communications hub or rebroadcast station because of its comprehensive communications fit.
They are at the end of a long transit flight, flying from the Middle East and although Nimrods do have excellent range the time on station numbers available mean that the fleet is being overused and stretched.
Able to carry out its traditional maritime roles but also command and control and electronic intelligence roles MRA4 will be a very capable but extremely expensive asset whose numbers are planned to be very low, 12, meaning their continued use will be problematical if required to cover more than one or two geographical areas. Because of the airframe, any losses will be practically impossible to replace.
The MRA4 is a classic example of a procurement failure and lessons should be learned from this incredibly expensive programme.
Following the loss of a Nimrod MR2 over Afghanistan there are continued doubts about the aircraft's long term reliability and safety.
The original missions of the Nimrod and its predecessor, the Avro Shackleton, was protection of transatlantic shipping lanes against the Russian surface and submarine threat, especially in the Shetland - Faeroe's - Iceland - Greenland gap and to protect the Royal Navy ballistic missile submarines from Russian attack submarines.
Nearing deployment and with vast sums already invested it would be a difficult decision to cancel but that must be an option given the small numbers that will be available and the more or less impossibility of getting any more should losses be incurred.
It is recommended that an analysis of the long term viability of the platform be carried out, looking at the option of participating in the US Orion replacement programme or a combination of UAV's and other manned aircraft, for example the proposed A330 signal/electronic intelligence system.
If we can get better capability, sustainability and long term value for money then the courage must be found to cancel the programme....
sometimes what looks a bad move is for the best.
The role currently being carried out by Nimrod MR2 in Afghanistan is one which was not originally envisaged but it has been pressed into service because of a lack of an alternative.
The fact that we do not have anything more appropriate to carry out the missions currently being carried out does not mean that Nimrod is the best platform, it is just the best platform we have. Forming a key element of the RAF's ISTAR capability it has been covered seperately due to the nature of the programme.
Putting Wescam turrets on Nimrods of course provides a long range electro optical capability in Afghanistan but using the Nimrod also means we have to haul MAD, sonar buoy launching equipment, maritime surveillance radar and harpoon launch rails etc. It acts as a target acquisition platform and as an aerial communications hub or rebroadcast station because of its comprehensive communications fit.
They are at the end of a long transit flight, flying from the Middle East and although Nimrods do have excellent range the time on station numbers available mean that the fleet is being overused and stretched.
Able to carry out its traditional maritime roles but also command and control and electronic intelligence roles MRA4 will be a very capable but extremely expensive asset whose numbers are planned to be very low, 12, meaning their continued use will be problematical if required to cover more than one or two geographical areas. Because of the airframe, any losses will be practically impossible to replace.
The MRA4 is a classic example of a procurement failure and lessons should be learned from this incredibly expensive programme.
Following the loss of a Nimrod MR2 over Afghanistan there are continued doubts about the aircraft's long term reliability and safety.
The original missions of the Nimrod and its predecessor, the Avro Shackleton, was protection of transatlantic shipping lanes against the Russian surface and submarine threat, especially in the Shetland - Faeroe's - Iceland - Greenland gap and to protect the Royal Navy ballistic missile submarines from Russian attack submarines.
Nearing deployment and with vast sums already invested it would be a difficult decision to cancel but that must be an option given the small numbers that will be available and the more or less impossibility of getting any more should losses be incurred.
It is recommended that an analysis of the long term viability of the platform be carried out, looking at the option of participating in the US Orion replacement programme or a combination of UAV's and other manned aircraft, for example the proposed A330 signal/electronic intelligence system.
If we can get better capability, sustainability and long term value for money then the courage must be found to cancel the programme....
sometimes what looks a bad move is for the best.