The Ship Model Forum

bengtsson wrote:
By the way, did the IJN use any Carrier for purely training of airgroups? Or did they need to spend considerable time on their own Carrier to come up to speed? I suspect the latter.

Bob B.

Up to Midway, no. After Midway the light carrier Hosho was withdrawn from operational duties and converted into a training carrier. The fact that the IJN would move an operational carrier to training duties after major carrier losses in Midway suggest the problem had become well recognized.

Airgroups tied to individual ships was a huge drawback in the IJN Airforce system. The USN could train and move groups around indpendent of the Carrier itself. The IJN system was great as long as no battle casualties occured. Highly unlikely in a World War. Look at how Yorktown's aircraft complement was brought up to speed so very quickly after Coral Sea. The ship is a flight deck that can move, the japanese didn't make the connection that the carrier is just a mobile airfield. There is NO need for individual ships to own an airgroup as it were.
By the way, did the IJN use any Carrier for purely training of airgroups? Or did they need to spend considerable time on their own Carrier to come up to speed? I suspect the latter.

Bob B.

chuck wrote:The Japanese carrier force were highly elitist, and you can see in this environment how men of second rate units, having newly demonstrated their continued unworthiness by being shattered in Coral Sea, would not be openly welcomed by the rest of the mobile fleet's aircrews who think of themselves as considerably better than the best and has seen nothing but proof of their superiority in the war hitherto.

Perhaps that's why the two carrier divisions that did go to Midway were below strength. They never replaced the pilots they lost in the first six months of the war, in spite of the pool of about 2,000 carrier qualified pilots available.

Werner, Chuck,
Exactly my point the IJN system didn't allow for the flexibility the USN system did. Therefore the luck was earned.
C T

Since Japanese airwings are trained as a unit, they are also judged as a unit. In the mobile fleet the Zuikaku and shukaku were the newest carriers and their aircrews the most raw of the bunch. Throughout the fleet they were held in low regard and deemed to be substantially below the standards of the aircrews of the other 4 Pearl harbor carriers. This doesn't mean they were incompetent as later Japanese aircrews would be. But it does means that they were not considered to be practiced enough to achieve the sort of tactical coordination other early Japanese aircrews could pull off. And the Japanese did indeed prize tactical choreography. During the Pearl harbor attack the Zuikaku and Shukaku's planes mainly provided the mass, the squadrons from the other 4 carriers provided the elite striking power. The Coral sea operation was deemed to have been an opportunity give the aircrews of Zuikaku and Shukaku some much needed practice and bring them closer to the other carrier crews. Of course things didn't turn out that way.

The Japanese carrier force were highly elitist, and you can see in this environment how men of second rate units, having newly demonstrated their continued unworthiness by being shattered in Coral Sea, would not be openly welcomed by the rest of the mobile fleet's aircrews who think of themselves as considerably better than the best and has seen nothing but proof of their superiority in the war hitherto.

The Japanese could have added Zuikaku to Kido Butai, but Japanese doctrine made the smallest tactical unit the carrier division. Since her sister was out of action, Zuikaku sat this battle out. Also, pilots and air groups were organic to a carrier, and not entities of themselves. Therefore, they could not simply make a composite airgroup from the surviving aircraft and pilots of the two carriers.

If I can chime in here. This was after all only the second time surface units made up of carriers would clash. A lot of the doctrines developed during peacetime came into play and had a direct bearing on the out come of the battle.

The Coral Sea battle directly impacted on the Japanese plan for the fight at Midway the airgroup losses and battle damage repair left two front line carriers sitting at home during the Midway Operation. This reduced the striking ability of the IJN by 331/3 %. At the same time Yorktown returned to pearl was patched up and returned to fight at Midway with a replenished airgroup adding an additional 331/3% to the US Forces. Doctrine difference in Yard work and replenishment gives the advantage to the USN.

By design the IJN carriers did not warm up aircraft in hangers prior to launch because of poor ventilation of the hanger decks. The slap on decks of the US Carriers with their big barn doors did permit warm ups in the hanger so plane handling and launching could go faster. That same design flaw would allow for build ups of gas pockets in the hangers that would make one bomb hits infernoes on the IJN carriers. Advantage to the USN.

Inteligence was a big win for the USN. Helps to know the other guys plan. On the other hand the Japanese did not plan for what the USN was capable of doing but rather what they assumed they would do. Therefore the submarine scouting line was 48 hrs late or 24 hours late in its deployment. If you have the enemy reduced to one fleet base in your operating area a constant patrol line by that area or between that area and where you are going to operate is critical. If the IJN patrol line had spotted the Enterprise and Hornet on their sortie and simply radioed back the information the strke force would have been prepared. Even if they had been in position to spot Yorktown 24 hours later the warning would have been useful. The patrol line was in the right place but not prompt enough to support the operation. The USN patrol line was in place properly that is why the US sub got off her shot at the IJN carrier.

Tactical weapons doctrine was changed for the USN at Midway with the DB's being escorted to the target by the fighters.
At the Coral Sea they had taken the brunt of the IJN CAP and the torpedo bombers had the free pass. Doctrine was changed for Midway. The Japanese considered the Coral Sea a victory so they made no doctrinal changes in their SOP so the CAPs were not managed well enough for what they were going to face.

So yes luck entered into the battle of Midway but luck is a lot of small things done right adding up to opportunity.

Just my piece of change. Worth about 2 cents.
C T

The Japanese staff, like many managers, applied what I term "controlled model optimization" where control is exercised over all model variables such that the process followed is optimal I know how stupid that is from numerical global unconstrained non-linear optimization problems. Robustness and resistant structure from which applications can flow is far more important for statistical usage.

Good point�s bengtsson, I agree had they dispersed the fleet better and used good OPSEC as they did with Pearl Harbor then the outcome could have been different, at least for a year or two before the industrial might of the US would finally catching up.
Yamamoto needed the victory not so much as a stepping stone to the mainland US but for a negotiated peace.

�Yamamoto insisted that unless America could be forced swiftly to accept a negotiated settlement, Japan was ultimately doomed.�
http://worldwar2history.info/Midway/Yamamoto.html

Lesforan wrote:I think the problem lies in the planning of the operation. If you consider the number and types of ships involved, the Japanese could have come back the second day with close to the same force they applied on the first day.

The real problem was the complexity and distribution of the japanese forces. Rather than concentrate their power, it was divided into widely separated task forces that were unable to consolidate if needed. It was a plan that not only depended on surprise, but also on the Americans doing exactly as the Japanese expected them to. The common response to why the IJN did not regroup and counterattack was that oilers were not positioned to support a regrouping. This lack of planning for unplanned contingencies is the main reason for the japanese failure. Is that luck or skill?

Maybe we should call it Japanese "Lack of Skill"
Taking the Japanese plans into account, Japan's efforts were a case study in how not to use superior force to gain an objective. As I wrote above, the USN Intelligence credited the Japanese with better use of their four carriers than proved the case. The fact that the four were all commited to the same schedule in the same place at the same time and with no support from the rest of the IJN surface navy and smaller carriers, just was a foolish plan
To expect your enemy to follow the script is even more dangerous. The enemy always gets a vote in a battle.

Bob B.

I think the problem lies in the planning of the operation. If you consider the number and types of ships involved, the Japanese could have come back the second day with close to the same force they applied on the first day.

The real problem was the complexity and distribution of the japanese forces. Rather than concentrate their power, it was divided into widely separated task forces that were unable to consolidate if needed. It was a plan that not only depended on surprise, but also on the Americans doing exactly as the Japanese expected them to. The common response to why the IJN did not regroup and counterattack was that oilers were not positioned to support a regrouping. This lack of planning for unplanned contingencies is the main reason for the japanese failure. Is that luck or skill?

Obviously belladonna or other herbs containing high concentrations of tropane alkaloids are present in your tea. Exhibit Diocarpine 1% iv until symptoms subside.

Werner wrote:Chuck, I can't speak to your methodology, but I agree with your analysis 100%.

Man, this late night tea makes me read odd things!! Wonder what's its composition??

Chuck, I can't speak to your methodology, but I agree with your analysis 100%.

You need to take a longer view than just of the events on June 4th. Here is my view:

If I were to estimate the odds not in terms of score sheet tally of ships, but in terms of number of times when one side can be expected to prevail over the other in any long series of mutually independent replays of the same scenario, then I would say that looking forward from the beginning of May in 1942, the Japanese ought to have enjoyed a 50 to 1 odds of success in any upcoming confrontation in the central pacific in one month time. That is to say in May 1942, I would expect that if a fleet action were to occur in the central pacific in 1 month, then in 100 replays of that same action, the Japanese will prevail 98 times.

The cracking of JN-25 code whittled that odds from 50:1 to 10:1. That is if the US had cracked the operational codes the Japanese were using, then the same 100 replays would yield only 91 Japanese victories. Yamamoto's boneheaded deployment further reduced that to 3:1. Americans would win 25 times out of 100. Good US deployment reduced that to 1.5:1. Americans would win 40 times out of 100. Luck allowed USN to overcome the 1.5:1 odds on June 4, so the outcome was one of the 40.

So I would say American deployment and code cracking improved American odds by a factor of 10. Luck only improved American odds further by a factor of a mere 1.5. Luck allowed American forces to prevail against moderately heavy odds on June 4th. But it was skill and foresight that ensured that such odds as Americans would face on that day was only moderately heavy, and not pulverizingly overwhelming.

So it was more skill than luck overall.

So, getting back to the original question (in case anyone forgot it) which asked "luck or skill?", it would appear that luck--good for the USN, bad for the IJN--played by far the largest role of the two.

The rest of you have thus far articulated support for that conclusion.

One problem for Nagumo was the way the Carrier air groups were handled at Midway. By commiting all four carriers to 1/2 of their airgroups for the Midway strike and 1/2 in reserve for anti shipping strike was ,that all four carriers were thus commited to land on the returning Midway attack groups. With all four recovering planes, no carriers were free to operate against unforseen events.
The USN intelligence expected Nagumo to operate two carrier task forces. One would close Midway and commit full strikes against Midway. The other would ride North/West and provide cover for the Midway attack carriers. Fletcher was very worried about this type of attack. He expected to find the two Midway attack carriers, but was then left to worry about their two support carriers, each with full deckload strikes, cocked and ready to launch. I think the USN intelligence may have suspected a plan that was much better than the Japanese actually had.
Fletcher recieved reports of two Jap carriers for most the day, and believed he was up against just such a two task force operation. The USN plan to have task force 16 cocked and loaded for full strikes while task force 17 remained fairly flexible with searches, cap and smaller strikes seemed a much better plan than what Nagumo operated under.
ANy thoughts???

Bob B.

The impending return of his strike from Midway and the constant dribble of American attacks all morning pinned his attack force in the hangars. In addition, it retarded efforts to arm and fuel the planes (would you like to be manhandling a torpedo or 250Kg bomb while the carrier is undertaking radical maneuvers?)

As I said up top, when he launched his first strike he was already committed to receiving the first ever (and only) substantial attack on Kido Butai. They had to withstand that attack not knowing their enemy's strengths or weaknesses, and using tactics developed pre-War.

In this battle, tiny things like Thatch's unexpected new fighter tactics, or the Zero's defective radios made a huge difference for the Japanese. They were surprised at how tough the Americans were to shoot down, which was exacerbated by the pitifully small supply of cannon rounds on the Zero. This in turn kept the CAP cycling on the flight deck, which prevented spotting the anti-shipping strike.

We should not overlook the fact that Kido Butai was a day behind schedule. If Nagumo was going to neutralize Midway before the landing force arrived, he had to be focused on plastering it quickly.

As for the search plane, you really ought to shoot the guy in the adjacent sector, who flew above the clouds and right over the Americans on his outbound leg, leaving it to the late flying pilot to discover it while cutting a corner in his own search pattern to "catch up" with the schedule.

The idea of duel roles for the Japanese Carriers was certainly a huge flaw in the Japanese plan. The idea that you would attack a land target first and lose alot of aircraft to shoot downs and battle damage BEFORE you looked to engage the enemy Fleet is not a good way to go about it to my mind. Nagumo was ordered to hold half his aircraft for attack against a USN task force. That was a good idea, and with proper scouting by his float planes, Nagumo would have got that strike off in good time. So I'de shoot that idiot floatplane pilot.
In the case of Hiryu, when she survived the ambush and was able to launch her attack, she was way down in strike aircraft because of the Midway raid. This showed that the dual role concept was not a good idea. The aircraft she did launch were heavily attacked by USN fighters but still got 3 bombs and two torpedos on target. The USN task forces were flush with fighters, but most were onboard and not in the air. So with proper CAP, the Hiryu Japanese would have scored very little I think.
Without the special intelligence there would be no perfect ambush. The USN was lucky to get the Divebomber attacks to come in together. As Werener says, the handling of USN aircraft left alot to be desired.
Also, without radar the Japanese were way in the hole. How do you task the CAP without radar and proper radios? Not easily. That the Japanese did so good against the early air attacks tells alot about the skill of their pilots.

Bob B.

Japanese carrier surface attack doctrine was formulated around the notion that the primary target would be heavy surface ships like battleships, not carriers. Vals were outstanding in every respect except for bomb load. Indeed all Japanese carrier dive bombers suffers from weak bomb load. So Japanese dive bombers can not carry AP bombs large enough to penetrate horizontal protection on battleships (Arizona was destroyed by heavy AP bombs dropped from a high flying torpedo bomber, such attacks is not expected to be accurate enough to hit moving ships). This is why low flying torpedo bombers dropping actual torpedoes were given preference over dive bombers as a tool for attacking major surface formations.

If Nagumo had thrown his 2nd Midway strike against US carriers, they almost certainly would have inflicted decisive damage. But Japanese doctrine wanted torpedo bombers as if the US forces were centered on battleships.