The Ship Model Forum

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Sorry, but I thought you wanted strike capability for the battleship. 32 RGM-109s and 9 16” 50 guns does not a strike platform make, even with HE-ER Mark 148 rounds (which never went entered service). You have to have weapons and sensors that get the task force well away from littoral waters (500-1500 nm) and still kill targets *deep inland.*


The cost would be upwards of $500M per rocket, and frankly that is a cheap price to pay for the ability to knock out an Iranian nuclear launch site, or the ability to take down the North Korean electrical grid with a single shot on the day they start bombarding Seoul. Cost is always relative. What is the potential cost of putting a BB, CG, and a couple of DDGs with 20 nm of Iran during a conflict?



This is false. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) has a family of Hypersonics Weapons Technology programs and has had them for some time. You're thinking represents the way DoD weapons programs worked 20+ years-ago. Now, DoD tries to fund technology applicable to multiple services. Do you think that the Army Falcon Hypersonic HTV-2 has no funding lines tagged to USN, or USAF? The Navy, Air Force, Army, DARPA etc. are all working on hypersonic systems, and sharing data, and yes there are multiple funding lines that cross services. Example, the V-22 is a USMC program that has USAF funding lines (AFSOC has V-22s too).


I agree with the need for more missiles, and VLS is the most space efficient way to add a lot of them. Problem is, RGM-109s old technology, and lack the range to give U.S. forces the advantage. Going with the larger launcher gives you the ability to field more capable systems as they become available. This makes the BB more likely to stay in service, rather than get the axe when the Navy transitions to newer weapons.


As I see it there is zero will to re-commission BBs on the Hill, in the Pentagon, or even in the Navy. Giving them AEGIS would at least start a discussion.

Had this discussion with Bob off-line. You are comparing an apples to oranges – the add-on DDGs have other systems, like mine sweeping capability that is reflected in the costs. I bet if you look hard at the actual funding lines I bet you will find spares and all sorts of other goodies buried in them. The new DDGs are not simply a repeat buy. Its like buying a containership, *and* a gantry crane and complaining that the package cost was a lot more than the container ship sans crane you bought five years ago. Well, sure its going to cost more. You added a new capability.



No! A CVBG's principal air defense is its *air wing* not AEGIS!

A BB task force bereft of CAP (including the early warning and EW capabilities of a CVBG) is going to need *more* air defense than the same formation with a carrier!

And you are expecting the BB task force to operate within littorals, a significantly higher threat environment, while current operational planning is to try and keep a CVBG outside of 500 NM!?!

My point was that not that the BB should shoot down satellites, the idea was that ballistic missile launchers would give the fleet a capability to temporarily replace destroyed satellites. No other fleet assets has that capability – it would be a mission unique to the BB and a potentially compelling one (Air Sea Battle!)


How so? Why can't a second space be provided for strike ops in addition to CIC (eg the second gun plot room)? The CO does not have to baby sit everything. You would be shocked to see the size of the Coalition force ops center that directed 300K+ troops during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Why can't the BB do so?



We are at the point where we have to agree to disagree: BBs with existing technology and a few add on weapons are not going provide a significant increase in fleet strike capability, nor do they make a compelling case for re-commissioning. 32 TLAMS and 9 16” guns is not a significant strike capability.

If you are not willing to explore missiles, directed energy weapons, whatever; you are not going to get the deep strike capabilities called for in current operational planning.

The BBs are welded to the pier. If you do not come up with a way for them to add more to the fleet than NSFS, they will remain there.

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A CVBG has many tools to strike beyond 500 nm.

The greatest strike weapon of the CVBG is salvo launched Tomahawk missiles coming from its escorts and ever present SSN(s). Proven, effective, and having entered serial production - plentiful and cheap (for DoD). The problem is that the tomahawk is an aging weapons system, and even with upgrades, there is only so much more you do to increase range, speed, etc. without running into the constraints caused by its size (another plug for the larger MK57 VLS).

F/A-18 does have range issues. The C/D in the strike mode can carry ~13,000 lbs of ordinance, including extra fuel in drop tanks, which does extend the range. The E/F model brings significantly more internal fuel, range and the ability to loft a lot more ordinance and external fuel.

USN aircraft also have air-launched cruise missiles like SLAM-ER to extend their strike range.

Tanking is also possible from other carrier assets (another bad reason for the Navy to give up the S-3), but USN/USMC aircraft normally will not tank from USAF aircraft because of differences in equipment. USN/USMC use the hose and drogue system, and the USAF normally uses the boom. The USAF can use the hose and drogue system, but this is not preferred. You would have thought that DoD would have fixed this by now... jointness at its worst.

The ultimate Navy solution to carrier aircraft range issues is the X-47B/C.

Back on topic, I think the easiest way to make a BB a strike platform is to give them as many VLS systems as can be fitted. I would like to see over a hundred if possible.

Your assessment of USAF tanker refueling support for USN aircraft is rather dated. Many USAF tankers have wing "pods" for hose and drogue support for TWO USN aircraft at the same time. The USAF sticks with the boom system for the simple reason that it transfers fuel at a MUCH HIGHER rate than the hose and drogue system and less time is spent in refueling a large aircraft like a C-17, B-52, B-1B, or B-2, also for that matter F-15 and F-22 aircraft.

I suspect that USAF tanker support for the USN is pretty universal today and there are many airbases in the South Pacific region that can support USN missions (Japan and Guam). In a large scale "war" with China, assuming it doesn't go nuke, will see allied airbases and navy bases hit by Chinese Ballistic missiles. Pushing out our "forward" operating bases even further out ... aka Australia.

Great contributions everyone. Thanks. Bisto, I would invite you to go a few pages back and take a look at the modifications I have listed that address many of the issues you have talked about. There are some things you have said that are remarkably different from any reference material. For instance, As a brown, green, and blue small boat operator I can tell you that the Navy classified the "littorals" as a maximum of 35 miles from the shore. I am not sure where you have gotten your 500-1500nm numbe but I would like to know. Fifteen-hundred miles is the furthest reach of the USN's conventional influence. Please don't forget that 60-80% of the third world potential areas of interest are within 20-50nm of the coast. 100% of the targets that the 120+ TLAMs fired in Libya were within 25nm of the coast. Like I said, that is all within the range of large caliber (8 inches) naval gunner and certainly within 11, 13, and 16 inch. I see you said tomahawks are in plentiful supply. How many do you think we have? The tomahawk contract has ended, and will not be renewed so, no they are not in serial production.

Please take a look several pages back to see some of the modifications the USN was going to make to the Iowas between 1993 and 1996. The 8 ABLs are not in the picture and should not be considered in any discussion of modernization. This would have kept the battleships in a "capitol" role until their planned decommissioning as late as 2010.

_________________
Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

If you note, I did not say the USAF couldn't refuel USN/USMC aircraft, I noted that "The USAF can use the hose and drogue system, but this is not preferred."

First , "Many" is not the same as "All" - Refueling capability for USN/USMC aircraft it is not a universal capability for all USAF tankers (obviously the USAF has aircraft providing this service daily in support of Afghanistan).

Second, Flight Refueling Limited (FRL) MK32 pods do add hose and drogue capability, but they come with other issues which means that even those aircraft modified for this might not carry it unless the mission calls for it.

Third, USN and USMC cannot provide reciprocal tanker service to USAF aircraft - that is a great example of stove piped design and parochial service acquisition. It might be handy for a CVBG to provide this capability to ground based air assets.

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As someone who is currently building an updated New Jersey, whilst I don't have the technical know how to contribute, I'm finding this whole discussion fascinating

John

Bob, you are asking great questions and raising valid points, but you are overstating the range degradation issue WRT way points.

This has more to do with the aircraft chosen for the air wing, than the validity of the carrier as a strike platform. The loss of long range bombers like the A-6, F-14 "Bombcat", failure of the A-12 program have led to this sorry state of affairs. This all happened about the time, the Soviet Union had imploded, TACAIR reigned supreme, everyone wanted the “peace dividend”, and USN strike planners grumbled in the corner…

Aha! This is exactly what Captain Hughes sets up, but does not explicitely state, in his book on tactics! However, Another way to look at it is, the air wing protect the escorts, which in turn destroy the enemy C4ISR, which enables the air wing to conduct strikes, which make the escorts better able to control the battle space, which makes the air wing even more effective, etc....

Short answer is yes, the air wing can make worthwhile strikes at 500+ nm. Stick with combat radius instead of other terms. Again, the loss of long range bombers like the A-6, F-14 "Bombcat", failure of the A-12 make this a harder proposition the farther you try to extend the range of strike ops.

AEGIS was designed to be an integral component of CVBG defense, not the whole enchilada, or even the major component. CVBG air defenses are a designed to present an attacker with an integrated, layered, defense in depth, that is tough to beat. With early warning aircraft, CAP, EW etc., ideally, the outer layer of this defense is resilient enough to defeat an air raid/missile strike in and of itself. This has become less and less likely as the treat grows, hence the requirement for AEGIS. But the ability to start killing an air threat hundreds of miles away from the Task Force is unbelievably more effective than waiting for threats to come within SAM range.

I am a big believer in AirSea Battle. A few relevant points from AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/up ... Battle.pdf

“A few broad metrics might apply in thinking about candidates for divestment or significantly reduced procurement. First, certain kinds of forces would be essentially unusable due to their vulnerability during the early stages of a major conventional war against a high-end adversary, and would remain so for a prolonged period if the threats to them could not be mitigated. For example, land and sea-based short-ranged tactical strike aircraft might be unemployable early in such a conflict. Yet, by far the largest Program of Record acquisition program in the coming years is precisely to buy those kinds of assets. As another example, aircraft carriers remain useful platforms — but perhaps not for prompt strike operations as in the past. [emphasis added]” Pg 120

“The Navy should expedite developing, experimenting with, and fielding a carrier-based UCAS system [emphasis added] designed to operate either independently or in conjunction with manned platforms. [Pushes the combat radius of carrier strike aircraft beyond 1,000 nm (based on the X-47B) and gets the carrier back in the game]” Page 130

“The Air Force and Navy should jointly develop future-generation stealthy long-range land-attack cruise missiles capable of carrying a wide variety of payloads to replace today’s Tomahawk (TLAM) and Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM). [emphasis added. This is why Mk57 vls may become very relevant, as you noted, TLAM no longer as the range to play the strike game]” Page 130

“The Navy should consider investing in conventionally-armed, relatively short-range sea-based IRBMs to further complicate PLA planning. [sound familiar? An IRBM would be something on the order of 1,500-3000 nm] Depending on missile technical characteristics, both submarines and surface ships (not necessarily combatants) could serve as potential firing platforms. Ballistic missile striking power should be distributed across a large number of platforms similar to the way Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles distributed Navy strike power that had previously been concentrated in a small number of aircraft carriers. An ASBM variant should also be considered.” Page 83

AirSea Battle seems to suggest that CVBGs would be used to screen USAF tankers/C4ISR planes (really their operational areas) from enemy air superiority strikes, screen allied bases, and SLOCs from enemy ISR platforms, and to attrite enemy air superiority. After the enemy submarine threat is attrited, and his air defenses weakened, the carriers will begin to work more in their traditional strike roles.

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It isn’t really about speed, as much as it is like a shift of balance, or advantage. Remember, AirSea battle is an operational strategy against a major regional power (a hot war). Hopefully it will not become a war of attrition, but assuming neither side inflicts enough damage to immediately knock the other out, there is a momentum shift back and forth like a boxing match. What we want to do is to disrupt the enemy OODA loop and start landing blows the enemy cannot counter. Carrier air strikes in OEF are the longest in history ~900 nm each way (yes they tanked – a lot), but a CVBG starts to get frighteningly effective the closer it gets to its targets (there will be many), especially when aircraft get within range were they don’t have to tank, or make trade-offs in ordinance to get over the target(s).


Our goal is to make it *much, much harder* for the enemy to find us. Area increases by the square of distance and volume by the cube. This is why AirSea calls for staying out of enemy ISR range (roughly 1,000-1,600 nm) after the satellites go down. We want him to waste a lot of time and fuel trying to find our forces, and we want to kill those precious ISR assets and air superiority fighters that come out to look for us,. Then sucker him into salvoing weapons on non-existing ships and aircraft using EW and every dirty trick we can. And we want to keep hammering those C4ISR assets.

IF AEGIS were as effective as you think, there would be no need for CAP, E2s, etc.. Aegis is an excellent system, but its not that good.


LCS is an abomination, but I think the real criticism is focused on the F-35 in all of its flavors.

You fight with what you have, and you have to fight the wars against the enemy you are actually fighting. I find it hard to believe that at least one of the services USMC, USAF, Navy, whoever, has not bought a few squadrons of inexpensive CAS aircraft like an EMB-314 to operate in permissive airspace in places like Afghanistan, Somalia, whatever. You don’t need an F-16, F/A-18, to strafe, or bomb irregular forces, or insurgents in those environments. They would have paid for themselves a dozen times over by now.

We have focused on the loss of carriers, but forget that we are not increasing carrier air wings either. And those air wings would be a lot more effective if they had a good mission tanker, and a long range strike aircraft like the X-47B. The F-35C will help somewhat with strike range, and a lot more with stealth, but until there is some aircraft with a ~1,000 nm combat radius, or at least a a buy of some flavor of ALCM, this is a big issue.


I note that AirSea postulates non-traditional rolls for the CVBGs at the onset of hostilities, but perhaps a shift to more traditional strike rolls as the war goes on. SSGNs cannot fulfill those roles. Screening an area so that USAF tankers and C2 aircraft can operate and support deep strikes is pretty radical stuff for the Navy. Telling the Air Force that it needs to support the Navy with patrol, maritime strike and counter mining assets is equally as radical. And that is the tip of the iceberg! Funny thing is; the CNO, USAF Chief of Staff, bought into this! Question is, will DoD and Congress fund it when the inevitable budget crunch happens?

Were I SECNAV, I would be spending a lot of capitol trying to procure submarines of all flavors, potentially even conventional boats (Sweden, Germany, Japan have some great boats that could be deployed around choke points). SSGNs are wonderful strike platforms, but SSNs carry tomahawk as well.

I think if the Navy wants other assets to play, it is going to need to “…rethink its current inventory of missiles, jammers, and decoys.” August 2010 What's New About the AirSea Battle Concept? http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2010-08/whats-new-about-airsea-battle-concept

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navydave,

I know you think I am being a jerk, but I am simply trying to point out that without some significant modifications, the BBs are not strike platforms, and will not have a significant roll in current strategic, or operational thinking – which is defined in AirSea Battle.

You seem glued to the outdated “From the Sea" doctrine. An operational mind set, which was driven by the USMC in a post Soviet Union world where the U.S. had no peer competitor, and major regional powers had very limited capabilities to conduct effective operations beyond their borders.

The world we live in today is very, very, different: we now have a peer competitor, and several major regional powers do have the ability to project power well beyond their borders, and to control/deny approaches at great distances from their shores. This is why AirSea Battle has been created. The two services least likely to cooperate (Navy and Air Force) have agreed (in principal) on a new operational doctrine to address the operational requirements called for by the Geographic Unified Commanders, specifically PACOM and CENTCOM. This has been blessed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.



I have been a strike planner. I am not attempting to define, or redefine littorals – a term the Navy had a lot of trouble defining. The 500-1,500 nm, range comes up when we are looking at CVBG strike ranges. This is relevant to the BB debate because AirSea battle postulates conditions where a CVBG may not be able to operate. And if CVBGs may not be able to operate, how can you possibly assert that a BB battle group can operate in this environment?

“Operationally, PLA military writings suggest that China’s evolving reconnaissance-strike networks are designed to: Threaten major US Navy surface forces out to 1200+ nm, thereby pushing aircraft carriers far beyond the maximum unrefueled ranges of their current and projected strike aircraft (with the notable exception of Navy UCAS) and surface warships beyond the range of their land-attack cruise missiles (LACM);” Page 37 http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/2010.05.18-AirSea-Battle.pdf

Take a look at the map on page 22 of http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/2010.05.18-AirSea-Battle.pdf

“A few broad metrics might apply in thinking about candidates for divestment or significantly reduced procurement. First, certain kinds of forces would be essentially unusable due to their vulnerability during the early stages of a major conventional war against a high-end adversary, and would remain so for a prolonged period if the threats to them could not be mitigated. For example, land and sea-based short-ranged tactical strike aircraft might be unemployable early in such a conflict. Yet, by far the largest Program of Record acquisition program in the coming years is precisely to buy those kinds of assets. As another example, aircraft carriers remain useful platforms — but perhaps not for prompt strike operations as in the past.” AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, Pg 120, http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/2010.05.18-AirSea-Battle.pdf

Are we selling what we make, or making what we sell?

This is absolutely irrelevant and almost directly from the *dead* “From the Sea” strategy.

We are not interested in bombing the coast of Basil. We are interested in deterring China, Iran, NK, etc.. Targets in those countries are *not within 20–50 nm* of the coast, and these countries have sophisticated, layered defenses.

Take a look at the map on page 59 and tell me how you are going to reach those targets with guns? http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/2010.05.18-AirSea-Battle.pdf

Now look at a map of Iran, etc..


Is Libya a representative scenario?

Is Libya applicable to the fight that, if it comes, we have to win in Iran? Really?!?

Is Afghanistan within the range of a battleship? What about Iraq? You are disproving your own thesis.


I made no statement about TLAMs other than they entered serial production. The U.S. has produced over 3500 of the things, which is certainly is serial production.


Why? What the navy was *thinking about doing* in 1996 is not relevant to 2012 and beyond.

Battleships in the 21st century are not strike platforms, strategic assets, or capitol ships.

When Congress last revisited the fate of the Iowas, it was to decide to activate them as NGFS platforms, principally to support amphibious operations, or to otherwise dispose of them. This was prompted by the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, who publishes a call for NSFS in Joint Fires to the JCS with the document: “Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals, May 31, 2005. From the GAO study: “Issues Related to Navy Battleships” GAO-06-279R December 13, 2005:

“Specifically, we identified (1) mission requirements established by the Department of Defense (DOD) for fire support to expeditionary operations [emphasis added].” and how DOD officials view these needs and the ability of the battleships and current and planned capabilities to meet these requirements, and (2) cost factors that should be considered in evaluating whether to sustain, reactivate, modernize or delist the battleships.”

“To determine DOD requirements for fire support for expeditionary operations in the littorals [emphasis added], we reviewed DOD requirements documents and identified current and planned capabilities. We also held discussions with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Chief, Naval Operations, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, the Navy’s Inactive Ships Management Office, and the U.S. Joint Forces Command to obtain their views on existing and planned joint fires capabilities, the adequacy of these plans, and the ability of battleships to perform the fire support mission [emphasis added].”

Nobody is calling the BBs “strike platforms.” Nobody is calling for any role for BBs except NGFS. And This is the reason that the BBs are, and will remain *welded to the pier.*

If you want to make the BBs relevant to current strategy and operational thinking; they will have to fulfill some of the missions called upon by AirSea battle and carry weapons like:

“ future-generation stealthy long-range land-attack cruise missiles capable of carrying a wide variety of payloads to replace today’s Tomahawk (TLAM) and Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM). AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, Page 130 http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/up ... Battle.pdf

“conventionally-armed, relatively short-range sea-based IRBMs to further complicate PLA planning. ... An ASBM variant should also be considered. AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, Pg 83 http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/up ... Battle.pdf

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If I made add something from my Strategic Studies program: what I'm seeing here is the opposing views on weapons and their role in tactics-operations-strategy-policy hierarchy. Busto feels that weapons should be made/procured/reactivated based on the strategy that the country has developed to fulfil policy requirements, whereas Dave feels that weapons should be procured/reactivated based purely for their tactical and operational merits.

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De quoi s'agit-il?

Hey, everyone, thanks for the patience. I have been enjoying a very busy leave since this conversation got started. Otherwise I would have been a little more active in it!

Aww, you're so sweet.

First off, I have to apologize for having written so much. There is too much to cover, and I have already lost my post more than once (damn you Internet Explorer!!!)

Just to start this off right despite what the AirSea Battle doctrine might say, the US Navy says that any ship carrying TLAMs is a strike platform. Even fitted for the 1980s, the Iowas are strike platforms. You must keep in mind that, in the 1980s, they were not only strike platforms, but they were nuclear strike platforms.

However, I agree, pretty significant but feasible modifications would have to be made to accommodate a large number of TLAMs.

Next, and most important, could you please repost the link you had up earlier for the AirSea Battle document? The link has gone dead, and I was not able to download it in time. I would really appreciate it. I look forward to being able to read the entire thing. I am very curious what the future strategic outlook may be.

I agree! That's why I asked you to look back a few pages. With as much time as you are willing to spend typing I thought you would be happy to read over some of the existing thread. There is great value in seeing what the Navy planned (and authorized) to do with the Iowas. It illustrates what is feasible with the structure. I have since consulted with the Iowa Modernization project manager about what else was feasible, and I have made a final fit. I have already established that a large number of Mk41 VLS would have to be installed aboard the ship to give it a heavy significant strategic value and a greater than "Alpha Strike" capability. Norman Friedman stated that an Alpha Strike is 100 tomahawk land attack cruise missiles (TLAM). The Navy had planned to install 96 Mk41 Mod1 VLS for TLAM in the 1990s. I have consulted with that project manager, and 160 cells is feasible with minimal displacement of existing accommodations. Other structure would have to be ballooned from the existing structure to accommodate the displacement of existing facilities.

I am not glued to any doctrine. I am in favor of the tactical realities of what happens on the ground. The "Forward from the Sea" was simply a statement saying that the Navy had shifted its focus from fighting Soviet groups on the high seas to delivering ordnance on the shore. From your presentation, it sounds like that is exactly what the AirSea Battle does as well. It just incorporates more factors and safety zones. Currently, carrier groups operate much closer than 500 miles to the target/potential target areas right now. The AirSea Battle restrictions obviously do not apply as of now.

carr recapped my points well, and TimmyC made a very good point. The AirSea battle is clearly a very large scale Strategic vision. Just because the US all of a sudden perceives a peer competitor does not mean anything has changed. It only means that the head has been pulled out of the sand, and "all future conflicts" are no longer low-intensity conflicts as some have claimed. The realities of operations in Libya where we expended over $250 million in TLAMs, blew about 15% of the fixed inventory. We have ongoing operations in Somalia and other coastal African countries where our DDGs and CGs have been called to perform NSFS. The SEALs who have called in the 5" gunfire on enemy positions and troops speak very, very poorly about the accuracy and effect of 5" gunfire. They called for naval gunfire, because there were no carriers around. There were no bombers around. There were no AC-130s around. Nothing but a ship was able to get in range. SEALs speak very poorly of TLAMs for support as well. They take so long to arrive on station that the enemy has already moved to a new/unknown position since the call for fire was initiated.

This calls for an off topic solution to NGFS. The long-term solution to the NGFS problem is not battleships or AGS, TACTOM or TACAIR. The long-term solution to the NSFS problem is the Mk71 MCLWG. The Mk71 8" gun operates like the Mk45 5" guns, and it fires a projectile that is big enough to offer maximum versatility in precision and extended range capabilities. The Mk71 is small enough to be installed on all new combatants, and it only requires the same manning as a Mk45 5" gun.

The last time the HASC examined battleship reactivation it was at the behest of the USNFSA, and they were focused on NGFS (now known as NSFS). Now it's time to step outside of the box. NSFS needs to be only one aspect of the battleship's focus. I know you believe this to be an old view point, but being old does not make it invalid or any less true. Sixty to 80% of the Third World targets of interest are still within 20-50 nm of the coast. This is a fact. The Afghanistan campaign is not, nor is the Iraqi campaign, but a majority of the rest are. These areas of interest either draw aircraft carriers from other needed campaigns and leave other areas without needed carrier attention, or they get a small group of escort ships to stand in for the carrier. Again, as I have said before, a battleship cannot equal all of the capabilities of an aircraft carrier, but its gunnery (mainly) and missile capabilities can fill a gap in striking power.

For example there is a tremendous gulf between the striking ability of a CSG and the same group without the carrier. The small group of escort ships cannot lay out nearly as much ordnance as the group with the carrier. The gulf of ordnance delivery capability is too big for mission accomplishment or economic mission accomplishment. However, when a battleship is introduced to the same group, the entire game changes. The battleship brings 6,000 5" rounds with a range of 13-20nm (if BTERM is completed it will extend the range to 40+nm with GPS guidance), the battleship will embark 124-156 TLAMs, and the main battery will bring the equivillant of upto 1,200 500lb JDAMs to the group. Between 20nm and 50nm will be subject to rapid delivery of 500lb JDAMs.

I understand people want to count on hypersonic weapons and ballistic missiles, but the fact that hypersonic missiles are being lumped in with ballistic missiles reduces the credibility of the feasibility of hypersonic missiles. If there is a single thing that will be dropped from the AirSea Battle, it is going to be the pursuit of conventional ballistic missiles. I agree with carr when he says that firing ballistic missiles at a power armed with nuclear weapons is dangerous. Historically, ballistic missiles are for delivering WMDs, specifically nuclear weapons, and coming from us, definitely nuclear weapons. There would be too much confusion if those ballistic missiles, especially Tridents like you suggested, started arcing through the air.

The use of ballistic missiles is politically, strategically, and tactically infeasible, because it invites a nuclear response.

Aircraft carriers are very valuable, but their firepower is required in too many places for their numbers. There are too many places requiring their firepower that are close enough to the coast for naval gunnery to strike.

The reality you don't seem to be acknowledging is that the carrier fleet is being thinned so badly that we cannot do what you say. We can't do what the AirSea Battle wants them to do. The US Navy cannot even do what it needs to do, because there are not going to be enough carriers to fill the basic mission.

So, in the vacuum formed by not having enough carriers, it is too easy to find other, cheaper ships to fill some part of the vacuum created. The question is:
The carrier is not going to be there. What would you rather be there?
The answer is the battleship. Yes, they can carry a huge number of tomahawk cruise missiles, but that's not what makes them most valuable. Their most valuable aspect is that they can deliver or threaten to deliver (deterrence) an enormous quantity of ordnance on such a large number of targets when otherwise there would be little or nothing.


So, the fit of the Iowa-class battleships would be:

Exploitation of 11" and 13" subcaliber projectiles extending the range of the 16" guns to 75nm (13") with GPS and possibly laser guidance.

6 x Mk45 Mod2/4 5/62caliber mounts. Replacement of the 5"/38 caliber guns with Mk45 Mod1/2 guns in storage from the Spruance-class and upgunned with the Mod4 5"/62caliber kit.

128-160 x Mk41 VLS tubes for TLAM and ESSM quad pack

3 x RAM launchers

2 x Phalanx CIWs mounts

NULKA and SRBOC decoys

LHD communications suite. This would bring the battleship's communication suite up to modern capabilities. Most importantly it would enable it to communicate with all adjacent forces on the ground and enable it to control up to 12 UAVs at a time.

Reduced LHD electronics package. This would be to remove many of the air traffic control radars from the fit but retain the air picture awareness.

Here is a basic shipbucket representation of the fit I will model.

Here is the last iteration of my original modernized Iowa. I hope to follow a similar path early this coming year.


So, Busto, does that help clarify anything or sway you any further toward the utility of the battleship? If not, some of my earlier posts make pretty good cases that address what you have already stated.

_________________
Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

G'day Mate,
With your shipbucket image I take it you have VLS between the Funnels?? what sort of clearances are required by the missiles during the launch sequence?? Also what is the aft deck house??

Was going to make a comment about what would result from the Tactical use of Ballistic missiles but you beat me to it!!

Cheers N merry Beer'mas

Bruce

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building:
1/72 RC USS LONG BEACH CGN9
1/72 RC USS CALIFORNIA CGN36
1/72 RC USS SAIPAN LHA2
1/72 RC USS JOHN PAUL JONES DDG53
1/72 RC USS SHARK SSN591
1/72 RC USS SEAWOLF SSN21
1/72 RC USS ALBANY CG10

Hey, Bruce!

The VLS between the stacks is in the same place the ABLs used to be. If you were to look straight down on the structure, you would see that the VLS arrangements are on the port and starboard sides of the structure just like the port and starboard sets of ABLs. There are no clearance issues.

The aft deck house is for UAV storage and maintenance.

I hope you're doing well, Bruce! Thanks for chiming in!

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Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

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