You are most welcome.
By coincidence, I happen to be reading about these CVE's in the new Lengerer book (pricey, but full of info:
https://daviddoylebooks.com/nonus-ships ... y-volume-2 ). One point is that these ships were all equipped with arrestor cables, contrary to some reports.
Two other things become apparent as to their relative ineffectiveness as combat units.
One is their low top speed of 21-22 knots. This limited the size of the strike group that could be launched at any given time. A slower top end meant that more flight deck length was needed for takeoff, which in turn meant less attack planes could be spotted for a strike. I can't find actual numbers, but I suspect six B5N2s might be the maximum number of attack aircraft that could be spotted for launch. Plus some fighters.
Compare that with some of the strike packages launched from Ryujo, which was a comparatively sized ship with a slightly shorter flight deck, but 7-8 knots greater top speed at 29 knots. Her first wave in the attack on the Aleutians was composed of 15 B5Ns and 3 Zeros.
The other point, which is probably even more critical, is the lack of experienced, qualified pilots for these ships. Given the limited parameters of the Japanese pilot training programs, there were too few new pilots with adequate training coming online even by late 1942. Any good newbie was siphoned off to the fleet carriers. Those sent to the CVEs had to continue their training onboard, when circumstances allowed it. As in when these ships were not acting as aircraft transports.
The Lengerer book gives an example aboard Taiyo early in 1942 when two Zeros were lost with their pilots in good weather and calm conditions, when both planes missed the arrestor cables upon landing. Not sure these just crashed, or just went over the side.
Just thought it was interesting to note.