Anonymous wrote:Werner, with your logic why not compare Dreadnaught to Augmemnon? They were launched with in months of eachother.
zach b
Dreadnought is a clear break with Agamemnon, having such new features as turbines and all big guns, neither possessed by the Agamemnon.
Iowa started from Chantry's South Dakota and is obviously the design child of the same ideas.
W
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.
The Yamatos incorporated some of all the poll options, I believe.
Significant advance in terms of weight of broadside, thickness of armor protection, and design ambition.
End of the road because, well, they WERE the end of the road for Japanese battleship design.
They were certainly lacking in details, aside from long-distance gunnery it's the details like electronics fit that doom them in modern "Versus" discussions.
And to say they weren't significant to modelers ignores modelers.
I have always wondered if any of the WW11 American Battleships had shock/resililent mountings for the machinery. Does anybody know, and if yes can they give a reference?
The USN warships incorporated mild steel shock devices, but I do not believe any were tested beyond the 500 pound limits specified by the general board.
USN ships would have been no better then RN ships like Belfast. The first ship seriously designed with these stresses in mind was DL 1 Norfolk, which probably would have had it's engineering plant survive destruction of the hull.
W
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.
zach b wrote:Not true. Iowas are another generation in ship design, their w/t compartments scheme is different, armor thickness, hull design, and immunity zones are quite different. Her design played off the errors learned on the NC and the SoDak. As far as a first generation post Washington treaty ship goes, NC is a very conservative approach, especially when compared to her true contemperies, like Bismark and Yamato. I am only talking of the hull form, from where I stand Yamatos hull form is ahead of even Iowa.
Just to set the record straight on this, I have attached two sections. The left one is South Dakota, the right is Iowa. Please show me the revolution in design represented in Iowa....
W
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.
Werner wrote:
Just to set the record straight on this, I have attached two sections. The left one is South Dakota, the right is Iowa. Please show me the revolution in design represented in Iowa....
W
Iowa plated over the top of the torpedo bulge?
Assessing the impact of new area rug under modeling table.
chuck fan wrote:Iowa plated over the top of the torpedo bulge?
Actually, the unit machinery arrangements of South Dakota is an advance on the alternating arrangements of Iowa.
Like St. Louis vs Cleveland, the later ships represent a retreat from the superior arrangement of the 1938 ships in the name of production.
The BuShips' preferred arrangements are to be seen in the final generation: Montana, Midway and Des Moines.
W
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.
What's interesting about the Yamato is a design almost destined to capsize after torpedo damage. The British examined USN practice and concluded that future RN warships (Colossus and Majestic to start) should be built without wing or centerline watertight bulkheads. If a holding side bulkhead is penetrated, the ship should be allowed to flood across the centerline to preserve the ship's righting arm.
There is a statistic which shows the vast majority of Japanese warships sank by capsizing. Yamato's beam would have exaggerated this tendency.
W
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.
Werner wrote:What's interesting about the Yamato is a design almost destined to capsize after torpedo damage. The British examined USN practice and concluded that future RN warships (Colossus and Majestic to start) should be built without wing or centerline watertight bulkheads. If a holding side bulkhead is penetrated, the ship should be allowed to flood across the centerline to preserve the ship's righting arm.
There is a statistic which shows the vast majority of Japanese warships sank by capsizing. Yamato's beam would have exaggerated this tendency.
W
That Yamato capsized eventually should not be used to indicate her excessive tendency towards capsizing. She was in fact extraordinarily resistent to capsizing. She recieved 9 torpedos on one side before capsizing. Iowa without center bulkhead is thought to be able to resist only 5 similar hits before capsizing.
Assessing the impact of new area rug under modeling table.
Both Yamato and Musashi capsized. The RN concluded centerline or other inboard watertight longitudinal bulkheads were more of a menace to life and limb than justified on the basis of protecting the ship's life.
Design data for Yamato's turrets imply that a list of slightly more than 5 degrees was about the maximum under which the battery could train. Japanese arrangements were also notorious for inability to return to battery at high angles. I am sure Yamato would have been no exception.
Shinano capsized completely as well, floating for a while with her bottom high and dry.
W
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.
Werner wrote:Both Yamato and Musashi capsized. The RN concluded centerline or other inboard watertight longitudinal bulkheads were more of a menace to life and limb than justified on the basis of protecting the ship's life.
Design data for Yamato's turrets imply that a list of slightly more than 5 degrees was about the maximum under which the battery could train. Japanese arrangements were also notorious for inability to return to battery at high angles. I am sure Yamato would have been no exception.
W
Mushashi didn't sink bacause she capsized. She capsized because she was already plunging. When a ship is in Mushashi's way, whole bow submerged and rest of the ship very low, the righting moment becomes almost non-existent and even a slight amount of list moment can turn her over.
The fact that Yamato capsized in extremis does not change the fact that what took her to extremis would have sank most other battleships twice over. That fact really is the measure of her resistence, not how she finally succumbed after taking more than her share of damage.
Assessing the impact of new area rug under modeling table.
Shinano isn't a fair comparison, she had virtually zero damage control. Yamato and Musashi took how many bomb and torpedo hits before sinking??? No ship could take that sort of pounding and survive. I don't think the Enterprise and Forrestal incidents are comparable BTW, I expect that you'll raise them.
Marty wrote:Yamato and Musashi took how many bomb and torpedo hits before sinking???
Somehow I fail to appreciate "Yeah, she was sunk on a useless mission, but look at how much hits it took" as a maior virtue.
I might be mistaken, but acting as a shell/bomb/torpedo sponge doesn't seem to be an obvious principle by which any design should be guided.
Jorit
Yamato and Musashi's proven ability to absorb bombs and torpedos is a astonishing tribute to its design. Somehow your ostentatious display of scepticism seem to occur in a manner particularly choosen and directed to support an somewhat non-sceptical view.
Assessing the impact of new area rug under modeling table.
It seems pretty obvious to me that Musashi was only partially effective by 1200 and by 1430 was headed to the bottom irrespective of the additional damage suffered after that time. The very first torpedo hit put her director system out of action at 1029 and by 1430 all available counterflooding spaces had been filled. The score at 1430 was 8 torpedo and 8 bomb hits (4 of each before noon and 4 of each after noon). This is a spectacular amount of punishment, but every thing after this point only moves the hour of sinking forward a few minutes.
It is also arguable that the damage before 1200 was fatal given the distance to any repair base.
W
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.
chuck fan wrote:
Yamato and Musashi's proven ability to absorb bombs and torpedos is a astonishing tribute to its design. Somehow your ostentatious display of scepticism seem to occur in a manner particularly choosen and directed to support an somewhat non-sceptical view.
I guess I'm a segmented sceptic rather than a part-time one...
Werner wrote:It seems pretty obvious to me that Musashi was only partially effective by 1200 and by 1430 was headed to the bottom irrespective of the additional damage suffered after that time. The very first torpedo hit put her director system out of action at 1029 and by 1430 all available counterflooding spaces had been filled. The score at 1430 was 8 torpedo and 8 bomb hits (4 of each before noon and 4 of each after noon). This is a spectacular amount of punishment, but every thing after this point only moves the hour of sinking forward a few minutes.
It is also arguable that the damage before 1200 was fatal given the distance to any repair base.
W
Shock damage to a director can hardly be used as a guage for a ship's fundamental structural survivability. The fact that all counterflooding space was filled does not doom the ship. Yamato class was designed to remain navigable and survivable when all spaces outside the citadel are filled. Mushashi came very close to demonstrating this design goal was achieved. It is arguable that but for some minor design weaknesses which are present in all battleships, but which in most cases could have been fixed with relatively minor modifications had combat experience and spare time been available, Mushashi would have had a shot of surviving to reach port even after >20 torpedo hits.
Assessing the impact of new area rug under modeling table.
California, in no materal condition to absorb an attack at Pearl took one torpedo and three bombs, and still took hours to settle on the bottom.
Musashi's performance in retaining her qualities as a fighting unit is what is important and not how many torpedoes and bombs it took to finish her. After 1030 she was a liability to her commander's plans and not an asset. By shortly after lunch she was a goner. The very first torpedo put her gun fire control system out of action.
Counterflooding machinery spaces achieved the same results as if the centerline bulkheads had not been installed and the machinery space divided into smaller (transverse) compartments. In this way the ship would not have had as severe a listing problem and could have remained effective longer.
W
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.
Any ship, whatever Navy it belongs, taking 3-4 or more torpedo hits on the same side will obviously capsize and sunk!!! Yamato and Musashi were indeed no exception...they took a too big toll of torpedoes then any other ship could ever survived.
"Build few and build fast,
Each one better than the last"
John Fisher
Marty wrote:"South Dakota was, after all, an attempt to accomodate 16-inch protection on the 35,000 ton North Carolina design (which was protected against the 14-inch originally planned). "
Werner, where do you come to this conclusion????? South dakota was a response to Congressional screams of agony over the cost of the North Carolinas, a more compact engineering plant with a smaller citadel, they sacrificed some speed and range to do it.
Marty
I've have to agree with Werner. The North Carolina class was designed with - and built to withstand - 14in guns. It wasn't until late in the design phase that the US decided to arm these ships with 16in guns - much to the Royal Navy's dismay, since they had decided to stay with the 14in gun for the KGV class. The SoDak class was a designed from the start as an improvement of the NCs and to be resistant to 16" gunfire within the 35,000 treaty limit. The compact size was the result of the heavier armor scheme...not because Congress wanted to save money.
IIRC, South Dakota was considered the ultimate treaty battleship because of her combination of armor and hitting power. Her biggest drawback was her top speed - one of the reasons the class wasn't kept in service or dramatically upgraded post war.
Martin
"Tomorrow is the most important thing in life. Comes into us at midnight very clean. It's perfect when it arrives and it puts itself in our hands. It hopes we've learned something from yesterday." John Wayne
