Lesforan wrote:I think the problem lies in the planning of the operation. If you consider the number and types of ships involved, the Japanese could have come back the second day with close to the same force they applied on the first day.
The real problem was the complexity and distribution of the japanese forces. Rather than concentrate their power, it was divided into widely separated task forces that were unable to consolidate if needed. It was a plan that not only depended on surprise, but also on the Americans doing exactly as the Japanese expected them to. The common response to why the IJN did not regroup and counterattack was that oilers were not positioned to support a regrouping. This lack of planning for unplanned contingencies is the main reason for the japanese failure. Is that luck or skill?
Maybe we should call it Japanese "Lack of Skill"
Taking the Japanese plans into account, Japan's efforts were a case study in how not to use superior force to gain an objective. As I wrote above, the USN Intelligence credited the Japanese with better use of their four carriers than proved the case. The fact that the four were all commited to the same schedule in the same place at the same time and with no support from the rest of the IJN surface navy and smaller carriers, just was a foolish plan
To expect your enemy to follow the script is even more dangerous. The enemy always gets a vote in a battle.
Good point�s bengtsson, I agree had they dispersed the fleet better and used good OPSEC as they did with Pearl Harbor then the outcome could have been different, at least for a year or two before the industrial might of the US would finally catching up.
Yamamoto needed the victory not so much as a stepping stone to the mainland US but for a negotiated peace.
The Japanese staff, like many managers, applied what I term "controlled model optimization" where control is exercised over all model variables such that the process followed is optimal I know how stupid that is from numerical global unconstrained non-linear optimization problems. Robustness and resistant structure from which applications can flow is far more important for statistical usage.
Gernot Hassenpflug
Find out how it works, then functionality and limits
If I can chime in here. This was after all only the second time surface units made up of carriers would clash. A lot of the doctrines developed during peacetime came into play and had a direct bearing on the out come of the battle.
The Coral Sea battle directly impacted on the Japanese plan for the fight at Midway the airgroup losses and battle damage repair left two front line carriers sitting at home during the Midway Operation. This reduced the striking ability of the IJN by 331/3 %. At the same time Yorktown returned to pearl was patched up and returned to fight at Midway with a replenished airgroup adding an additional 331/3% to the US Forces. Doctrine difference in Yard work and replenishment gives the advantage to the USN.
By design the IJN carriers did not warm up aircraft in hangers prior to launch because of poor ventilation of the hanger decks. The slap on decks of the US Carriers with their big barn doors did permit warm ups in the hanger so plane handling and launching could go faster. That same design flaw would allow for build ups of gas pockets in the hangers that would make one bomb hits infernoes on the IJN carriers. Advantage to the USN.
Inteligence was a big win for the USN. Helps to know the other guys plan. On the other hand the Japanese did not plan for what the USN was capable of doing but rather what they assumed they would do. Therefore the submarine scouting line was 48 hrs late or 24 hours late in its deployment. If you have the enemy reduced to one fleet base in your operating area a constant patrol line by that area or between that area and where you are going to operate is critical. If the IJN patrol line had spotted the Enterprise and Hornet on their sortie and simply radioed back the information the strke force would have been prepared. Even if they had been in position to spot Yorktown 24 hours later the warning would have been useful. The patrol line was in the right place but not prompt enough to support the operation. The USN patrol line was in place properly that is why the US sub got off her shot at the IJN carrier.
Tactical weapons doctrine was changed for the USN at Midway with the DB's being escorted to the target by the fighters.
At the Coral Sea they had taken the brunt of the IJN CAP and the torpedo bombers had the free pass. Doctrine was changed for Midway. The Japanese considered the Coral Sea a victory so they made no doctrinal changes in their SOP so the CAPs were not managed well enough for what they were going to face.
So yes luck entered into the battle of Midway but luck is a lot of small things done right adding up to opportunity.
Just my piece of change. Worth about 2 cents.
C T
With ten such as these I'll march out through the back of Hell
The Japanese could have added Zuikaku to Kido Butai, but Japanese doctrine made the smallest tactical unit the carrier division. Since her sister was out of action, Zuikaku sat this battle out. Also, pilots and air groups were organic to a carrier, and not entities of themselves. Therefore, they could not simply make a composite airgroup from the surviving aircraft and pilots of the two carriers.
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.
Since Japanese airwings are trained as a unit, they are also judged as a unit. In the mobile fleet the Zuikaku and shukaku were the newest carriers and their aircrews the most raw of the bunch. Throughout the fleet they were held in low regard and deemed to be substantially below the standards of the aircrews of the other 4 Pearl harbor carriers. This doesn't mean they were incompetent as later Japanese aircrews would be. But it does means that they were not considered to be practiced enough to achieve the sort of tactical coordination other early Japanese aircrews could pull off. And the Japanese did indeed prize tactical choreography. During the Pearl harbor attack the Zuikaku and Shukaku's planes mainly provided the mass, the squadrons from the other 4 carriers provided the elite striking power. The Coral sea operation was deemed to have been an opportunity give the aircrews of Zuikaku and Shukaku some much needed practice and bring them closer to the other carrier crews. Of course things didn't turn out that way.
The Japanese carrier force were highly elitist, and you can see in this environment how men of second rate units, having newly demonstrated their continued unworthiness by being shattered in Coral Sea, would not be openly welcomed by the rest of the mobile fleet's aircrews who think of themselves as considerably better than the best and has seen nothing but proof of their superiority in the war hitherto.
Assessing the impact of new area rug under modeling table.
chuck wrote:The Japanese carrier force were highly elitist, and you can see in this environment how men of second rate units, having newly demonstrated their continued unworthiness by being shattered in Coral Sea, would not be openly welcomed by the rest of the mobile fleet's aircrews who think of themselves as considerably better than the best and has seen nothing but proof of their superiority in the war hitherto.
Perhaps that's why the two carrier divisions that did go to Midway were below strength. They never replaced the pilots they lost in the first six months of the war, in spite of the pool of about 2,000 carrier qualified pilots available.
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.
Airgroups tied to individual ships was a huge drawback in the IJN Airforce system. The USN could train and move groups around indpendent of the Carrier itself. The IJN system was great as long as no battle casualties occured. Highly unlikely in a World War. Look at how Yorktown's aircraft complement was brought up to speed so very quickly after Coral Sea. The ship is a flight deck that can move, the japanese didn't make the connection that the carrier is just a mobile airfield. There is NO need for individual ships to own an airgroup as it were.
By the way, did the IJN use any Carrier for purely training of airgroups? Or did they need to spend considerable time on their own Carrier to come up to speed? I suspect the latter.
bengtsson wrote:
By the way, did the IJN use any Carrier for purely training of airgroups? Or did they need to spend considerable time on their own Carrier to come up to speed? I suspect the latter.
Bob B.
Up to Midway, no. After Midway the light carrier Hosho was withdrawn from operational duties and converted into a training carrier. The fact that the IJN would move an operational carrier to training duties after major carrier losses in Midway suggest the problem had become well recognized.
Assessing the impact of new area rug under modeling table.
I know how stupid that is from numerical global unconstrained non-linear optimization problems. Robustness and resistant structure from which applications can flow is far more important for statistical usage.
