US "HOOD"

[Laurence Batchelor]

I meant even pre-war they would have had many more deck fittings than is shown in the plans the kit is based from.
Things like vents, cable reels, hatches etc.

She's still a lovely built and ship though, I really like your deck weathering!

[chuck]

Yes, 7 stack Lexington was ugly. 2 stack Lexington isn't all that pretty either, being too low, too squat, and lacking long sweeping curves somewhat expected of a fast ship.

I think G-3 and N-3's suffers from the fact that their overall appearance in profile suggests several high rise apartment blocks connected by a common ground floor rather than a single cohesive ship.

A different sort aesthetics than those commonly used to appreciate ships is required to appreciate the G-3 and N-3.

[Werner]

Sir Stanley Goodall submitted the plans for the final version of Hood to the US Board of Construction. His fingerprints are all over the original 2-funnel Lexington. I wouldn't be too harsh on her.

[middle_watch]

I wonder if your question answers one that puzzled me for some time: Why HMS Vanguard was completed, even during the war building work was slowed as priority shifted to other ships, and after the war battleships were decommissioned at a dizzy rate, yet Vanguard went ahead.

Makes me wonder if there was a deliberate attempt to make her the "new Hood" particularly as one of her first assignments was to act as the Royal Yacht on a world cruise.

If so it failed, ask any Englishman in the last half of the 20th century to name a warship and the top answer would have been a prompt "Ark Royal, mate!" There was a failed attempt again to preserve the magic of the name by renaming the Through Deck Cruiser Indomitable to Ark Royal but all it did was remind everyone just how far down the toilet the Fleet was being flushed.

[Guest]

Code: Select all

What always surprised me with Lex & Sara is the huge jump the USN seemed to take with them, when in other areas, like as already pointed out, the Battlecruiser or Fast Battleship by 1918-1922. Their lack of wartime activity and lack of design testing in WW1 and just after meant their designs were lagging behind in that area. Though I would say their engines were superior. 

This wasn't the case with Lex & Sara and it has always struck me how it almost seemed one whole area of their warship design seemed to improve by 'leaps and bounds' whilst others had lagged. 

Not being a USN navalist hopefully someone can tell me why?
_________________[quote]

I'm no expert, but I have an idea. 

The US was committed to being a Pacific power, so even in a USN dominated by battleship admirals the navy wanted to build as much power into the Lex and Sara as possible. Their speed and range probably had as much to do with the vast distances in the Pacific as their battlecruiser origins. If you compare that aspect wit the RN and their multitude of refuleing bases literally all lover the world, that may help to account for the lower ranges/radii of action of your typical RN carrier.  Vast Pacific distances may also explain the Lexingtons' larger aircraft complements and USN deck park practices, as scouting for the battlefleet took on a greater role. 

Also, since the Lex and Sara were literally entering uncharted territory, the USN went to great lengths to try to make everything as "just right" as possible. The fact that they were the perfect hulls (at the time) to convert into carriers only made them better. The RN, on the other hand, was very interested in cost-cutting, so the "large cruiser" conversions perhaps weren't all that they could have been had more money been available. I've always wondered what a really modernized Furious would have looked like and been capable of. 

I'm not sure that I'd say the Lexingtons were perfect conversions by any means. Rather, I'd say a lot of things came together at just the right moment to create a better carrier conversion than anyone else: the exigencies of operating in the Pacific, having a good hull available, being able to observe RN carrier practices and learn from them, weight-saving turboelectric drives (which were actually not as bad as people pillory them for being), and a Congress willing to spend some money for a change. Anyway, that's my nickel's worth.

Robert


[/quote]

[ar]

Dear Warner,
You are correct about the Lexington.
Goodall turned the US Design teams upside down. It was eye opening for them. One gets the impression that Goodall took over the American design bureau.
I have read the official papers (British and American) on this. They make very interesting reading, especially as many of them are written in a style unlike the normal turgid ones.
Godall's own reports, I believe are required reading, as it puts so much into perspective. ie how two major navies think, design, construct, and operate.

Sir Stanley Goodall submitted the plans for the final version of Hood to the US Board of Construction. His fingerprints are all over the original 2-funnel Lexington. I wouldn't be too harsh on her.

[Rodders]

for middle_watch
As an Englishman Ark Royal would not be my first choice. Vanguard did it for me.
I was on Foudroyant in Pompey harbour when Vanguard grounded on her way to the breakers. As a 16 year old boy I thought then, and still do, that without doubt she was the finest looking warship ever produced for the Andrew. She was reputed to be, and I believe it, that she was the best capital seaboat of all time, able to steam at high speed in all sea states. The Americans attempt at a flared bow with the Iowa class was good but not as good as Vanguards.
As a young boy I remember the visits to Brighton by RN ships and we all would pester our parents for the couple of bob charged by local fishermen to row us out to the anchored ships usually up to a mile from the beach.
The last one I boarded was HMS Glasgow, a Town class cruiser.

[Pieter]

Not much more than the existing Large Light Cruisers I think. The FAA was kept short of funds by people who believed in the bomber that always gets through. A converted Hood was just as irrelevant to the Air Ministry as a converted Glorious. For the limited amount of funding available the 48 aircarft capacity of the ex large light cruisers was just about right and they gave the RN much experience in working with a multi carrier task force under Henderson. I wonder what their reputation would have been had they not been thrown away so easily in 1939/40.

I
I wonder what effect it would have had on British naval outlook and the role of fleet air arms had Britain been able to convert 2 incomplete Hood hulls or G-3 hulls to carriers in a similar fashion to Akagi and Lexington.

[Guest]

Not much more than the existing Large Light Cruisers I think. The FAA was kept short of funds by people who believed in the bomber that always gets through.

Not sure if that was true. I don't think the British were much behind the general thinking and implementation of naval aviation until the mid-1930s. In 1930s the British refocused fighting in the Mediterranean and North Sea, where it could really be argued that the fleet would usually be in range of land base aircraft, and that land based airpower will enjoy considerable performance and massive numerical advantages over FAA, and therefore fleet air defense by fighters is a lost cause and bombing strikes by FAA would make little difference.
Prior to mid 1930s the British were focused primarily on fighting the Japanese north of Singapore. In this situation there would little land base airpower in range, and the notion that the bombers will always get through will work both way - It would discourage putting too many fighters on the carriers, but it would encourage putting more bombers on the carriers. Up to middle of 1930s, I think all the major carrier powers operated under the same assumption, that bombers will always get through, so one ought to put as many bombers as possible on the carriers since only the first massive strike would count.

[Werner]

I will leave a response here to someone who is closer to the FAA's history, but it was obvious that the RAF influence on the FAA was in repeated failure of procurement and lack of staffing and coordination with the Admiralty.

[Guest]

I think that's been gone over before. It is true everyone was told to tighten belt by the treasury and RN scaled its demands accordingly. But nevertheless through the 1920s FAA pretty got everything it wanted despite RAF. If there is any complaint against the RAF it would be that RAF got any money at all when RN was told to tighten belt. But one can't blame the problems of the RN on the mere existence of RAF, for where would RN be if the Blitz comes without there being a RAF to respond to it.

Read Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939: Preparing for War against Japan (Cass Series: Naval Policy & History)