Interesting idea? Armor rounds for ships

[Mark Petersen]

Armed with artillery counterfire radar, a battery of modern land based self-propelled gun/howizers can pin point the location a ship firing her guns in amphibious support before the ship's artillery shell has had time to fly 300 yards from its muzzle.

And what happens when in an amphip operation seeing as you have air superiority and the cohnterbattery radar starts broadcasting ist position and it gets a anti-radiation missile for its trouble.

[Werner]

Armed with artillery counterfire radar, a battery of modern land based self-propelled gun/howizers can pin point the location a ship firing her guns in amphibious support before the ship's artillery shell has had time to fly 300 yards from its muzzle.

And what happens when in an amphip operation seeing as you have air superiority and the cohnterbattery radar starts broadcasting ist position and it gets a anti-radiation missile for its trouble.

I don't think any wheel-portable system is prepared for the level of active ECM a ship is prepared to dispense. To complicate the situation, the ship's helicopters will be flying ESM missions with blip enhancers and flares to distract any targeting system.

Firing on the landing force will not be a laboratory experiment. It will be an extremely complicated environment which will confound the decision maker and complicate the picture to an impossible degree.

Occasionally, the US Government gets something right. In this area, they have been working hard since Vietnam.

[Guest]

You have no idea whether ECM or ECCM on a ship or a helicopter can effective mask a flying shell, do you?

[Werner]

You have no idea whether ECM or ECCM on a ship or a helicopter can effective mask a flying shell, do you?

I believe the question was whether the ship would be destroyed by shore batteries of cruise missiles before the landing force could perform it's task.

Since the USN has prepared "worst case" defenses for an opposed landing against Soviet or Chinese designs, it is a reasonable expectation that these defenses are insufficient against the USN countermeasures.

[Guest]

Armed with artillery counterfire radar, a battery of modern land based self-propelled gun/howizers can pin point the location a ship firing her guns in amphibious support before the ship's artillery shell has had time to fly 300 yards from its muzzle.

And what happens when in an amphip operation seeing as you have air superiority and the cohnterbattery radar starts broadcasting ist position and it gets a anti-radiation missile for its trouble.

How fast can an anti-radiation missile get to the counterfire radar? I am quite willing to trade several counter fire radars for the opportunity to land a salvo of 155mm shells on a modern warship, especially since such occurrences will probably immediately cause the whole amphibious force to turn around, open range, and give me some breathing space.

[Guest]

You have no idea whether ECM or ECCM on a ship or a helicopter can effective mask a flying shell, do you?

I believe the question was whether the ship would be destroyed by shore batteries of cruise missiles before the landing force could perform it's task.

I am talking about a counterfire battery zeroing in on the ship by back tracking the trajectory of the ship's own shells.

Since the USN has prepared "worst case" defenses for an opposed landing against Soviet or Chinese designs, it is a reasonable expectation that these defenses are insufficient against the USN countermeasures.

Since the Chinese or Russians has prepared "worst case" defenses against an amphibious invasion of American designs, perhaps it is also a reasonable expectation that these defenses will be more than sufficient against the USN countermeasures.

[Werner]

Since the Chinese or Russians has prepared "worst case" defenses against an amphibious invasion of American designs, perhaps it is also a reasonable expectation that these defenses will be more than sufficient against the USN countermeasures.

It's reasonable to assume much of this effort was derailed in the 1990s, while the respective economies switched gears to capitalism.

[Guest]

Since the Chinese or Russians has prepared "worst case" defenses against an amphibious invasion of American designs, perhaps it is also a reasonable expectation that these defenses will be more than sufficient against the USN countermeasures.

It's reasonable to assume much of this effort was derailed in the 1990s, while the respective economies switched gears to capitalism.

I would think much of the Chinese efforts have taken place since the 1990s, when the collapse of Soviet Union made it much less likely for the US to overlook China's taking of Taiwan.

Afterall, for the US, the most likely scenario involving protracted high intensity conventional combat against a technologically resourceful enemy would be a war against China over Taiwan. No other reasonably plausible enemy can put up any serious and lengthy high intensity conventional resistance to US forces.

[Guest]

For China, keeping the US forces from interfering in any initial conflicts with Taiwan, and then preventing US forces from reversing any Chinese gains, is almost the entire conventional military objective of the whole Chinese armed forces. I would think developing the ability to deny the seas around Taiwan through combined to any US forces through the optimal combination of air/land/sea assets currently has Chinese military's undivided attention.

[Werner]

Chuck, your statements seem to assume the US countermeasures have been static during this period, but a brief survey of new equipment shows an acceleration of countermeasure developments in the period, including systems developed in concert with allies like Australia and Israel.

[JWintjes]

So the key argument against shipborn artillery in an amphibious support situation is the possibility of 155mm SPGs on the other side?

Sorry, but that's not very convincing. Apart from a very confined number of first-world states, who has the capability to operate a) artillery-locating radar, b) high-end SPGs and c) extended range shells? If you assume that your opponent has all this at his disposal, he will likely have a complete AD suit including sophisticated radar, integrated C3 and latest generation SAMs.

Which means what? Leaving the navy at home? Nuking them anyway?

I'm all in for realistically measuring the effectiveness of guns vs missiles, but throwing the gun totally out of the window isn't very sound in my eyes.

I still can't see how you can get the same amount of firepower for the same money with any other means, particularly if you assault someone below your own technical capabilities.

Jorit

[Guest]

No, it's a race. Both sides are making progress. I do not assume we've won, or even that we really are ahead. I grant that we appear to be ahead by those measures which we focus on. All too often we focus on those things that would make us look and feel good, and ignore things that don't.

It is not clear who really is ahead if all factors, not just those that we revel in, are considered.

[Guest]

Sorry,...... who has the capability to operate a) artillery-locating radar, b) high-end SPGs and c) extended range shells?

Jorit

Every state that can put up a meaningful coastal defense requiring naval artillery remediation.

[Werner]

Sorry,...... who has the capability to operate a) artillery-locating radar, b) high-end SPGs and c) extended range shells?

Jorit

Every state that can put up a meaningful coastal defense requiring naval artillery remediation.

We all really wish you would log in.

So, you are telling me Syria, with it's "state of the art" air defense network would be better at this than it was at stopping the IAF from turning it's "nuclear facility" into cinders with no losses on the Israeli side?

[Guest]

BTW,

1. Artillery locating radar is almost as common as infantry mortar teams.
2. You don't need high end SPG for this. Anything mobile with a long 155mm tube, ran by a crew that could put a round into a designated coordinate box will do.
3. Most 122 or 155 round made in the last 40 years are extended range bleed gas round. This is the primary reason why modern field artillery so heavily out range even Vietnam era artillery.

[Guest]

Every state that can put up a meaningful coastal defense requiring naval artillery remediation.

We all really wish you would log in.

So, you are telling me Syria, with it's "state of the art" air defense network would be better at this than it was at stopping the IAF from turning it's "nuclear facility" into cinders with no losses on the Israeli side?

NO, I mean if Syria has enough coastal defense to make it important for any amphibious force to shell the beach defenses in order to succeed, the chances are those beach defenses would be able to shell the attacking ships back.

[Werner]

We all really wish you would log in.

So, you are telling me Syria, with it's "state of the art" air defense network would be better at this than it was at stopping the IAF from turning it's "nuclear facility" into cinders with no losses on the Israeli side?

NO, I mean if Syria has enough coastal defense to make it important for any amphibious force to shell the beach defenses in order to succeed, the chances are those beach defenses would be able to shell the attacking ships back.

After the initial wave of air assault and a ripple of HARMs?

[Guest]

Which means what? Leaving the navy at home? Nuking them anyway?
Jorit

Nuke them anyway is always an effective option for the moment. Although against major powers the moment might be very short.



I am trying to argue that the notion of "overwhelming firepower" conferred by naval artillery in an amphibious attack is now largely mythical, especially with the retirement of real gun armed warships. Naval gun power is actually very feeble compared to what would be available to even moderately sized and modestly equiped modern land force. Adding one gun tube per $500 million - 2 billion warship is not going to significantly increase it.

What is even more is those naval gun power is more vulnerable to the artillery power of land defense than is commonly supposed. And land artillery can be increased at a very tiny fraction of the cost of increases to naval artillery power. .

[Guest]

NO, I mean if Syria has enough coastal defense to make it important for any amphibious force to shell the beach defenses in order to succeed, the chances are those beach defenses would be able to shell the attacking ships back.

After the initial wave of air assault and a ripple of HARMs?

If there is enough left to the beach defenses to warrant major naval artillery support, then there is probably enough left to shell the naval ships back.

[Timmy C]

Stop quoting quoting quoting quoting quoting quoting quoting quotes. Please.