Alternate Midway

[chuck]

Suppose the US did not become privy to JN-25, or the Japanese bureaucratic red tape had not forestalled the adaptation of a new naval code, so that USN did not have advanced warning of operation MI to take Midway. What do you think Nimitz should do on June 5? Do you think other clues would give Nimitz enough confidence in his interpretation of Japanese intentions so as to deploy the carrier force in time near Midway anyway to intercept Nagumo? If not, do you he might have position his carrier somewhere to minimize threats to their survival and maximize their ability to cover a range of possible Japanese targets but without positioning them specifically to cover Midway? Or if the carriers had been allowed to remain in pearl, do you think Nimitz should immediately sortie upon news of the Japanese attack, in order to to make Midway in about 48 hours, knowing a major concentration of Japanese carriers would be in position and waiting for him? Or do you think he should stay put, or sortie only to parry a possible Japanese thrust towards Hawaii, and then go out to retake Midway after the Japanese had left?

[Gone Asiatic]

Perhaps he would have gone after the Alaskan bait?

[Lesforan]

Now, none of us can know what Nimitz would really have done if he lacked the intelligence info on Yamamoto's plan. But I'll stick my neck out here and hazard a guess. If I were him in that situation, here is what I would have done:

My first priority would be to locate the Japanese carriers. Although we had ruined the Japanese plans at the Coral Sea, we had come off the worse for the battle. The Japanese had lost one light carrier. We lost one major fleet carrier, and suffered heavy damage to a second. The fact the Yorktown was presumed by the Japanese to have been sunk could only embolden their efforts.

I would have launched long-range patrols by Catalinas from Midway, Dutch Harbor, and Northern Australia to search for the Japanese fleet. I would also do as Nimitz did, and get Yorktown into dock at Pearl for slap-dash repairs. Also, I would have similarly speeded up work on Saratoga in San Francisco to rejoin the fleet. After Coral Sea, Nimitz was down to only two operable fleet carriers in the theatre, Enterprise and Hornet.

The next thing I would have done was consider the farthest extent of American and Japanese outposts in the Central Pacific. Midway was the westernmost US outpost. Wake Island was the easternmost Japanese outpost. Either one was within range of Pearl Harbor by long-range land-based aircraft. Midway must remain in American hands, and Wake must be made neutralized.

I would have filled Neosho with aviation gas and sent her to Midway. If the Navy fuel depot could not have held a full tankerload, then I would have commandeered the Pan-Am facility on the island for additional fuel storage. Then I would have taken Langley and loaded her with fighter and attack planes and sent her to Midway to beef up the island's air defenses.

While Langley was on her aircraft ferrying run, I would have taken Enterprise and Hornet down to Wake and plastered everything the Japanese could have used to launch a strike. After that I would have returned to Pearl, but not directly. I would have sailed due north from Wake to a position roughly west of Hawaii so as to be in a position to strike the Japanese fleet if my Catalina patrols located them. If nothing was found, then I return to Pearl to reload. By then, Yorktown should be ready to sortie. I would not have remained in Pearl Harbor to be hit a second time, but would have taken all three carriers out raiding in the Central Pacific.

This strategy would have combined offense and defense. It may have resulted in the contact between the fleets with our carrier task force hitting the invasion fleet of lightly defended transports rather than tangling with their Midway carrier strike force. The lack of flexibility in the Japanese plan probably would have derailed their entire operation. The next carrier battle could have included Saratoga, possibly then fighting with even odds.

[Werner]

Considering the magnitude of the surface force Nimitz sent to Alaska in early June, I believe Fletcher and Halsey/Spruance would have made a bee-line up there as well. I bet he would have ignored Midway Atoll altogether.

Sometimes military judgment is influenced by the politicians. The operations in Alaska were operations on US sovereign soil, in North America. Even though in reality he knew what to expect, he still had to march 2 cruiser squadrons and the battleships in that direction to show the politicians he was doing something.

[Devin]

It's a very real possibility that if Midway was a surprise then the US would have been down one carrier. Yorktown's repair at Pearl was only done because of the imminent battle. She was way overdue for a refit with battle damage on top of that, and Saratoga was only a few days away from returning to Pearl. With no immediate threat she returns to Pearl after Coral Sea she would have tied up for a few days and then headed to Bremerton for overhaul. If not already on the way to the coast, then Yorktown would surely still be sitting pier-side in Pearl with no work done on her at the time of the battle.

[Werner]

I know his history has had a sharp revision, but if Fletcher was the only carrier admiral, I would expect him to deploy plenty of his legendary caution, which would cause a serious reverse for the USN.

[chuck]

Perhaps he would have gone after the Alaskan bait?

Would Aleutians be an effective bait? Provided Aleutians came as much a surprise to Nimitz as Midway because the USN had no access to Japanese code, then even if the US forces sorties within hours from the Dutch Harbor attack, it would still be no more than a few hours out of Pearl when the Midway attack came. So it seems to me that the Aleutian attack would have had almost no effect on the strategic choices facing Nimitz on the morning of June 4.

[Werner]

I think Yamamoto's idea was to peep into Pearl from French Frigate Shoals the day before and make sure the USN carriers had docked, then to draw them Northeast toward Alaska for a day before reports at Midway came in. That would draw the Americans into a "predicted" first base position, where Yamamoto expected them.

If the US carriers had sailed toward Alaska for a day or more they would, upon turning back to Midway, come across the racetrack of Kakuta's Second Mobile Force.

As it happened, I think the USN wound up closer and farther South than Yamamoto expected.

Yamamoto's plans typically require the USN to be a cooperating enemy, behaving much like modern computer game AI.

[bengtsson]

Do we assume the USN intelligence was completely in the darK??

If so, I would expect Japan to seize Midway and then regroup in ambush position to nail the USN reaction force coming to the rescue. The USN would probably just have the two carriers available. I would expect the USN to eat the loss of Midway and leave the Japanese force hanging out there. Once the Japanese main fleet has to return home, then we hit Midway hard with carrier strikes and build our strength to use Midway as bait for the decisive battle with the IJN at the time of our choice and when we had maximum strength available.
WIth no forwarning, it would surely have taken some days to get a force out to Midway. What you don't want to do is take the Japanese bailt and go out weak and in the dark. Just what the IJN was looking for.

Bob B.

[Werner]

Turning back from Alaska may have allowed Fletcher the consolation of scooping up Ryujo and Junyo before getting cold feet and turning back to Pearl.

[Dan K]

These are all very interesting responses. I agree with Devin that, w/o prior intelligence, Yorktown is not yet available as there is no dire need to rush repairs. Only Hornet and Enterprise are immediately available. And, the Aleutians attack is a surprise as well.

With his battlefleet impotent, only two carriers available for any sort of hard response, and most important, the loss of initiative borne of the intelligence scoop, Nimitz is immediately on the defensive and cannot risk his two remaining assets without more concrete information. They sortie to a position 200-300 miles N-NW of Pearl to await that info and head off a possible thrust towards Pearl.

Pearl might be within bomber range of Midway, but the reverse is also true. Nimitz has a good heavy bomber force available at this point that would be effective in neutralizing the land-based threat. If searchplanes do not quickly find IJN units around Midway, Washington will force his response to Alaska. That could be fortuitous, as his two carriers pack a far creater punch, with more experienced aircrews, than the IJN force that includes Junyo and Ryujo. They might do some real damage to the IJN Northern Force.

If that happens, then Yamamoto finds himself in a bit of an embarassing pickle. He loses the Alaska carriers without finding the US fleet and now, in turn, to save face, must risk the Kido Butai to again find the US fleet. The intiative shifts back to the US. Retaliatory IJN ops will be limited due to constrictions on fuel and logistics.

On the other hand, if US searchplanes do find IJN units around Midway in the initial searcj, I've no idea how it plays out.

[chuck]

Turning back from Alaska may have allowed Fletcher the consolation of scooping up Ryujo and Junyo before getting cold feet and turning back to Pearl.

He would still be 3-4 days sailing from Aleutians and the Japanese northern force when the news of Midway attack would be flashed. Would he be allowed to keep on going North?

[chuck]

If that happens, then Yamamoto finds himself in a bit of an embarassing pickle. He loses the Alaska carriers without finding the US fleet and now, in turn, to save face, must risk the Kido Butai to again find the US fleet. The intiative shifts back to the US. Retaliatory IJN ops will be limited due to constrictions on fuel and logistics.

If US forces heads north and engage the Northern force in spite of the pounding Midway is taking at the same time, then the US force would not come into contact with the Japanese northern force for 3-4 days, or around June 8th. The Japanese would not know until that the US fleet is heading North. On June 8th, would Kido Butai have the fuel to head north in pursuit after having stayed in a combat zone and sustaining combat operations for 4 days? or even to take up station north of Hawaii for another 5-6 days in the hope of intercepting the US fleet on the way back?

[Werner]

Turning back from Alaska may have allowed Fletcher the consolation of scooping up Ryujo and Junyo before getting cold feet and turning back to Pearl.

He would still be 3-4 days sailing from Aleutians and the Japanese northern force when the news of Midway attack would be flashed. Would he be allowed to keep on going North?

Look at the disposition chart in Morrison IV. The two Japanese carriers were assigned a holding racetrack half way to Midway.

Everyone also needs to remember the Japanese elephant sitting in this room. Fuel. Every act the fleet takes is predicated on the optimal use of fuel. If this operation failed, the next opportunity might not be before September.

[rtheriaque]

I think one fact is being overlooked... If US Intelligence is assumed to be in the dark, than Coral Sea doesn't happen, either.

I'd have to put more thought into the basic question before I could put more forth, but I wanted to add that to begin with!

[chuck]

I think one fact is being overlooked... If US Intelligence is assumed to be in the dark, than Coral Sea doesn't happen, either.

I'd have to put more thought into the basic question before I could put more forth, but I wanted to add that to begin with!

Not necessarily. The IJN had scheduled the replacement of the penetrated JN-25 code by the yet unpenetrated JN-40 for about 1 month before Midway, but bureaucratic red tape postponed the switch. As it happened the JN-40 proved trouble some to decipher and it took USN some time and a great stroke of luck to penetrate it. So if the switch over from JN-25 to JN-40 had occurred on schedule, it would have occurred so close to Coral sea that the USN would have had enough time to gleam data from JN-25 to have warning of Coral sea before the switch over, but would not have been warned of Midway as a result of the deciphering blackout period that would covered all of may and probably for several month afterwards.

Also, if there was no US opposition in Coral Sea in early May, and the Japanese captured Port Morseby, would the Japanese have embarked upon Midway in June or would they have spent June consolidating their newly gained positions in the South, perhaps seeking a decisive confrontation in the South around the lifeline to Australia some time later, rather than near Midway in June? How much did the thwarted attempt to capture Morseby hasten Japanese effort to destroy the USN carrier fleet?

[Werner]

How much more fuel and how many more tankers to sink the USA at Port Morseby? I am struck by the short leash immediately after Pearl Harbor. I wonder if the location of the battle was not partly chosen on economic grounds.

[chuck]

Port Morseby would be much closer to the nearest major Japanese fleet base than Midway. The logistical problems of supporting a major operation would also be less.

[Lesforan]

I don't believe Nimitz would have dawdled in Yorktown's repairs in any case. He must have been acutely aware that with his battleships either sunk or disabled, and only two operable carriers left, he was at extreme risk. Both Yorktown and Saratoga would have to be rushed back into service.

[Werner]

Yorktown's repairs (estimated in the same way to Saratoga's damage at Jan 42 damage) ought to have taken six months. Even four would be pressing it.