Subs in general

[Guest]

Walt,
As was pointed out above, the type XXI was a solid 16 1/2 to 17 1/4 knot performer in underwater speed. Their sea trial proved as much. You will kindly note that the US Navy did not come anywhere near this ability at that time or in the early years after the war.
The US Navy's new TANG clas boats which entered service in 1951-52 had a submerged speed of 17 knots. So, with type XXIs to study and learn from, the USN got their equals only 6 years after the war was over. I'm sorry, but the Germans were far superior to the USN submarine force in 1945. With no XXIs to study, where would the Tangs have been in 1951? Probably not built. No one who studies the U-Boat force and the Royal Navy ASW forces is ever going to agree with your claims of USN submarine superiority in WWII. The facts fly in the face of that conclusion.
Don't take it personal though. I'm just not seeing your arguments as winning me over

Bob B.

[Werner]

XXI killed the General Board's 1945 Fleet Submarine, which was essentially an enlarged Tench. It argues strongly that in the '44-'45 timeframe the USN was not even aware such capabilities could be realized with a mass production combat submarine.

Am I correct that the VIIC was the deepest diver, with some boats operational at or just below 300m?

[Walt]

To respond to a few comments posted before.
Yes the type XXI on paper was supposed to have a burst flank submerged flank speed of 17.5kts according to Otto Merkers design. But according to Eberhard Rossler who is a recognized authority on the type it is doubtful if the "In service" boats ever came close to that speed. Eberhard points to the many very serious design problems with the types shafts and drive units to the serious toxic conditions experienced by poor Battery ventilation. Not to mention sabataged parts, poor quality and inexperienced crews at the time they were pushing the type into service..

Someone mentioned that the US borrowed from the XXIs in the design of the Tench. This may be true. But I do know that the Balao/guppy conversions were much better boats than the Tangs or the Tenchs.. Size and range of the Balaos offered many more possibilities for updates without a complete redesign.

The Germans direly needed an effective Attack boat .. The Gatos and Balaos were doing just fine so the US priority was on production not experimentation especially in 44 to 45. The USN did not see the need for a radical design change.. This mindset would come to haunt them in the early days of the Cold war with The USSR taking lead in Submarine production.

The Tang class was on the drawing board at EB in 1944.. Not needed war was drawing down, improved w/ guppy design put off to 1946 and commisioned in 1951 not a particulary groundbreaking design.
Whoever said it was the late 50s is wrong.and for the record the Balao guppys were better boats.

The Soviet K3s were death traps and had such a big radiation signature in it's discharge they could be tracked by a fisherman in a rowboat with a geiger counter 4 days later. hence their knickname "Glowboat.. Source of info here is me. A shipmate of mine while on USS Skate trailed one for 2 days in the Barents .. they didn't have to go fast at all they could hear it and smell it's glow 50 miles behind her..

The German snorkles had a bad habit of head valve freezing..that wasn't fully corrected until post war with electric headvalves. Hence a 10" or 12" hole in your boat you cannot close and early units didn't have induction valves..we will never know how many UBoots took the last dive via snorkle , not pretty for sure you know all that salt water and battery wells... don't mix well at all..What effect did a snorkle have if you had to run at PD to use it and the whole RN USN escort is closing on you..in a state 4 or 5 sea?? Here we are!...see us broach peek a boo. They couldn't chase under snorkle because of reduced speeds to use it. The snorkle did not become a truely effective and "safe" until post war. Sure it would alow the UBoats to loiter submerged while waiting in ambush but once the fat hit the flame they were just added weight. These are reasons the USN and RN did not pursue the snorkle until much later, besides by then there were few targets left for the US/RN Submarine fleet and a snorkle isn't needed for pilot rescues etc.
Those here who like to snub the Gatos often say having 6 up front and 4 behind makes no difference, I ask what?
To this day torpedo/missle rate of fire is number one on the designers list..Look at the combat reports ask a submariner would you rather go into a fight with 4 or 6 locked and loaded with 4 more in the stern.Why then would Speer goad Otto Merker into more torpedo tubes on later boats like the Ty XXI?? it's called firepower.
A 6 fish spread an a 4 fish back up should sure raise a lot of heck in any combat situation and it did over and over again...

AR mentioned the Mk 14s poor performance early on in the war, Yes the failure rate was about 40% to 60% they believe it could have been higher.
Thank you AR you couldn't have made my argruement any better. Just look at those incredable numbers the US Submarine fleet was running up on the IJN early on.. all that with a dud fish in 4 ot of 10 ..truely amazing .
Not to mention that fortunitly for the USN and to the great dismay of the IJN most boats early on also carried a good supply of trusty MK 10s..they worked fine. ar thanks for the example wow now here's a "what if" What If the Mk14s never acted up? War over by 43??? 44??? who knows..how many big boys got away?? I'll guess eh... 1944..

This arguement could go on for ages. But I'll stick to the following facts.
1. The US Submarine Force in WW2 was responsable for over 70% of all the IJN's Losses. operating thousands of miles from homeport in the IJN's own back yard most often solo or in pairs taking on all commers escorts as well as merchantmen. Thus rendering IJN's merchant fleet almost useless by 1944 . Thus demonstrating an unmatched ability to take the fight to the enemy in their homewaters without fleet support well over a thousand miles ranging.
2. The Gato/Balao class submarine served on well into the late 60s and even the 70s and 80s in some Navies in front line service. The same basic WW2 hull and engineering design with updated equipment, What other submarine could match that ability to improve with the same hull..that kind of virsatility? Name one.
3. Givin the Gato and Balaos capabilities as well as proven track record against " advanced ASW systems" as they demonstrated in the the post war years. If they were to operate in wolf packs in the North Atlantic the effects would have been just as great as they were in the Pacific..or better given the target rich enviroment of slow fat merchantmen the North Atlantic had to offer. More losses suffered yes, but a greater effect as a hunter killer undoubtedly..
Later you see that the Guppys were good boats with updated systems and weapons but the heart of the boat, the things that make it a submarine are the same as they always were.
Yup, I know I've wrote this before and and I'm sure the same ol Bathtub pirates will target me again for it.. But if you wish to talk Monday morning Quaterbacking about how great this or that "WOULD or COULD" have been then I guess a modeller's forum is the right place to do so, I do enjoy such speculation also.
But when facts are overlooked because of one's prejudice or misinformation it is no longer a Historical forum.. My prejudice for that Gato/Balao class submarine of WW2 fame is based on factual War records not hearsay. My knowledge of the boats systems and capibilities are from being qualified in the type.. Sure the typ XXI and others may have been wonderful designs..I have no particular axe to grind with the design except for the fact they served the Nazis cause. But where's the beef? To call any other type of ww2 submarine besides the Gato/Balao class the best submarine in WW2 is historicly wrong.. The Gatos earned their spot on that perch their unparrelled war record is their laurel, and believe me the IJN wasn't all that easy as some here believe and the many lost USN boats indicate... If the War lasted until 1960 maybe the Type XXIs would have earned that spot..

When a poster can go as far as saying the K3s were good boats then I know I'm in way too shallow water . I should ask ar to try to find a K3 crewmember still alive to support that claim and no I'm not kidding.
I claim no expertise in this field except for where I worked , all other facts and records are available for anyone with google or a good book. Have at it all you mermaids of the deep cyber space.. I know it's a comming ..Please support your claims to the throne with facts like warpatrols performed, warship tonnage sunk as well as merchant tonnage sank and then finish it with your candidates service life... as in 1940 to 1980 etc. No more what if's please.

[Timmy C]

A bit off-topic, but I have a question...

What colour were USN surface ship torpedoes in WWII?

[phil gollin]

Walt you keep making the same errors and silly statements - WHY ?

.. This mindset would come to haunt them in the early days of the Cold war with The USSR taking lead in Submarine production. ......

The model that the USN and RN took was the Soviets having a large fleet of basically Type XXI-type subs, with a small number of "walther" boats by the nominal date of 1956. It was the Type XXI that was the driver for this "haunting"

The German snorkles had a bad habit of head valve freezing..that wasn't fully corrected until post war with electric headvalves. Hence a 10" or 12" hole in your boat you cannot close and early units didn't have induction valves..we will never know how many UBoots took the last dive via snorkle , not pretty for sure you know all that salt water and battery wells... don't mix well at all..What effect did a snorkle have if you had to run at PD to use it and the whole RN USN escort is closing on you..in a state 4 or 5 sea?? Here we are!...see us broach peek a boo. They couldn't chase under snorkle because of reduced speeds to use it. The snorkle did not become a truely effective and "safe" until post war. Sure it would alow the UBoats to loiter submerged while waiting in ambush but once the fat hit the flame they were just added weight. These are reasons the USN and RN did not pursue the snorkle until much later, besides by then there were few targets left for the US/RN Submarine fleet and a snorkle isn't needed for pilot rescues etc.

Yes there were some problems with early snorts, and some operational restrictions. HOWEVER, they did allow U-Boats to transit submerged at reasonably high speed and essentially free from interference from aircraft (there were a few successful attacks on snorting subs, but rare!). The Snorts also gave U-Boats the ability to catch-up to and overtake convoys again withing air cover. These abilities were not available to subs without snorts. Snorts were basically safe and effective during the war. Even post-war the ducking of a snort would cause problems for the crew of a sub. The RN persued the snort immediately they got their hands on them - you have strange ideas.

Those here who like to snub the Gatos often say having 6 up front and 4 behind makes no difference, I ask what?
To this day torpedo/missle rate of fire is number one on the designers list..Look at the combat reports ask a submariner would you rather go into a fight with 4 or 6 locked and loaded with 4 more in the stern.Why then would Speer goad Otto Merker into more torpedo tubes on later boats like the Ty XXI?? it's called firepower.
A 6 fish spread an a 4 fish back up should sure raise a lot of heck in any combat situation and it did over and over again...

You "forget" (yet again) that the Type XXIs pioneered the fast reloading gear that is now standard in subs.

1. The US Submarine Force in WW2 was responsable for over 70% of all the IJN's Losses. operating thousands of miles from homeport in the IJN's own back yard most often solo or in pairs taking on all commers escorts as well as merchantmen. Thus rendering IJN's merchant fleet almost useless by 1944 . Thus demonstrating an unmatched ability to take the fight to the enemy in their homewaters without fleet support well over a thousand miles ranging.

An unmatched ability against an awful ASW force. That is not to decry the courage or skill of the USN submariners, merely that one has to keep things in perspective.

2. The Gato/Balao class submarine served on well into the late 60s and even the 70s and 80s in some Navies in front line service. The same basic WW2 hull and engineering design with updated equipment, What other submarine could match that ability to improve with the same hull..that kind of virsatility? Name one.

First it was NOT the same basic hull (it was lengthened and streamlined unless you failed to notice)

The RN's modified T's and A's

3. Givin the Gato and Balaos capabilities as well as proven track record against " advanced ASW systems" as they demonstrated in the the post war years. In addition they had much better silencing. If they were to operate in wolf packs in the North Atlantic the effects would have been just as great as they were in the Pacific..or better given the target rich enviroment of slow fat merchantmen the North Atlantic had to offer. More losses suffered yes, but a greater effect as a hunter killer undoubtedly..

Again you are "forgetting" (as ever)

The WW2 fleets were NOT GUPPY's. The GUPPY's were lengthened, streamlined, had snorts and had decent passive sonar (all courtesy of the Germans/Type XXI's). They had much better silencing. The WW2 Fleets advantages in the Pacific would either be non-existent in the Atlantic (code-breaking) or actually detrimental to their health (radar and TBS). And they wouldn't even have a basic schnorkel. You both "forget" the differences between a WW2 Fleet and a GUPPY and don't understand the differences in Pacific and Atlantic ASW.

But when facts are overlooked because of one's prejudice or misinformation it is no longer a Historical forum..

Which is precisely what you are doing. Ignoring the differences between WW2 Fleets and GUPPYs and between the ASW forces in the Atlantic versus the Pacific.

............ My knowledge of the boats systems and capibilities are from being qualified in the type....... .......... and then finish it with your candidates service life... as in 1940 to 1980 etc. No more what if's please.

But that's the point you are talking about GUPPY's and mixing that up with WW2 Fleets (together with a total misunderstanding of the ASW situation in the Pacific and Atlantic)

YOU are qualified in GUPPYs, not WW2 Fleets and Atlantic WW2 ASW.

Stop "forgetting" things. Stop mixing up things and try to talk about facts.

.

[chuck]

XXI killed the General Board's 1945 Fleet Submarine, which was essentially an enlarged Tench. It argues strongly that in the '44-'45 timeframe the USN was not even aware such capabilities could be realized with a mass production combat submarine.

Am I correct that the VIIC was the deepest diver, with some boats operational at or just below 300m?

There is absolutely nothing major in the XXI that the US could not physically mass produce. There were a few points of hydrodynamic and hydrophonic sophistication in the XXI that would have escaped the USN in 1944-1945, but there was no show stopper that could have prevented the US from mass producing something fairly close to an XXI in the 1944-1945 time frame had the USN been inspired to do so. However In 1944 and 1945, the USN has simply never been on the receiving end of any ASW effort effective enough to hammer home the need for something like a XXI. The USN submarine force simply wasn't in the major leagues and didn't get the sort of trial by fire the German Uboat arm received. Frankly the USN also wasn't visionary enough to extrapolate the need for an XXI style boat from its experience observing the giving end of the ASW.

Keep in mind that the Germans had perceived the need for something like a type XXI as far back as 1940 - 1941, when type VIIC were flying very close to the sun and were sinking more British tonnage than ever all the US boats put together would sink of Japanese tonnage. The fact that the USN hadn't been thinking along these line even in 1945 suggests that the personnel of the USN, cocky and competent they might have been, were not really of the very highest order as far as understanding underwater warfare goes.

There was a type VIIC-42 design that featured extra-thick pressure hull and crush depth of 1500 feet (500 meters). But AFAIK, few if any type VIIC-42 ever made it into service.

[ar]

I noted in Friedmans 'British Destroyers and Frigates' an account of a meeting in NOvember 1942, in which the Germans, who were despondant at having lost the 1942 summer North Atlantic battles discussed the need for new types of submarines. From what Friedman writes, the type XX1 was conceived at that very meeting.
UNfortunately I have forgotten the chapter in which this meeting is mentioned. Blast! Norman writes so many words, so much data.
It is clear from reading the above mentioned book, that the RN knew about the new fast submarines from the spring of 1943, and the amount of effort that they devoted to the problem from this time on was great.
It is a little difficult to underatand as to why the USN did not have the same approach, as they were privy to everything that the RN knew.

[chuck]

The Germans had been working on high speed underwater boats using exotic propulsions since quite sometime before the idea of XXI was first mooted. XXI itself was conceived of as something of a stop gap measure. The type XVIII, an advanced combat boat under development for sometime was running into trouble with its AIP propulsion. So it was decided to use the hull designed for the XVIII as the basis of a conventional diesel electric submarine, filling the lower pressure hull, originally intended to store AIP fuel, with batteries. This was the origin of XXI.

[bengtsson]

Cannot be sertain, but I believe that the Norfolk was sailing alone, and NOT fitted with Asdic, therefore...

If I remember correctly she was escorted by 5 escort ships...but need to check that better.

The Ministry of Defence (Navy) publication "The U-Boat War in the North Atlantic 1939-45"

States: The first type XXI to be ready - U.2511- On May 4th sighted a British Cruiser and her destroyer escort at long range. Closing at high speed and then reducing to silent-running speed, the U-Boat attained an attacking position inside the screen, from which she carried out a dummy attack, albeit with six tubes ready. After a final look at the target, which was too close to miss, U.2511 went deep. The MOD history was written at the Admiralty's request by Korvettenkapt�n Alfred Hoschatt. He used original German records. He also interviewed crew members for the publication.

I'de be happy to hear what other sources there are out there on this one type XXI operation.
I have heard it described a number of different ways in other publications. The type XXIII operations are descirbed in some detail from officer interviews, but it is limited by a lack of records for a number of the XXIII's used. Again, I'de love to know what else is out there.


Bob B.

[chuck]

Also the U2511 carried out the entire attack maneuver under water, using sonar alone.

[bengtsson]

Also the U2511 carried out the entire attack maneuver under water, using sonar alone.

Probably one of the MOST important points of the new XXIs that made them so far superior to the USN fleet boats and other subs in general. The new passive sonar array gave the Germans an ability to operate as a true submarine. From experience, I can state that when sitting at a decent passive array on a sub, that has found the best depth for listening, one is well aware of all that is going on above one. The active sonarman is blind as a bat, he simply is pinging around hoping for a contact, if the sub is under a layer or in disturbed water, the odds are not good of finding anything.
The Germans need not surface or even use the periscope for search. The ears will do fine. Approach can be made, shadowing can be done and attack approach made on passive sonar alone. Taking the shot, it helps to get the range by a look or an active sonar ping. Note the German could get a range with an active ping.

Here's a bit more from the MOD: A boat proceeding on cruising motors had to schnorkel for three hours daily to keep batteries fully charged, and at a submerged cruising speed of 5 knots could thus traverse the danger area between the Norwegian coast and the south of Ice Land in about five days, raising her schnorkel on only FIVE occasions. The Schnorkel head was fitted with Tunis aerial and coated with sorbo rubber as a protection against radar. Even if the schnorkel was located by radar, which by virtue of it's absorbent coating was only possible at short range, a boat would be in no great danger, since a sharp alteration of course coupled with a large increase in speed would take her quickly out of the aircraft's sonobuoys; she could then continue as long as necessary at the silent running speed of five knots, at which it was possible to cover 300 miles.

The silent running speed of 5 -5 1/2 knots was also an excellent attack speed and, in the event this proved too slow, a convoy attack could always be pressed home by using high speed. This capability and the newly introduced echo-ranging [active sonar] gear and plotting table, specially designed for such attacks, gave the type XXI a decisive advantage over the older boats.

Further more, the Torpedo Trials Staff had developed a special instument for so-called "programed firing" in convoy attacks: As soon as a U-Boat had succeeded in getting beneath a convoy, data collected by echo-ranging [active pings] was converted and automatically set on the LUT torpedos, which then fired in spreads of six. at five second intervals. The torpedos opend out fanwise unitl the spread covered the extent of the convoy, when they began running in loops across it's mean course, making good a slightly greater or lower speed, and in so doing covered the whole convoy. In theory these torpedoes were certain of hitting with a possibility of 95-99 % hits in an average convoy.

In addition to the LUT, an improved torpedo was now available [the T II acoustic torpedo] which was capable of homing onto propeller noises virtually immune to Foxer.

By virtue of it's great endurance the type XXI could reach any aprt of the Atlantic and remain there for three to six weeks; it could, in fact just make the passsage to Cape Town and back without refuelling. And not to forget the ability to speed along underwater at a good 16-17 knots. No other sub came close. The Germans got the future of submarine warfare right when they designed and built the XXI and XXIIIs.


Bob B.

[chuck]

Also the XXI was the first front line boats whose crew accommodations were specially designed to facilitate prolonged operation while completely submerged. It was fitted with forced air CO2 scrubbing system, near-natural light florescent lighting, refrigerated food storage, special underwater trash disposal tubes, toilets that will work at any depth, and air dehumidifier to relieve one of the worst miseries of being cooped up in a cold iron tube with 60 other men's breath condensing on the cold steel walls. If you have to travel submerged for long periods, XXI will keep you comfortable and your crew morale up like no other WWII era submarine.

Regarding the claim that snorkels didn't work perfectly well, there were also the epic undersea journey of the last 2 Uboats to surrender. They ignored Dornitz's order at the end of the war, and snorkeled their way all the way from Norway to South America. The inside of these two older boats, which lacked the creature comforts for submerged travel built into the XXI, was turned into a dank dripping cesspit overflowing with trash by 60 days of continuous underwater travel. But they got to where they were going. and their snorkels evidently worked well enough.

[Filipe Ramires]

Again, I'de love to know what else is out there.

Bob, I will take a look on my stuff here during the week-end regarding U-2511 patrol. Now I am curious where did I dig out the 5 escort information...might be confusing with something else I've read lately. Currently reading Clay Blair's "Hitler's U-boats". Fine book so far!!!
Actually I am building U-2511 at 1/350 scale.
Regards,

Filipe

[bengtsson]

Actually I am building U-2511 at 1/350 scale.
Regards,

Filipe

Good luck with that model Filipe. The XXIs were beautiful boats as well as ultra modern for 1945.

Bob B.

[phil gollin]

........ Currently reading Clay Blair's "Hitler's U-boats". Fine book so far!!! ..........

Please beware - his books are very good OPERATIONAL histories, but AWFUL on STRATEGY (he just doesn't understand). It is hardly sursprising that it is a good operational history because he basically went to the STU at Cuxhaven. (You will also note from his foreword that he was highly predjudiced agaainst the Type XXI because to had a look at one post-war, but didn't know what the US Navy was doing with them. It is so bad it's a laugh).

.

[ar]

My mistake.

If I remember correctly she was escorted by 5 escort ships...but need to check that better.

The Ministry of Defence (Navy) publication "The U-Boat War in the North Atlantic 1939-45"

States: The first type XXI to be ready - U.2511- On May 4th sighted a British Cruiser and her destroyer escort at long range. Closing at high speed and then reducing to silent-running speed, the U-Boat attained an attacking position inside the screen, from which she carried out a dummy attack, albeit with six tubes ready. After a final look at the target, which was too close to miss, U.2511 went deep. The MOD history was written at the Admiralty's request by Korvettenkapt�n Alfred Hoschatt. He used original German records. He also interviewed crew members for the publication.

I'de be happy to hear what other sources there are out there on this one type XXI operation.
I have heard it described a number of different ways in other publications. The type XXIII operations are descirbed in some detail from officer interviews, but it is limited by a lack of records for a number of the XXIII's used. Again, I'de love to know what else is out there.


Bob B.

[Filipe Ramires]

Please beware - his books are very good OPERATIONAL histories, but AWFUL on STRATEGY (he just doesn't understand). It is hardly sursprising that it is a good operational history because he basically went to the STU at Cuxhaven. (You will also note from his foreword that he was highly predjudiced agaainst the Type XXI because to had a look at one post-war, but didn't know what the US Navy was doing with them. It is so bad it's a laugh).

Point taken, Phil. I will keep an open eye for this.
Cheers,

Filipe