What if Modernized USS Iowa and USS Wisconsin

[drdoom1337]

Personally I say reactivate Iowa and New Jersey. New Jersey is doing the worst out of the museums so far and Iowa still hasn't become a museum. I've been on board NJ and honestly the only thing in bad shape is the wood deck, everything else is outstanding the people there really take care of the ship. Slowly the wood is being replaced, but it will take years. I wish that for the 70th anniversary of VJ day someone would donate trucks of teak wood like they did for the North Carolina.

[navydavesof]

Personally I say reactivate Iowa and New Jersey. New Jersey is doing the worst out of the museums so far and Iowa still hasn't become a museum.

Well, New Jersey is full of museum stuff. Wisconsin, however is still locked up and probably will stay that way for a long time. Iowa is still mothballed. A real solution is to reactivate either 3 or all 4 of them and use them as surge and naval special warfare assets. The near-term proof of concept would be to reactivate 2.

The long term solution would to build new ones

[navydavesof]

I had the privilege of being a docent on the battleship Wisconsin from late '05 to '07. Operational requirements kept me from spending any more consistent time on her. As passionate as that group is, I am sure the crew aboard the New Jersey is just as if not more happy about being able to host the ship.

I have not had the opportunity to go to the New Jersey, however it would be pretty cool to get to see her all gussied up with CIWS and missile displays. I was able to go through Wisky durring a ship check with NAVSEA. Even though she had been locked up and mostly untouched since 1991 she looked like the crew had just left.

Modernized Iowa-class battleship...someone needs to make a model of that!

[navydavesof]

Oops, sorry. Double post, like key-bounce.

[Landlocked]

The long term solution would to build new ones

That would be a perfect answer, but in today's fiscal climate....?? $40bn BB-1000, anyone?

[navydavesof]

That would be a perfect answer, but in today's fiscal climate....?? $40bn BB-1000, anyone?

lol Oh, my. $40 billion. That's a pretty big price tag! Building one out of steel and conventional building practices instead of using reinforced carbon composite with unicorn bone marrow used on DDG-1000 would keep its cost realistic (far cheaper than a carrier). For $40B...heck for $10B...I hope it would come with a mustache...with titties...manned by ninjas.

[johndon]

Modernized Iowa-class battleship...someone needs to make a model of that!

Between the 2 of us, we just might manage that one day

Been away from mine for some time now, need to get it back out again...

John

[Landlocked]

I hope it would come with a mustache...with titties...manned by ninjas.

I just wanted a poke at the DDG-1000!

[LonCray]

I've spent a few days reading this thread. It's obvious that the pro-BB folks (esp. NavyDave) have a pretty cogent military argument in favor of bringing them back... but this isn't the argument that's going to end with recommissioned BB's. I went aboard Wisconsin last winter with some of my Boy Scouts (and we plan to go aboard NJ this coming winter) - she's a magnificent ship and I'd love to see her back in the Fleet - but I'm not the one who needs convincing. Nor is anyone else in this forum. Where's the argument to convince members of Congress or the President? What argument is going to convince our civilian leaders to spend a lot of money (yes, yes, less than a CVN - but still a LOT of money, esp. in a recession)? You need to have a significant part of the Navy and DoD leadership behind this idea - how do you go about getting it? Talking about 120nm shells and the need for something cheaper than Tomahawk is fascinating in here (I was only ever Army enlisted, and the technical posts in here are out at the edge of my understanding) - but is that going to convince members of the various Budget Committees to support funding? If the battleships are going to be brought back, it's going to take something more than what's being laid out in here - because the right people aren't currently convinced that there's a need for monies to be spent on the battleships.

[LSUfan]

I've spent a few days reading this thread. It's obvious that the pro-BB folks (esp. NavyDave) have a pretty cogent military argument in favor of bringing them back... but this isn't the argument that's going to end with recommissioned BB's. I went aboard Wisconsin last winter with some of my Boy Scouts (and we plan to go aboard NJ this coming winter) - she's a magnificent ship and I'd love to see her back in the Fleet - but I'm not the one who needs convincing. Nor is anyone else in this forum. Where's the argument to convince members of Congress or the President? What argument is going to convince our civilian leaders to spend a lot of money (yes, yes, less than a CVN - but still a LOT of money, esp. in a recession)? You need to have a significant part of the Navy and DoD leadership behind this idea - how do you go about getting it? Talking about 120nm shells and the need for something cheaper than Tomahawk is fascinating in here (I was only ever Army enlisted, and the technical posts in here are out at the edge of my understanding) - but is that going to convince members of the various Budget Committees to support funding? If the battleships are going to be brought back, it's going to take something more than what's being laid out in here - because the right people aren't currently convinced that there's a need for monies to be spent on the battleships.

The manpower requirements are too much for today's Navy. The Iowa incident resulted in bad press and embarrassment for the Navy brass and efforts to continue modernizing the ships to reach the potential of their service life ceased. Things like rocket-assisted projectiles, 11-in submunitions with ranges as long as 110nm and the like could have transformed these ships, but the opportunity was lost.

Now, with budget constraints as you mention and the tendency to always fight the last war, it is almost impossible to see these ships being recommissioned. Iraq and Afghanistan are not geographically situated for naval gunfire support to play a role and our politicians have historically been too myopic to think that a future conflict might occur in a locale with a coastline...

[navydavesof]

I've spent a few days reading this thread. It's obvious that the pro-BB folks (esp. NavyDave) have a pretty cogent military argument in favor of bringing them back...

Hey, LonCray. Thanks for commenting. I agree. Earlier this year I made a proposal through the CNO's Strategic Studies Group concerning the BBs, a modern role for them, a modernization scheme, and NAVSEA's thoughts on my proposal. I think that it would be a little while before the issue was brought up at all, but from what the House Armed Services committee a plan has to be put into place, because the Navy is looking at losing 3 carriers. BB reactivation is feasible, economical, and supportable.

LSU makes a good point about the manning issues. However, my case remains, and this was emphasized in my report, that there is only a perception that battleship manning would preculde them from being manned. This assumption is only just justified by comparing them to escort ships, which is a very common comparison, because BBs, CGs, and DDGs carry some of the same weapon systems. Because what a BB does, the correct man-power comparison needs to be made with peer ships, other capital ships. Then the manpower, especially with a less than 1000 man crew, is very supportable.

However, I still think it's a really, really long shot. Some in the Navy would rather see the Navy unable to support its mission than reactivate any BBs.

[LSUfan]

I've spent a few days reading this thread. It's obvious that the pro-BB folks (esp. NavyDave) have a pretty cogent military argument in favor of bringing them back...

Hey, LonCray. Thanks for commenting. I agree. Earlier this year I made a proposal through the CNO's Strategic Studies Group concerning the BBs, a modern role for them, a modernization scheme, and NAVSEA's thoughts on my proposal. I think that it would be a little while before the issue was brought up at all, but from what the House Armed Services committee a plan has to be put into place, because the Navy is looking at losing 3 carriers. BB reactivation is feasible, economical, and supportable.

LSU makes a good point about the manning issues. However, my case remains, and this was emphasized in my report, that there is only a perception that battleship manning would preculde them from being manned. This assumption is only just justified by comparing them to escort ships, which is a very common comparison, because BBs, CGs, and DDGs carry some of the same weapon systems. Because what a BB does, the correct man-power comparison needs to be made with peer ships, other capital ships. Then the manpower, especially with a less than 1000 man crew, is very supportable.

However, I still think it's a really, really long shot. Some in the Navy would rather see the Navy unable to support its mission than reactivate any BBs.

Part of the heavy manpower requirement is associated with the 5 inch twin mounts. If those got replaced with single 5'62 mounts the manpower requirement could be reduced with a nominal decrease in firepower.

[Russ2146]

Replacing the 5"/38's with modern mounts could reduce the required crew to 900 or less. This is substantially less than an aircraft carrier requires for delivery of ordnance on target.

[navydavesof]

Replacing the 5"/38's with modern mounts could reduce the required crew to 900 or less. This is substantially less than an aircraft carrier requires for delivery of ordnance on target.

Part of the heavy manpower requirement is associated with the 5 inch twin mounts. If those got replaced with single 5'62 mounts the manpower requirement could be reduced with a nominal decrease in firepower.

I agree with both of you gentlemen. There is no post 1990 proposal for Iowa-class modernization that retains the 5"/38s. The WIP modernization designed in the late '80s and authorized for the early '90s was to replace them with new-build 5"/54s designed for the Montana-class. The advantage to this would have been a simple removal of the 5"/38 mount and replacement with the 5"/54 mount. The base rings would have been the same, and the only modification to the ship would have been a slightly modified powder host. However, everything past that plan was to install Mk45 Mod2 guns. Here is what the whole Mk45 gun assembly looks like:

Not a whole lot. It's just gun with three electrical panels and a hoist sticking down below it like a tooth's root.

To head off a comment of how "hard" and "impossible" it might be installing the Mk45 I will include the following: Anyone who has ever worked on a Mk45 knows there is not a lot to the system. The Mk45 mount and its hoist machinery can be vertically installed into handling rooms of a 5"/38 gun mount without a lot of trouble.
I consulted with BAE, and they agree that the following would be feasible:

The 5"/38 powder and projectile hoists would be removed with the gun house leaving the loading room and lower magazine open and clear. The 5"/38 system used a double projectile hoist. The Mk45 uses a single powder/projectile hoist. Because the Mk45's hoist is smaller than the double hoist it would slide through the holes in the decking separating the upper and lower loading rooms for the original double projectile hoist without much modification.

The mount's base ring could be cut away leaving a slightly larger hole in the top of the square armored base. Then the Mk45 and its smaller base ring would be mounted atop a square plate equal size to the square base where the old base ring used to be. The lower hoist would extend into the lower handling room,

and the loader drum would be in the upper handling room.

There are more than 15 Mk45 Mod2 5"/54 guns left from the retired Spruance and Ticonderoga-class preserved. Six could be put on each ship and could/would be modified to the Mod4 features as is being done on all CGs and DDGs undergoing HM&E modernization.

This gun requires 6 men to operate. The Navy has 3-4 do the job. Even at 6 people per Mk45 mount vs the original 27-33 men per 5"/38 mount (162-198) is not a bad deal. In all likelihood, the Navy would probably have 3-4 men per mount like on all the other ships. Manning for the 6 mounts would be 18-24 instead of 162-198.

[navydavesof]

In the modern environment if the battleships were to be reactivated I believe they would need to be equipped to take the place of the lost carrier capabilities as economically possible. While a long range AAW capability is possible with an Improved New Threat Upgrade to the Mk74 Tartar-D weapon direction system equipping our closest allies. However, there is no need to go that far. The battleship's consort vessels would provide all AAW and ASW capabilities needed. In addition, As it has always been, the battleship is a capital ship best suited for strike warfare. There is not much reason to have more AAW capability than an LHD.

With such consideration, one could approach battleship modernization simply with the same modernization planned for them in the 1990s. Today, however, such a modernization would only barely bring the ships up to modern combatant requirements. In order to supplement and compensate for carrier losses the battleships should be fitted with the most flexible and heaviest weapons possible.

While I already have a modernization plan organized, out of curiosity, what does the audience believe the battleship should have in order to accomplish the offensive missions of a CVN?

[Busto963]

In the modern environment if the battleships were to be reactivated I believe they would need to be equipped to take the place of the lost carrier capabilities as economically possible. While a long range AAW capability is possible with an Improved New Threat Upgrade to the Mk74 Tartar-D weapon direction system equipping our closest allies. However, there is no need to go that far. The battleship's consort vessels would provide all AAW and ASW capabilities needed. In addition, As it has always been, the battleship is a capital ship best suited for strike warfare. There is not much reason to have more AAW capability than an LHD.

With such consideration, one could approach battleship modernization simply with the same modernization planned for them in the 1990s. Today, however, such a modernization would only barely bring the ships up to modern combatant requirements. In order to supplement and compensate for carrier losses the battleships should be fitted with the most flexible and heaviest weapons possible.

While I already have a modernization plan organized, out of curiosity, what does the audience believe the battleship should have in order to accomplish the offensive missions of a CVN?

The short answer is the battleship is not a replacement for the CVN - it wasn't in WWII and it it still does not have the ability to deliver as much ordinance, deliver that ordinance to as great a range, or with the same degree of flexibility as a carrier. Battleships bring no aviation assets to the table beyond helicopters, which have speed/endurance/payload capabilities grossly inferior to WWII fixed wing aircraft, and compund this inferiority with significantly higher maintenance costs, fuel consuption and lower operational availablitiy. This translates into dramatically lessened capability to: 1) locate the enemy (volume searches), conduct electronic warfare, and 3) ability to prosecute targets. This does not mean there is no role for battleships, but a battleship is not able to acomplish the missions of a CVN.

A better question is what makes a battleship a "strike platform" in the 21st century? Does the U.S. Navy have a credible minesweeping and shallow water anti-submarine capability to enable a battleship (and other surface ships) to get within range to use its guns? If the battleship is forced to stand off at ranges of 500-1500 nm, why wouldn't a fast (30 knot+) containership loaded with ballistic and cruise missiles, and manned by a crew of a few dozen, be a cheaper, more effective weapon platform for this role? Why isn't an SSGN, which can reliably get into firing position, launch and evade retaliation be an even better strike platform than a battleship?

While I love battleships, heavy cruisers etc., and believe that there is a role in modern warfare; I do not believe that they really are "capitol ships" for the 21st century. I think that trying to modernize a battleship with 21st century communications, sensors and weapons systems will cost significantly greater than acknowledged on this forum. [added later] I think the idea of refitting nuclear propulsion for the Iowas is economically infeasible. Submarines surpassed surface ships long ago. Admiral Doenitz had it right - the future of warfare at sea is *under the sea*.

[proditor]

I agree with a lot of what you said, except the part about a CVN delivering more weight of ordinance.

�Nimitz class carriers can deliver approximately 75 long tons of ordnance per strike. At an average of three strikes per day, 225
tons of ordnance can be delivered per day. Iowa Class battleships can deliver 229 long tons of high explosive and steel in a
30-minute gun strike.�

�The cost to deliver ordnance on target is estimated to be $12,000 per long ton of aviation ordnance from a Nimitz class carrier,
and $1,600 per long ton of gun ordnance from an Iowa Class battleship.�

Source: �IOWA CLASS BATTLESHIPS Their Design, Weapons & Equipment� Robert F. Sumrall. (Naval Institute Press 1988,
Appendix A, pp 157.)

[Busto963]

I agree with a lot of what you said, except the part about a CVN delivering more weight of ordinance.

�Nimitz class carriers can deliver approximately 75 long tons of ordnance per strike. At an average of three strikes per day, 225
tons of ordnance can be delivered per day. Iowa Class battleships can deliver 229 long tons of high explosive and steel in a
30-minute gun strike.�

�The cost to deliver ordnance on target is estimated to be $12,000 per long ton of aviation ordnance from a Nimitz class carrier,
and $1,600 per long ton of gun ordnance from an Iowa Class battleship.�

Source: �IOWA CLASS BATTLESHIPS Their Design, Weapons & Equipment� Robert F. Sumrall. (Naval Institute Press 1988,
Appendix A, pp 157.)

I will not comment on Sumrall's math because I do not have his assumptions; the key point is a carrier can carry more ordnance than a battleship, that ordinance is far more flexible, and most important is that an air wing can at its option deliver that ordinance in massive, overwhelming pulses in a very short period of time - the proverbial alpha strike. The battleship may deliver more ordinance in a 30 minute strike, but a battle fought at sea with missiles and aircraft will be decided in 30 seconds give, or take - making the issue a moot point.

The implications of the alpha strike, which also applies to mass salvos of cruise/missiles, is sobering, both for the incredible intensity of destruction unleashed in short period of time, the stresses it places on the defense, and ultimately the overwhelming requirement for both sides to deliver their alpha strike before being caught in turn by the enemy's alpha strike. Admiral Sir Percy Scott's maxim: "Hit first, hit hard, and keep on hitting..." has always held, but the penalty for poor reconnaissance, indecisive strikes, or bad targeting in the carrier/missile age has been ratcheted up by at least two orders of magnitude. In an era of ever increasing lethality, the trick is to either apply so much firepower as to overwhelm your enemy, or to deliver your strike and not hang around for the enemy response.

Mathematically, battleships tend to follow Lanchester difference equations, and carrier strikes tend to follow Hughes' "Salvo model," both of which are nicely explained in Captain Wayne Hughes text: "Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat." Again the implications for procurement, strategy, training intelligence and operations is profound. Many people commenting on Air-Sea Battle, have completely missed the point of proliferation of sensors, particularly satellites, and the effect on what Hughes would describe as "hitting first *effectively*...". I also note that Captain Hughes also advocated for increasing ship survivability, but that does not dogmatically imply that battleship armor per se is the only, or even the best means to that end.

[proditor]

What exactly is your hypothetical battleship doing? There are a lot of holes in your argument, I'm going to sum up:

1) Why is this being used like a 1940's battleship with a main role of sea superiority? Surely the SSN or SS is going to be able to argue that role far more effectively.

2) Getting your alpha strike together requires time. Time to launch the aircraft, time to form up, time to fly there. No way are you doing that in 30 seconds. No way, not ever.

3) Precision of munitions: I already granted that one, so I don't see any point in continuing to revisit it.

4) In our hypothetical surprise scenario, you have planes flying CAP, but nothing loading a strike package. So you arm your planes, get them up on deck, launch them, form them up, and then, when they all get there, deliver the ordinance in one wave of awesome. Cool, nice idea. How long does that take? 30 minutes? An hour? So in the time that your planes are flying to the target, my battleship has already dropped more ordinance on it then your carrier can for the rest of the day. The training speed of the turrets is 4 degrees a second, flight time out to 40,000 yards is 80 seconds. RoF is 2 per minute, meaning it's only going to take me about a minute to acquire bearing and load, then 80 seconds travel time out to 40000 yards. I'm pretty sure your strike package will still be sitting on the carrier's deck when the first shells start landing.

Now, if we're throwing out all benchmarks and the planes start fully loaded, launched, and formed up 5 seconds outside the target, sure, the carrier will dump more ordnance in a shorter span of time. But that's pretty much ignoring the reality of the situation, no?

[Busto963]

What exactly is your hypothetical battleship doing? There are a lot of holes in your argument, I'm going to sum up:

1) Why is this being used like a 1940's battleship with a main role of sea superiority? Surely the SSN or SS is going to be able to argue that role far more effectively.

2) Getting your alpha strike together requires time. Time to launch the aircraft, time to form up, time to fly there. No way are you doing that in 30 seconds. No way, not ever.

3) Precision of munitions: I already granted that one, so I don't see any point in continuing to revisit it.

4) In our hypothetical surprise scenario, you have planes flying CAP, but nothing loading a strike package. So you arm your planes, get them up on deck, launch them, form them up, and then, when they all get there, deliver the ordinance in one wave of awesome. Cool, nice idea. How long does that take? 30 minutes? An hour? So in the time that your planes are flying to the target, my battleship has already dropped more ordinance on it then your carrier can for the rest of the day. The training speed of the turrets is 4 degrees a second, flight time out to 40,000 yards is 80 seconds. RoF is 2 per minute, meaning it's only going to take me about a minute to acquire bearing and load, then 80 seconds travel time out to 40000 yards. I'm pretty sure your strike package will still be sitting on the carrier's deck when the first shells start landing.

Now, if we're throwing out all benchmarks and the planes start fully loaded, launched, and formed up 5 seconds outside the target, sure, the carrier will dump more ordnance in a shorter span of time. But that's pretty much ignoring the reality of the situation, no?

You completely missed the point I was driving home in my last post.

The issue isn't about how much time it takes to form up, fly to the target etc.. The point is that a missile salvo, or airstrike delivers a devastating amount in an incredible short period of time. The *time* I am referring to is the time which a defender has to evade/disrupt/decoy the attack, and the attacker is able to press the advantage. Specifically it is the point where the outcome is decided. For an large air strike, this is somewhere between when the aircraft reach weapons release point (or not) and when it is clear that the defender will, or will not, be able to destroy the inbound bogees/vampires whatever.

In historical terms terms this is the point at which the IJN officer in charge of the CAP at Midway looses air superiority (his airplanes are out of position) and the rest of the USN carrier strike groups arrive atop the Japanese carrier task force. That was the point of decision in that battle. It did not matter that the Japanese pounded the crap out of Midway. Nor did it matter that the bulk of the Japanese forces were untouched (actually un-engaged), to include two battleships (ahem). At that point they were assured of losing three carriers, lost air superiority, were unable to screen their invasion fleet, and therefore were unable to invade Midway. This time is growing ever shorter in duration due to a number of technologies.

This is relevant because it has many profound effects on not only the operational commanders, but affects everything from strategy, to force structure, tactics and logistical issues, and it presents problems that previous naval commanders never could have imagined. I strongly suggest that you pick up a copy Captain Hughes book and look hard at the Salvo equations (and their ramifications) and the Lanchester difference equations. Hughes also repeatedly hits at the issue of scouting, which should strike a note with anyone closely reading the Air Sea Battle papers.

BTW, Krepinevich's point was not simply about proliferation of precision weapons, but more importantly the proliferation/evolution of sensors and communications.

Also, I was not making a "surprise scenario," not sure where you are going with that.

Finally, I did find a copy Sumrall's book, and after looking I think his math is really questionable; the text is dated anyway (copright 1988!).