What if Modernized USS Iowa and USS Wisconsin

[carr]

..

[navydavesof]

I got a copy of the document, Busto. I really look forward to reading it!

[johndon]

Dave,

I take it that pic is of the Iowa that you mentioned had 'disappeared'...

Great stuff though and certainly something that has inspired my New Jersey

John

[navydavesof]

Dave,

I take it that pic is of the Iowa that you mentioned had 'disappeared'...

Great stuff though and certainly something that has inspired my New Jersey

John

Yes, that is the Iowa that is buried somewhere deep inside a storage building in Texas. That is a picture from early 2010 in Virginia. I need to look on the storage building in question while I am here. Maybe I can find it and send it to Japan so I don't have to start over.

[navydavesof]

Love the UAV hangar! When are we going to see a 1/350 UAV sitting on the deck?

Thanks, Bob. I will be making a bunch of UAVs for the CGN-42. I have not decided which ones to use yet. I have a feeling the Shadow and the Hunter UAVs are going to be in order, but we'll see. One way or the other they will have to be big enough to carry the standard opitcs, a laser designator, and have a pretty beefy range. Being able to get to the operating area, up to 75nm from the ship, and stand on station for long periods of time require some long legs on the UAVs.

How about a closeup and desciption of the construction of the scratch built UNREP sliding post? It looks like you've done a nice job on a tricky piece of equipment.

Here are some pictures of the original sliding Kingpost.

One way or the other, I will have to build another one. It was built out of a lot of little pieces. I have all of the original plastick stock, but I will have to figure out which pieces I need to use all over again

Tremendous work!

Thanks very much. I can't wait to get back to CGN-42 and get her finished up. Then I can move onto other things including the Iowa. How much fun!

[Busto963]

If I made add something from my Strategic Studies program: what I'm seeing here is the opposing views on weapons and their role in tactics-operations-strategy-policy hierarchy. Busto feels that weapons should be made/procured/reactivated based on the strategy that the country has developed to fulfil policy requirements, whereas Dave feels that weapons should be procured/reactivated based purely for their tactical and operational merits.

Timmy, I would go further and note that: Weapon systems in the US *are* procured to fulfill a requirement that are articulated in national strategy documents, which in turn drive the plans of the war fighters (the Geographic Unified Commanders), who then go back to the services (Army, Navy, Air Force, USMC - a.k.a the force providers) with capability requirements. These capabilities requirements are used by the acquisitions people to generate specifics for the weapons systems.

[Busto963]

If there is a single thing that will be dropped from the AirSea Battle, it is going to be the pursuit of conventional ballistic missiles. I agree with carr when he says that firing ballistic missiles at a power armed with nuclear weapons is dangerous. Historically, ballistic missiles are for delivering WMDs, specifically nuclear weapons, and coming from us, definitely nuclear weapons. There would be too much confusion if those ballistic missiles, especially Tridents like you suggested, started arcing through the air.

Just to be clear, and after additional thought, I believe the use of coventional ballistic missiles (CBM) would be dangerous, as you state, but that alone is not sufficient reason not to develop and use them. China appears to have them and all reports indicate that they will have many of them in the relatively near future. If China is willing to lob CBMs at us and trust us to recognize their conventional nature (or not care) then there's no reason we can't do the same.

I'm not a ballistic missile expert but it appears that the Chinese shorter range, theatre-use, anti-ship BMs (1000-2000 nm) will use much lower sub-orbital paths which would make them recognizable as such. Of course, there's no way of knowing whether the payload is nuclear until they land but that's true even of conventinal missiles, torpedos, artillery shells, etc.

This.

[Busto963]

Two points missed by everyone in the whole CVBG vs BB discussion:

• 1) The punch of a carrier is her air wing, we are not giving up air wings, and in real terms, the capability of those air wings will dramatically increase in the new term as the F-35C will be joining the fleet, two squadrons per wing, and hopefully UCAS as well.
  2) The Navy will continue to build carriers � the advanced retirement, does not mean a permanent loss.
  3) The LHDs will also be getting F-35Bs, not a deep strike aircraft, but certainly an improvement.

You object, strenuously, to the characterization of the BB as a strike platform since it can't perform deep inland strike, at least no better than any other VLS-Tomahawk vessel. Semantically, though, that statement can be reversed: the BB is as good a strike platform as any other VLS-Tomahawk vessel. Still, that alone hardly justifies the reactivation of a battleship.

In 1980s, BBs were one of the few TLAM capable assets in the fleet - 32 TLAMs was a big deal. Today VLS has proliferated, the number of TLAM capable ships expanded hugely, the capability to put many x the number of TLAMs on a combatant is doable, and finally, TLAMs themselves are a useful, but aging weapon system.

Bear in mind that Dave has never justified the BB as a deep strike platform. His justification has always been the gun support mission. �

So, the question then becomes whether gun support is sufficient to justify reactivation. Dave cites the presence of numerous useful targets within 20-50 nm of the shore. Let's be fair and acknowledge that that is, indeed, the case.

No, I think this is overstating the case, and when you look at truly hostile nations that threaten *vital U.S. national interests* they all tend to fit into Sub Saharan Africa, or the east coast of Africa, where we have permissive environments (many weapons systems will work), or Indian/Pacific Ocean, where AirSea becomes a factor.

The real challenge is that if you buy say a stealth bomber � it fight both fights. It can fly deep strike missions in a high threat environment, or it can fight in low threat environments. When was the last time that the Navy launched air strikes and the Air Force was not involved?

This is not only I have a hammer every problem is a nail argument - it is a great example of service parochialism.

Again, to be fair, the China map on pg. 59 in the AirSea Battle document does, in fact, show a significant number of targets that appear to be within 20-50 nm of the shore. Note, also, that the map only shows a couple of particular types of targets and does not include possible industrial sites, harbors, and other types of worthwhile targets.

No, projected Chinese capabilities will make it unlikely that anything other than stealth aircraft, or submarines will be able to get closer than ~1,000 to 1,500 nm of China until:

• 1) Those targets on that map are destroyed (many are recuperable and have to be hit multiple times).
  2) Chinese ISR platforms and air superiority fighters are rolled back.
  3) An *massive ASW campaign* is prosecuted, and won by USN submarines.
  4) The U.S has established not only air, but space superiority (expect every ones satellites to go pfff! on day one�).

By the time all this happens, I question the utility of 16� guns.

I also believe that Dave's focus is less on the China scenario and more on Iran, NK, and various third world hot spots that flare up, such as the Libya affair or the foreseeable Africa scenarios that are currently developing.

NK and Iran are developing similar area denial capabilities to China, but with different tools. Iran is also a big country and those centrifuges are not in gun range.

On the �third world hot spots� - this gets into three interesting points.

• First, everybody gets the bigger is better argument, but the �third world hot spots� argument is not �hot war� (unless *you* are getting shot at), it is typically an insurgency, or other low intensity fight - a 16� shell fired into one of these spots is as likely to kill a bunch of innocent civilians as the bad guys. You cannot believe the restrictive nature of our rules of engagement (ROE) our troops fight under and for good reason. I would love to hear how a 16�/50 round from a BB fired into some Somali village, or a mosque in Lebanon have fit in with the ROE. We, and our allies are actually fielding smaller, less lethal rounds for the low intensity fight. Examples: GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb, Delilah (missile), etc.. We know how to fight in Dirkastan, seriously � we have been fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq for the better part of a decade. No U.S Commander has cried for more fire support during Iraq or Afghanistan.
  
  Second, we tended to throw CVBGs at every problem, and now that we face a temporary loss of CVBGs; we default to �we need a gap filler for the CVBG� � really? We never had a CVBG to handle every imaginable crisis in the day, so why now? And why is the BB the only, or the best answer to this temporary loss of CVBGs? Why couldn�t a detachment of maritime patrol aircraft like P-3s, or drones do the job against Somali pirates? Why can't the Air force fill in? The U.S. Treasury Department has done more harm to international terrorists since 911 than USSOCOM. I am dead serious, the Treasury Department has hampered more terrorist operations by strangling off their money than any kinetic program we have launched.
  
  Third, with a $15T (trillion) dollar public debt, and budget deficits running into the $1.5 T range, just how many interventions are we going to allow ourselves to get into as a nation? I am not arguing about rescuing our citizens, or defending our clear national interests. For example, Iran is a must deter, or win the fight scenario. But plainly stated, if we keep intervening in places like Somalia or Libya we are really pissing $$$ in the wind. It isn�t a question of fighting the most economically; it is a question only intervening when truly required. Fighting Somali pirates is a great example � WTF are we providing security to the world�s merchant fleets when most of the shipping companies long ago shifted to flags of convenience in order to pay lower taxes and ignore U.S regulations. Screw them! If they want our help, make them register under our flag, or the flags of our allies. Libya � what U.S. national interest? Hello?

[navydavesof]

These are some interesting points. One must keep in mind that if it costs $2.3Billion for a new DDG-51 Flight IIA (which it does) then a battleship with magnitudes greater firepower for less than 1/2 the cost is well worth the investment when the battleship can act in places of lower threat where a carrier's offensive firepower if necessary but cannot be afforded.

Concerning the Naval Gunfire Support capability, I am very firm on the idea (and I am open for other opinions on this as well) that the Mk71 MCLWG 8"/60caliber gun would provide a more flexible platform than the 16" of the Iowa-class or the enormous 155mm AGS of DDG-1000. This is because, like Busto has stated, there are only 4 Iowa-class battleships available to us, but the Mk71 can be installed on all new DDG and CG construction and back-fitted on any and all DDG-51s.

I am still not stating that the battleships are to replace the aircraft carriers in the AirSea Battle concept in a first strike role against China. I am still saying that the battleships can act in place of aircraft carriers where carriers are needed but cannot be afforded. This is most important because carriers are going to be in reduced numbers for years if not a decade.

Because the battleships free up the aircraft carriers to focus on the AirSea Battle concept, the look even more attractive. However, I have yet to read the entirety of the paper. I look forward to reading it all so I can totally see where you are coming from.

=================

In a general statement, lots of people get all wrapped up in the "battleships were made obsolete by aircraft carriers in WWII!!!!" argument. Unfortunately, for the conventional thinking, that is not the case.

The reason why I say this is because the mission of the US Navy is to deliver ordnance. One of the main mission of Navy ships is to deliver ordnance ashore. AirSea Battle or not, one of the most important missions of the US Navy is to deliver ordnance in Third World countries. The fact is that 60-80% of targets of interest are within 20-50nm of the coast, and 11" rounds achieved 51 nm, and 13" subcaliber rounds were expected to range to 75 nm. Expending the very limited supply of TLAMs against targets within 16" gunnery range is a horrible waste of resources. It takes 18 months to build another TLAM, and the production line has already been retooled to make torpedoes. Only after the production line was retooled would the Navy be able to begin on the 18 month (or slightly accelerated due to war priorities) cycle to build more TLAMs.

I say TLAM, because the hypersonic missiles don't exist yet (they certainly don't exist for VLS tubes) and we have to operate with what we have. Don't forget that we go to war with the military we have, not the military we want to have or the "if only" hypothetical weapon systems the AirSea Concept proposes and desires. It takes far less to do what I propose to the battleships than to build more aircraft carriers or big deck amphibs in a fiscally restrained environment.

To Busto: Are you working on any model warships? I am very curious what subjects you have in mind and what scale.

Thanks for the input!

[carr]

..

[Busto963]

Also, you seem to take it as a given that the AirSea Battle concept is gospel and that U.S. forces simply can't operate inside 1000 nm without slowly and methodically pounding down every last Chinese missile, plane, sub, and ship before venturing closer.

You misunderstand me - the Navy would be operating within 1,000 nm of shore - heck it would be operating *inside their harbors*, and raining fire upon strategic targets.

The point is that it will be the submarine, drones, and missiles doing the damage.

The CVBGs will be conducting an air-superiority campaign, and enforcing a blockade to cutoff petroleum and other strategic resources, as well as deprive their economy of a market for goods.

This is good old fashion sea control. If you look at history, this is actually the way the Pacific War played out, but with different weapons, tactics.

==================================================================================================================
missed this:

You can't think that we'll never have the need for big explosions again?

We have a need for *big explosions* almost daily in the war - here are two (of many) ways to deliver >= 16" gun penetration:

5,000 lb GBU-28

Massive Ordnance Penetrator MOP GBU-57 30,000 lbs!!!

Massive Ordnance Penetrator MOP GBU-57 30000 lbs.jpg (7.95 KiB) Viewed 2655 times

[navydavesof]

You misunderstand me - the Navy would be operating within 1,000 nm of shore - heck it would be operating *inside their harbors*, and raining fire upon strategic targets.

You just made the case for a battleship not only being able to get within 500-1500nm of the shore but "heck it would be operating *inside their harbors*". Thank you.

The point is that it will be the submarine, drones, and missiles doing the damage.

Missiles, missiles, missiles! When do you plan to run out of missiles? When you have to address hundreds if not thousands of targets, I plan to run out of them inside of only a few strikes. Again...why use missiles when 16" guns can do the same job? Using cruise missiles to destroy targets where a ship can address those same targets with gunnery is wasting a very scarce resource. The prident thing is to use the missiles for more important targets deeper inland where the guns cannot reach.

You are continuing to make a good case for the battleships

The CVBGs will be conducting an air-superiority campaign,

I agree. Air superiority is an excellent use for an aircraft carrier.

...and enforcing a blockade to cutoff petroleum and other strategic resources, as well as deprive their economy of a market for goods. This is good old fashion sea control. If you look at history, this is actually the way the Pacific War played out, but with different weapons, tactics.

Why use an aircraft carrier when surface ships can do this? Prudence us to the conclusion that we can relieve the carriers to do deep inland TACAIR/CAS by allowing groups operating RQ-5 Hunter or other UAVs from surface ships armed with anti-ship cruise missiles and heavy guns to do this. A Battleship Strike Group would fill such a function pretty effectively.

You can't think that we'll never have the need for big explosions again?

We have a need for *big explosions* almost daily in the war - here are two (of many) ways to deliver >= 16" gun penetration...5,000 lb GBU-28

While penetration is not usually going to be used for TACAIR/CAS, trying to make the case as you did earlier that 16" danger close is too big to be useful, TACAIR/CAS involves 2,000lb bombs inside danger close a lot of the time.

I don't know, Busto...you're making a good case for battleships, especially in a Navy with fewer carriers than we need.

[carr]

..

[johndon]

Here is a basic shipbucket representation of the fit I will model.

Dave,

Pardon my ignorance, but I notice that the discone array is missing on the forecastle - I assume this would no longer be required due to the new electronics fit?

John

[navydavesof]

Pardon my ignorance, but I notice that the discone array is missing on the forecastle - I assume this would no longer be required due to the new electronics fit?John

Well, take a look at other Navy ships and see if they still use them Maybe the Iowas should keep them.

[johndon]

Well, take a look at other Navy ships and see if they still use them

Bugger, I've spent ages detailing mine

John

[Busto963]

One must keep in mind that if it costs $2.3Billion for a new DDG-51 Flight IIA (which it does) then a battleship with magnitudes greater firepower for less than 1/2 the cost is well worth the investment when the battleship can act in places of lower threat where a carrier's offensive firepower if necessary but cannot be afforded.

Wrong!

First, the cost of BB reactivation is indeterminate, largely because we do not yet know what we want in the ship (assuming we want more than NGFS/NSFS � really this is �joint strike� capability), but one thing for certain is that the BB will require three DDGs as escorts.

To reactivate the BB we will be paying that $2.3B (your figure) x three, unless you intend on taking DDGs away from the CVBGs, or ABM defense patrols. Ergo, the cost of a single BBBG is going to be at least $6.9B + the unknown cost of BB reactivation (again your figures). See how BB reactivation becomes a major weapons procurement program?

Second, I have worked for the appropriators in Congress � I would love to see you pull the actual contracts to show *exactly* what was authorized, appropriated, obligated, and expensed for the new DDGs. People who are unfamiliar with accounting routinely make incorrect and misleading assumptions based on numbers w/o understanding what it means. This is how the press comes up with $400 toilet seats, which is pure horse crap. Guaranteed there are extended services, training, supplies, etc. in those figures, which distort you saying a DDG-51 costs $2.3B. What else is included in the contract can only be found in the *specific line items*. Besides, the Navy made almost a dozen major modifications to the combat systems of these ships � they are not simply another �DDG 51�; almost every weapon and sensor was affected.

Third, a DDG can do many things a BB cannot (ASW, air defense including ABM, strike). In fact a BBBG (BB + (3) DDGs) with minimal BB modifications, is not much more powerful or flexible than a task unit/SAG made up of three DDGs.

What all this suggests is that you have to be a little more creative about what capabilities you add to your hypothetical BB modernization. Assuming that the �baseline� reactivation cost per your BB is $600 million and we go with your $2.3B per cost of DDG - that means your BBBG is going to cost $7.5B. Stop and think about what capabilities can be added � the BB are very large hulls, and what the marginal costs per added capability will give the entire formation.

Concerning the Naval Gunfire Support capability, I am very firm on the idea (and I am open for other opinions on this as well) that the Mk71 MCLWG 8"/60caliber gun would provide a more flexible platform than the 16" of the Iowa-class or the enormous 155mm AGS of DDG-1000.

Actually the term is �Joint Fires,� and while I strongly agree that the fleet needs a gun system that delivers something along the lines of a 8� shell (~300 lbs), I would not lock myself into a specifc system.

I would argue for a 250-300mm gun - smooth bore, firing saboted, subcaliber rounds. Ideally these could be rounds from existing stocks of modified 8� and even 155mm artillery rounds, as well as a purpose built round in the 350 kg+ range.

I also argue that if the fleet really wants to be able to conduct forcible entry operations from the sea against a major regional power - the Fleet will need a range of mortar, gun/howitzer, and rocket weapons, as well as several combatants of differing sizes to do the job (more mine sweeps too). The USMC will have to abandon, or at least not rely entirely upon vertical envelopment. The USMC constantly blames the Navy for lack of mine sweeps and gunfire platforms, but does not have a widely available means of clearing mines/obstacles from high water to the beach exits (M1ABV is excellent, but too expensive). Nor does it have SP artillery systems that can get into the fight quickly. Sling loading towed howitzers with limited ammunition does not equal a battery of SP 155mm that bring a full load of ammunition and can put steel on target as soon as they get past the high water line. This means the USMC will need new *AFVs* and combat engineering capabilities. Neither service USN or USMC is well prepared to do the job. Tank/AFV capability anyone?

Because the battleships free up the aircraft carriers to focus on the AirSea Battle concept, the look even more attractive. However, I have yet to read the entirety of the paper. I look forward to reading it all so I can totally see where you are coming from.

You simply must read the document, background papers, presentations, as well as professional journals of the Navy and Air Force etc.. Keep in mind that these are unclassified versions and do not go deeper in the nuts and bolts of the issue.

And no, the BBs do not free up CVBGs � that is the essence of the problem.

Operational planning is driven by national strategy; which in turn drives procurement. War against a major regional power or peer competitor means that military responses to lower priority contingencies (e.g. anti-piracy) will be delayed, reduced in scope, or perhaps ignored.

The issue is that the capabilities the Unified Geographic Commanders (particularly CENTCOM and PACOM) are calling for the Navy to provide based upon operational planning are:

• 1) ASW, more ASW, and even more ASW
  2) Theater air defense, particularly ABM defense
  3) Deep strike capability
  4) Protection of USAF C4ISR and tanker assets
  5) Attrition of enemy air superiority and ISR platforms

These priorities make it easy for the Navy to request funding for submarines (preeminent ASW platform), DDG-51s (fleet/theater air defense), CVNs (strike, defeat of air superiority and ISR platforms), UCAVs (deep strike), J-35, etc..

This makes it tough to justify the BB because not only does it take away procurement dollars that could be spent on weapons and platforms that address priority missions, the BB will also have to have additional combatants as escorts.

If you are going to base your BB project in current reality, it has to address a capabilities gap in one or more of the above missions.

In a general statement, lots of people get all wrapped up in the "battleships were made obsolete by aircraft carriers in WWII!!!!" argument.

�Obsolete� is a catch all with little real meaning. It is frequently confused with useful.
The BB was eclipsed as the center piece of fleet action, but had other uses.

Pistols and knives are �obsolete weapons� but in close combat our guys have found them useful.
Like this USMC Sergeant Major who was shot seven (7!) times, grenaded, saved several marines, killed at least one insurgent, and still managed to maintain trigger discipline after loosing 60% of his blood! Photograph, taken by photographer Lucian Read
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bradley_Kasal

The reason why I say this is because the mission of the US Navy is to deliver ordnance. One of the main mission of Navy ships is to deliver ordnance ashore...
AirSea Battle or not, one of the most important missions of the US Navy is to deliver ordnance in Third World countries. The fact is that 60-80% of targets of interest are within 20-50nm of the coast, and 11" rounds achieved 51 nm, and 13" subcaliber rounds were expected to range to 75 nm.

The mission of the U.S. Navy is to win wars and not simply deliver ordinance in third world countries.

Again we are confusing �optional interventions� with major wars that have to won. 60-80% of the �targets of interest� in Iran, China, NK etc. are *not within* 20-50 nm of the coast. Most targets in Japan during WWII were not within 20-50nm of the coast either.

Expending the very limited supply of TLAMs against targets within 16" gunnery range is a horrible waste of resources.

Agree, but are we confusing weapons with the wisdom to use (or not use them)?

I also note that missiles and guns can coexist because they have different characteristics � hence different uses.

To Busto: Are you working on any model warships? I am very curious what subjects you have in mind and what scale.

I like a multitude of subjects, most of my prior experience was armor and large scale military figures.

For ships I have unbuilt 1/350: Fletcher class DD, the DML Scharnhorst, and my pride a Yankee Model Works CB-1 Alaska.

I am also interested in scratch building a couple of hypothetical modern combatants, and have assembled, made a couple of silicone molds, and actually cast a few weapons to this end (thanks to this site). Unfortunately I think I am going to be a long time in building due to a bathroom remodel, and major interior painting project.

[Busto963]

The U.S has established not only air, but space superiority (expect everyone's satellites to go pfff! on day one�).

This is one of my concerns about the U.S. military, in general, and the Navy/AirSea Battle, in particular. If satellite communications and GPS capability are going to be lost, how will all the missiles and UAVs function? Heck, for that matter, how will ships and planes navigate?

The AirSea Battle document acknowledges the likelihood of loss of space-based assets at the onset of war and then simply proceeds to ignore the consequences as it goes on to describe UAV operations and missile strikes. To be fair, the document ignores this issue equally for both sides, crediting the Chinese with pinpoint ballistic missile accuracy, faultless targeting, and unimpeded communications. To the best of my knowledge, UAV operations are mostly satcom based (certainly, the long range ones) and missiles rely heavily on GPS for navigation.

There's always inertial navigation but that hardly constitutes precision strike.

Who has the Navy's sextant, by the way?

Anyone have any insight on this?

There are a number of solutions/work arounds to this, many in the strategy documents themselves.

The obvious is to replace the satellites, while killing the enemy capability to destroy/jam/cyber attack the new satellites. then there are aircraft/drones/HAVs etc. that can temporarily replace satellites.

[carr]

..

[Busto963]

The obvious is to replace the satellites, while killing the enemy capability to destroy/jam/cyber attack the new satellites. then there are aircraft/drones/HAVs etc. that can temporarily replace satellites.

I'm sure it would be quite some time before new satellites aren't being knocked out as fast as they're deployed.

Aircraft/drones/etc. constitute a network of communications relay stations and, while functional, would be haphazard in coverage area, limited in range and bandwidth, susceptible to localized jamming, and vulnerable to routine air-to-air kills.

This seems to be a point of weakness and a huge advantage will go to the side that best manages the problem. Hopefully, we're preparing for it.

Along that line, I hope the Navy occasionally turns off its GPS systems and tries to navigate without it so that they'll be ready when the time comes. I would also hope that the Navy runs all their UAV training exercises in a self-imposed heavy jamming environment because that's what we'll face in a serious war.

It has been a while, but I am sure that all combatants have either inertial navigation systems, or at least gyroscopes - pretty tough to use GPS on a submerged submarine.

As to jamming etc. - well this is a problem even with the "low tech" taliban, etc. we are fighting today. Not all of the enemy fit the stereo types - in fact, the profile of senior AQ and other Islamo-fascist leaders include plenty of engineers and doctors (often educatated in European or US universities). Besides, lack of wealth, or even education does not mean lack of intelligence. No one should have been shocked when EFPs capable of knocking out M-1 tanks appeared in Iraq.

And beyond a whole new set of boosters Atlas V, Delta IV etc., there is this beauty: