What if Modernized USS Iowa and USS Wisconsin

[navydavesof]

Wrong!

Could you please explain exactly why you don't think a battleship can fill a void left by carriers removed from service. I would like for you to refute my premise of:

• 1) Carriers are being removed from service for budgetary savings, not National Strategy nor Operational Planning. National Strategy and Operational Planning are now being dictated by budgets. The Navy's mission will have to change to a surge force instead of a present force. The USS George Washington is slated for decommissioning because the right beans add up to a politically expedient number, not because we need fewer carriers. We need to maintain as much of the offensive carrier power as we can.
  
  2) Thus the premise we are operating on is that we still need heavy carrier like offensive power. The fact that the battleship delivers incredible amounts of firepower is not in question. With simple modifications to existing projectiles and developed projectiles, they can be GPS guided and will not suffer the dispersion and deflection associated with standard gunnery. New projectiles can have the same capability and can range from 51nm to 75nm.
  
  3) Projectiles are typically cheaper than missiles. In this case by many times.

I have addressed your concerns so I am confused as to what you are having an issue with. Could you please specifically list the particular points you disagree with?

...but one thing for certain is that the BB will require three DDGs as escorts. To reactivate the BB we will be paying that $2.3B (your figure) x three, unless you intend on taking DDGs away from the CVBGs, or ABM defense patrols. Ergo, the cost of a single BBBG is going to be at least $6.9B + the unknown cost of BB reactivation (again your figures). See how BB reactivation becomes a major weapons procurement program?

Again this is not adding battleships to the existing carrier force. This is replacing carriers we are losing anyway with a ship that can do significantly more for less money and expendature than utilizing of scare ordnance like the Tomahawk.

Second, I have worked for the appropriators in Congress � I would love to see you pull the actual contracts to show *exactly* what was authorized, appropriated, obligated, and expensed for the new DDGs. People who are unfamiliar with accounting routinely make incorrect and misleading assumptions based on numbers w/o understanding what it means. This is how the press comes up with $400 toilet seats, which is pure horse crap.

It does not matter what kind of accounting tricks you want to play (Congress is now holding the Navy accountable for deceptive accounting), the total figure for the ship is the total figure for the ship. Everything involved in the ship from raw ore to the commissioning ceremony is the total cost. It is a shame the Navy feels it has to try to hide or lump costs together to get something done.

Third, a DDG can do many things a BB cannot (ASW, air defense including ABM, strike). In fact a BBBG (BB + (3) DDGs) with minimal BB modifications, is not much more powerful or flexible than a task unit/SAG made up of three DDGs.

First, just like a Carrier Strike Group is a CSG, a Battleship Strike Group would be a BSG, not a BBBG. Second, DDGs cannot conduct the strike and support missions a BB can. That's why you insert a battleship into a carrier strike group when the carrier is taken away from it. The group of escort ships cannot offer the same level of offensive power as the battleship.

On another topic the Navy is guilty of, the list of heavy missions you listed for the DDG is the primary reason why DDGs fail in their escort duties a LOT more often than they used to. DDGs are over tasked with conducting mega missions like AAW, BMD, and ASW all at once. The Spruance-class ships showed us the contrast between focused mission ships that were feared and multi-mega mission platforms that can do a lot but have ADHD and can't do anything very well.

What all this suggests is that you have to be a little more creative about what capabilities you add to your hypothetical BB modernization. Assuming that the �baseline� reactivation cost per your BB is $600 million and we go with your $2.3B per cost of DDG - that means your BBBG is going to cost $7.5B. Stop and think about what capabilities can be added � the BB are very large hulls, and what the marginal costs per added capability will give the entire formation.

Again, you don't have to build new ships. You are not building more groups. The reactivation cost involves only the reconditioning, reactivation, modernization of the ship, and sailors changing rates.

Concerning the Naval Gunfire Support capability, I am very firm on the idea (and I am open for other opinions on this as well) that the Mk71 MCLWG 8"/60caliber gun would provide a more flexible platform than the 16" of the Iowa-class or the enormous 155mm AGS of DDG-1000.

Actually the term is �Joint Fires,�

You and I are not the only ones reading this so I am using the more commonly known terms like NGFS/NSFS/TACAIR.

...while I strongly agree that the fleet needs a gun system that delivers something along the lines of a 8� shell (~300 lbs), I would not lock myself into a specific system.

I list the Mk71 because it is an existing system, was already approved for use by the Navy, would need little modification/modernization for use in modern ships, and it would fill an immediate need in the near, mid, and long term, and it has already been engineered to fit in the DDG-51-class.

I would argue for a 250-300mm gun - smooth bore, firing saboted, subcaliber rounds. Ideally these could be rounds from existing stocks of modified 8� and even 155mm artillery rounds, as well as a purpose built round in the 350 kg+ range.

I would, too, but look at the AGS. Anything starting from scratch like a 250-300mm gun is a long, long term goal. The Mk71 already exists, and United Defense, the makers of the AGS, own the plans.

The MK71 can do the job in only a few years instead of taking nearly 2 decades to develop from scratch just to be too big for installation aboard a DDG like the AGS has.

[Busto963]

Could you please explain exactly why you don't think a battleship can fill a void left by carriers removed from service. I would like for you to refute my premise ...

Short answer, because a BB cannot do this:

The issue is that *you have not made the case for BB reactivation* - The war fighters (Geographic Unified Commanders) are not calling for this, the Joint Staff are not pushing for this, the SECDEF isn't pushing for this, and the last time Congress addressed battleships seriously (aka in an *appropriations bill*) was in Section 1011 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, and that was to provide support to amphibious landings.

The BB does not fit into the high with current operational thinking either within the Navy, or DoD (AKA AirSea Battle)- in fact it will require 2-3 DDGs, and arguably an SSN for as escorts in a major regional war - this means reactivating a BB either takes away from fleet ASW and TMD defense assets, or it costs at least $6.9B for buying additional DDGs and or SSNs escorts.

You can blaze away with anecdotes and your perception of reality, etc. but *you* are trying to fit scenarios to the BB, not select appropriate responses from across all services.

Why for example is it that the eight (8!!!) LHDs, which are essentially small aircraft carriers, cannot handle the low priority missions you envision for the BB? These LHDs are not suited for deep strike missions, ASW, air superiority, etc. called for in AirSea Battle. Ergo they are available for low priority missions you envision http://www.naval-technology.com/project ... wasp1.html

[SumGui]

I continue to be a fan of the BBs as they add diversification of capabilities available to generate the effects needed to prosecute targets and therefore execute the national strategy.

The solutions proposed are achievable in the near term, be they from abandoned programs or extant systems not yet used in the proposed manner. Nothing proposed for the BB refit is science fiction � the �What-if� is combining these items, completing development, and applying them in new ways.

Gunfire for +/- 120 nm (with sub-caliber rounds for the 406mm or improved 203mm rounds, if Mk 71 derivative is fitted) would be superior to aircraft for the same area � lower cost per strike, not limited by weather, harder for the enemy to interdict (electronically or otherwise), etc. �Joint Fires� via naval rifle would have a reaction time better than launching an aircraft, but not better than an aircraft already in a CAS support box � this is why arty is still king for the US Army.

Aircraft in the same area would be more susceptible to countermeasure (interception, for instance) and would require either escort (in order to concentrate on the ground target needing to be serviced, or the Marines/Soldiers on the ground � close air support requires concentration) or a permissive environment. Naturally servicing a target with a stand-off weapon may not require the same amount of strike package protection, but that is not a situation which is appropriate to close air support.

When the permissive air environment exists, and bases are available, and we have overfly rights, and there is a platform available, the AC-130 is a master of direct support, until it has to RTB. The 130 has great endurance, but it also must burn some of that endurance on transit to and from, as with any aircraft. In general, the same can be said of the A-10.

The BB is the better option within its range for the non-permissive environment, as the density of fire available and passive protection strike me as a perfect fit for environments when you cannot put a large deck, such as the Straits of Hormuz and Taiwan. The passive protection also allows for more aggressive positioning for deep strike (Tomahawk).

Note that the passive protection of the BB is IN ADDITION to already existing defense systems available to any battle group, with the exception of air superiority without the CVN's aircraft - but that air may be available from non-US/USN aircraft in theater. or the given target may not have significant air capability.

Outside of the 120nm �Gun� bubble � aircraft are the better option. So the BB enhances the CVN by allowing the air wing to concentrate where the aircraft is the better option.

This 120nm �bubble� is a great place to allow the USMC to enter and establish a foothold to allow other forces a secure area to marshal for subsequent action, as needed.

In some cases, the role would be for the BB to be the belligerent target, as US policy generally strives for the first military action to come from the other side, so they can be seen internationally as the aggressor.

1500 personnel to operate a BB is significantly less cost that the 6000 required for a CVN, so within a 120nm non-permissive environment, the BB is the better bang for the buck, and in an extremely hot environment, the BB/CVN combination provides a diversity of capabilities which almost no power existing today can effectively counter.

As CVN replacements, escorts for the BB will not be more than that for a decommissioned CVN, so there are no additional costs (the BB would use the escorts the decommed CVN would have operated with).

A return of range of aircraft and diversity of mission capabilities to the CVN should be a number one priority to the Carrier community, and reducing the reliance on overly short range aircraft, for at least the strike role, should facilitate improving the air wing�s equipment.

[HvyCgn9]

Well said mate

Merry Beermas!!

Bruce

[navydavesof]

Wow, that got out of hand.

You know, a lot of the time it's better not to publically show your hand, especially on the internet.

In the Navy, it has always surprised me how offended some people get when you question an established system. When you suggest there maybe a problem with a refined system they sometimes act like you're personally attacking them. That's one way you can see that they're jaded and that they're no longer thinking objectively.

I have seen a similar problem on a lot of forums, and that usually leads to one side not considering all of what the other party says, and the entire thread turns into an insult match and people saying "nu-uh, you! Nu-HU, YOU!" The best transaction of ideas is when people have a discussion. When people just want to tell you how wrong you are without telling you what you're wrong about, that's not a discussion, it's a one-sided meat gazing match...and that's gross.

I am glad this forum is moderated like it is. They do a good job keeping us reasonably professional!

[Busto963]

In the Navy, it has always surprised me how offended some people get when you question an established system. When you suggest there maybe a problem with a refined system they sometimes act like you're personally attacking them. That's one way you can see that they're jaded and that they're no longer thinking objectively.

I have made a career out of "questioning the system" - and been paid quite well to do so.

The issue here is that you are not even looking at what people in "the system" or "outside the system" are saying, but feel free to dismiss every contrary opinion. That is a great example of the closed minded thinking that you are flailing against, not to mention "the pot calling the tea kettle black."

Worse, you clearly do not have a serious professional or technical background to go after people (like when you challenged me reference "danger close):
1) By your own admission you have no education, or experience as an FO/Anglico/FAC etc. your opinions are based on supposition and anecdote.
2) You are not a strike planner, never done post strike BDAs etc.
3) You are not familiar with ASW (a key component of naval thinking)
4) You are not an engineer, scientist, Operations Research Analyst etc.
5) You have no experience with procurement, manpower, shipbuilding etc.

The goes on, but does this sound like a reasonable basis for telling Admiral Greenert the Chief of Naval Operations, General Schwartz the Air Force Chief of Staff, Admiral Willard, Commander of USPACOM that their assessments are unsound?

I have noted on several occasions that you have made statements regarding Congress and BB activation which are simply not true - I have asked you several times to provide documentation to your claims regarding Congressional interest in reactivation of BBs - no response. Anyone can look at the unclassified Congressional hearings, and even classified programs have funding lines defined in the National Defense Appropriations.

[Busto963]

When the permissive air environment exists, and bases are available, and we have overfly rights, and there is a platform available, the AC-130 is a master of direct support, until it has to RTB. The 130 has great endurance, but it also must burn some of that endurance on transit to and from, as with any aircraft. In general, the same can be said of the A-10.

The BB is the better option within its range for the non-permissive environment,

This is the heart of the argument, Almost any weapon systems works in a permissive environment, but I do not believe the BB can fight in a �non-permissive environment.� Without massive support of submarine escorts, sea and land based air protection, and surface escorts -that makes it a tough sell.

Non permissive implies a peer/major regional power with significant area denial capabilities defined as submarine, mines, ASBMs, long range strike aircraft (including stealth), and other asymmetrical capabilities, which bodes ill for the BB.

There is a chorus of professional concern that a carrier and her escorts will have a difficult time operating against such an opponent - how do you expect a BB which must close significantly even with a 200 nm range, than a carrier? Assuming a combat radius of 800 nm for SU30MKK2 and 200nm range for the 16" sub-caliber shells (which are not in production - no stock pile, and of course more expensive and less payload), the battleship will require over 26 hours of exposure to substantial enemy land based air power, on the way in to its target, and another 26 hours on the way out. And then of course there are the submarines, IRBMs etc. to deal with. If we let the enemy air forces tank (they have a robust capability), and give them long range ASCMs (which they have en mass...) - the exposure time doubles.

This drawing from page 24 of Why AirSea Battle? By Andrew F. Krepinevich demonstrates the problem (you can click on the picture to enlarge it):

• �In fact, when considering the military-modernization programs of countries like China, we should be concerned less with their potential ability to challenge the U.S. symmetrically � fighter to fighter or ship to ship � and more with their ability to disrupt our freedom of movement and narrow our strategic options. Their investments in cyber and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, and ballistic missiles could threaten America�s primary way to project power and help allies in the Pacific � in particular our forward air bases and carrier strike groups. This would degrade the effectiveness of short-range fighters and put more of a premium on being able to strike from over the horizon � whatever form that capability might take.�

As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, National Harbor, MD, Wednesday, September 16, 2009 http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech. ... echid=1379

• To summarize, those American carrier strike groups that survive ASBM attacks in the outer layer of the PRC�s maritime A2/AD network and succeed in penetrating into the western Philippine Sea near Taiwan risk confronting barrages of anti-ship cruise missile salvos launched from PLAN submarines, as well as multiple torpedo attacks. As such, future US naval commanders seem likely to confront the prospect of either proceeding rapidly to pierce Chinese A2/AD defenses, but at a terrible (and perhaps prohibitive) price, or defaulting to a protracted campaign in which the PLAN submarine force is gradually eliminated as a significant threat.

page 23 of Why AirSea Battle? By Andrew F. Krepinevich

• Appendix E. Excerpt from April 2011 Testimony of
  [Admiral Willard] Commander, U.S. Pacific Command
  
  "For example, China continues to accelerate its offensive air and missile developments without corresponding public clarification about how these forces will be utilized. Of particular concern is the expanding inventory of ballistic and cruise missiles (which include anti-ship capability) and the development of modern, fourth- and fifth generation stealthy combat aircraft. In conjunction, China is pursuing counter-space and - cyber capabilities that can be used to not only disrupt U.S. military operations, but also to threaten the space- and cyber-based information infrastructure that enables international communications and commerce."

Page 132 of China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities�Background and Issues for Congress Ronald O'Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs October 20, 2011

• "Augmenting the H-6Ks in the maritime strike role are land-based strike fighters, the most impressive of which is the Russian-built Su-30MKK2, a variant of the highly maneuverable Russian Su-27 Flanker air superiority fighter. The aircraft is roughly comparable to the US F-15E Strike Eagle. With a normal combat load, the aircraft has an impressive unrefueled combat radius of about 860 nm. Consequently, as with the H-6K, the Su-30MKK2 outranges all of the manned strike aircraft in the US Navy�s program of record carrier air wing. Moreover, its strike range can be extended out to 1,400 nm with one refueling, meaning the aircraft could escort H-6Ks over nearly their entire unrefueled strike range. This raises the specter of combined fighter and bomber attacks against US aircraft carriers�a threat not encountered since World War II.50 It appears Chinese air and naval air forces will soon field some five hundred modern, fourth-generation fighters and strike-fighters, or about twelve CVW equivalents of strike aircraft. With support from China�s A-50 AWACS and H-6U and II-78MKK tankers, these aircraft will be able to contest US forces for control of the air in the Western Pacific and to strike targets at ranges beyond 850 nm."

Page 21 Why AirSea Battle? By Andrew F. Krepinevich

These reasons make the submarine and long range stealthy drones/cruise missiles the future of Air Sea Battle

[navydavesof]

Busto,

You're acting like the conversation the group is having is a personal attack on you just because we are not agreeing with you right off the bat. It's not.

I apologize for not addressing every point you have made, but as you have probably experienced yourself, in my line of work I don't have a whole lot of spare time. I think it's great that you have been so successful that you are either retired or you have made enough money to where you have time to write all that you write. It's very fascinating and quite educational. It really helps show us where you're coming from. My schedule is a little more constrained. If I am not at the office, I am in the gym, in the pool, negotiating an obstacle course, learning a new martial art, running, learning demolitions, maintaining my gear, or corresponding with people from whom I can learn. I don't have a whole lot of time to build the models I want to build or have the conversations on here as I would like. I apologize that I don't have the time to counter all the necessary points in the posts you make.

I have made a career out of "questioning the system" - and been paid quite well to do so.

The issue here is that you are not even looking at what people in "the system" or "outside the system" are saying, but feel free to dismiss every contrary opinion.

I have not been dismissing any opinions. I take them on board and have addressed the ones I disagree with. With you it's been more of trying to keep you on track. You keep drawing the issue back to the AirSea Battle paper that addresses a conflict with China. I keep trying go get you to understand that the subject is not China, nor should it be. Sure the battleships can participate in a conflict with China, as you said we would be operating from within their own harbors, but the Navy is concerned about more than just China.

Worse, you clearly do not have a serious professional or technical background to go after people (like when you challenged me reference "danger close)

It's interesting you took it that way. I am surprised. I did not go after you. I corrected you.

1) By your own admission you have no education, or experience as an FO/Anglico/FAC etc. your opinions are based on supposition and anecdote.
2) You are not a strike planner, never done post strike BDAs etc.
3) You are not familiar with ASW (a key component of naval thinking)
4) You are not an engineer, scientist, Operations Research Analyst etc.
5) You have no experience with procurement, manpower, shipbuilding etc.

Actually it turns out that I only mentioned the first of your points. The other 4, you are assuming an awful lot. Don�t forget, �Assuming makes an ass out of you, not me�.

I don't share with many people on here who I am and what experience I have, because I don't need to. All anyone needs to know is that my screen name is what it is, and I have a mentality to lean forward into every new day, because the only easy day was yesterday. I don't share how many ships I have boarded or what kinds of trainings I have gone through, where I have been, how warm the water is in the Persian Gulf or what the visibility is like, what Arabs smell like, how poor their muzzle discipline is, or how much sand I have breathed, because I don't need to. This is not a policy forum on SIPERNet where in depth introductions are needed. This is a modeling website. We build models and talk about stuff here.

I guess I will address the concerns above because you didn't read what I wrote earlier.
1) I said I have not formally been to the ANGLICO school. I did not get a seat in the class, because due to the continuing resolution, my command did not have the training funds to pay for a seat in the class. However, my CO coordinated with the school's OIC and instructors to allow me to sit in the classroom portions and go on the FieldEX to Ft Pickett. Because of this, I did not receive the NEC, but I received a lot of hands on training coordinating with adjacent forces via grid squares, GPS, and laser designation, and because of the training I was able to coordinated several stand by 5" fire missions from a CG while down range. My CO saw the advantage in this, and a permanent funding line has been allocated to the squadrons my old unit is apart of for ANGLICO school, and people receive the training every year. Like I said earlier, I have training in the area, but I would like to go to the school for real, get credit for it, and get more practice, because the qual is only good for 6 months anyway.

2)No, I am not a strike planner, nor am I a leprechaun. I don't see what that has to do with the idea of taking out targets with cheap, plentiful, and quickly manufactured ordnance instead of expensive, scare ordnance that takes 18 months to build. Nor do I see what it has to do with utilizing a platform we already have with weapon systems we currently manufacture for (even in the largest projections) very little comparative cost.

3) We have not talked about ASW, but I am very familiar with it. I have written a points paper for the CNO's SSG about the ASW situation, and I have configured a ship design that can cheaply (approximately 1/2 the cost) and effectively address the problem while improving the fleets ASuW and NSFS capability.

4) We have not talked about engineering, but I am an engineer educated at Texas A&M University, and I was the first enlistedman invited to work at the War College by a 4-star Admiral as an unconventional analyst.

5) We have not talked about shipbuilding or man power, either. I have spent a long time talking to the Iowa-class Modernization project manager, one of the best naval architects to work at Longbeach Naval Shipyard, about the ins and outs about how the Iowas were modernized in the 1960s, 1980s, and how they were to be fitted with VLS, 5"/54caliber guns, and an AAW weapon direction system and launchers in the 1990s. I have frequent correspondence and the occasional telephone call with Ronald O'Rourke of CRS about the modern Naval issues. When I don't know I go to the people who know and ask. Then I know.

The goes on, but does this sound like a reasonable basis for telling Admiral Greenert the Chief of Naval Operations, General Schwartz the Air Force Chief of Staff, Admiral Willard, Commander of USPACOM that their assessments are unsound?

No, but being a thinking person does justify questioning any assessment. On the topic of the AirSea Battle paper, despite Admiral Greenert's and Admiral Roughead's endorsements, Admiral Roughead did not change procurement to reflect the needs put forward in the AirSea Battle paper. Admiral Greenert has said nothing that would lead one to believe that procurement is going to be shifted to reflect the conclusions put forward in the paper. Forty percent of the Navy's new procurement is in the Littoral Combat ship, a ship that can't realistically answer any of the heavy needs expressed in the AirSea Battle paper. More important than that the Navy is looking at drawing down to a 220 ship fleet and reducing 1-2 CVNs in the near term and posslibly 3 in the long term. The George Washington crew has already been warned that this is likely the ship's last forward deployment cycle. The ship is looking at decommissioning instead of refueling in 2016 or earlier. The Ford is being pushed out even further so we won't have it for years longer than already projected.

It is clear there are a lot of flag officers who really like the AirSea Battle paper, but we have to keep in mind the most important thing here. Political whims are now driving force levels, not National Strategy. The coming budget reductions will gut the military, and the Navy is already cutting. I have seen nearly 20% of my command be kicked out of the Navy because of budget driven manpower reductions.

You go to war with the military you have. Popular or not, the US Military does not have the means to carry out the AirSea Battle presently much less to build to the capabilities ($200 million conventional ballistic missiles - your number) it calls for. If we want the AirSea Battle to become procurement reality, we need another political administration. Otherwise, the AirSea Battle is nothing more than a paper popular amongst flag officers.

I have noted on several occasions that you have made statements regarding Congress and BB activation which are simply not true - I have asked you several times to provide documentation to your claims regarding Congressional interest in reactivation of BBs - no response. Anyone can look at the unclassified Congressional hearings, and even classified programs have funding lines defined in the National Defense Appropriations.

I am not sure where you are going with this. The idea here is not to point out what the Congress has already said. It's to point out what short comings can be filled in the near to mid-term with what we have on hand. The battleships have capabilities that Congress did not address. If you want to, you can watch the congressional testimony CAPT Fred Moosally gave in 1990 about how the battleships had far more capability than the Navy (or Congress) was giving them credit for. NSFS (NGFS then) was only a small portion of the missions the ship was capable of accomplishing. As I have illustrated before, the same is true today. This is �outside of the box� thinking. If you don't like what I have to say, how about the men who drove the battleships around and executed wartime and deturrent missions with them?
http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/SIowaI

There is a chorus of professional concern that a carrier and her escorts will have a difficult time operating against such an opponent - how do you expect a BB which must close significantly even with a 200 nm range, than a carrier?

I think you missed his point. I don't think SumGui or anyone here is concerned about a BB getting in and fighting with China in the middle of the first stages of the conflict. However, anyone who knows Aegis or has spent a considerable amount of time talking with senior Aegis technicians, knows that if you like it or not, Aegis is a really, really good platform and if functioning in a wartime posture will successfully defend any group in high threat environments without the aid of air cover.

...the battleship will require over 26 hours of exposure to substantial enemy land based air power, on the way in to its target, and another 26 hours on the way out. And then of course there are the submarines, IRBMs etc. to deal with. If we let the enemy air forces tank (they have a robust capability), and give them long range ASCMs (which they have en mass...) - the exposure time doubles.

This is very true. But again, a group would not likely be sent into a Chinese scenario like that anyway you go about it.

The rest of the things you talk about are China based. The subject has always been the battleship going where heavy ordnance is needed but the presence of carriers can't be afforded.

These reasons make the submarine and long range stealthy drones/cruise missiles the future of Air Sea Battle

The AirSea Battle will benefit from these, but current Navy budgeting cannot afford the necessary growth, especially in SSGNs in the near or mid term to meet these challenges. The fact that some of our most sophisticated UAVs have either been commandeered by a foreign power and safely landed or have safely landed themselves instead of self-destructing in enemy territory puts the heavy use of UAVs AirSea Battle calls for in the "highly questionable/unreliable" box.

That is a great example of the closed minded thinking that you are flailing against, not to mention "the pot calling the tea kettle black."

..."flailing"? Really? Mr. Busto...I have used italics, bold, and underlines because that's a similar tone you have taking, but you're using colors, derogatory statements, etc. in every one of your messages. In the written world that means you're being really, really emphatic...like yelling. I am making statements. You continue to make points that I have already countered as if you did not read my response at all. It's these types of things that illustrate yourself to be emotionally compromised as opposed to being a conversationalist. You've been so offended by my factual statements that you do not address them but instead make personal attacks so bad that you're censored by the moderators.

Like I said when I started this post, just because we're not giving you absolute authority when you say something does not mean we're attacking you. We are making points that counter what you have to say. As you can see, we are having conversations, we're exchanging ideas, and trying to learn. Your "how dare you question me" tone does not add to the conversation.

I invite you to start a thread about the AirSea Battle so we can talk about it, but I think enough has been said about it here.

====
edit for spelling errors I initially overlooked. Ron would kick me in the ass.

[Timmy C]

Ronald* O'Rourke

[tko24]

[ex-navy]

wow.....
Been gone for a while and it seems that some people feel the need to vent... which is everyone's right... but I thought this was a forum for discussion of ship designs and models...
I still agree that the BB has a role but don't ask me what that role is ... but as someone who has been in the military for nearly 30 years.. things don't change they just get re-looked at or looked at a different way.. I can remember this same conversation back in the late 70's in my N.R.O.T.C... when they first talked about bring these ship back...
Before my surgery.. my wife took me on a surprise trip, she book a private tour of the USS Alabama BB-60.. for me it was an eye opener,She is a well perserved... I don't know how the IOWA's are maintained.. but this could work IMHO....

[Seasick]

The PLA-N has been developing anti-ship balistic missiles for a while as did the Soviet Union. The USN has been preparing for this, the SM-3 has from the beginning been designed to deal with this threat.

[navydavesof]

The PLA-N has been developing anti-ship balistic missiles for a while as did the Soviet Union. The USN has been preparing for this, the SM-3 has from the beginning been designed to deal with this threat.

While the SM-3 fills the engagement gap in the extra-atmosphere region, the Lockheed and Navy says the SM-3 was designed to address the speed and altitude specifications of rouge intercontinental ballistic missiles, the difference being altitude and speed achieved by the missile in flight. Because of the ranges involved, an ASBM would (presumably) not go nearly as high in the sky nor as fast as an ICBM. I would actually put my money on the SM-2 BlockIV being more practical than the SM-3 in a real ASBM engagement. The SM-2 Block IV is more plentiful and engages a ballistic missile in its terminal phase. The SM-3 engages outside of the atmosphere.

This ABM stuff is a great use for Aegis, but it really sucks that so few ships are capable of doing it, and we aren't making any new Aegis WDS capable of BMD. If I were to make a real cruiser (a project carr and I have been poking around with) I would give it a definate ABM capability with the missile capability to engage at all phases of ballistic missile flight.

[Timmy C]

Actually, current SM-3s (IA and IB) are designed for mid-course medium-range ballistic missiles, with, as you noted, the SM-2 Block IV for the terminal phase. SM-3 IIA, expected by 2018, is the one that is meant for intermediate range BMs, with some ICBM engagement capability.

[navydavesof]

Actually, current SM-3s (IA and IB) are designed for mid-course medium-range ballistic missiles, with, as you noted, the SM-2 Block IV for the terminal phase. SM-3 IIA, expected by 2018, is the one that is meant for intermediate range BMs, with some ICBM engagement capability.

It amazes me that we can jam all of this stuff into a Mk41 VLS canister. If you ever see these in real life you understand how small these missiles are and how much money must go into miniaturizing these weapons to fit into existing systems.

I am curious what they will someday make for the Mk57 VLS. It will be interesting to see what kind of capabilities they will have.

[Timmy C]

21" diameter, right? I can put one and most another ruler next to each other, thanks

[JevJanson]

I personally agree with the idea of reactivating at least two of the Iowas. I feel the best combination is a carrier doing long range strikes, and the battleship being the cheap, close-in artillery that the navy has been lacking for years. Personally, I would like to see a Montana or two in Scheme 8 design being built.

[Norseman]

I think that a modernized battleship with an escort group would be an ideal force multiplier in the Arabian Gulf, given the current situation.

but in now a day navy you have to have a carrier in theater, you don't really have to have a BB.

Well, you see, that's the thing. We don't have enough carriers to "have to have" a carrier in theater. The carrier fills the roll of a capital ship capable of delivering significantly more power than a group of small escorts over a greater range. When that is the capability requirement in a capital ship, and you have fewer carriers than "presence" requires, then you have to look other places for capital ships that can provide "presence". Presence is another of the battleship's strengths.

While the battleship does not deliver ordnance at the same ranges as a carrier, it delivers significantly more ordnance in volume and speed than a cluster of smaller ships and acts as a center piece (capital) ship for significantly less money than an aircraft carrier.

When you cannot afford a carrier but still need as massive power projection as possible with the money available, you look around to see what you have. A battleship provides a massive ordnance delivery capability for significantly less cost than a carrier. One of the advantages is that a battleship gives you as many if not more capital ships to maintain presence with very sharp teeth when you are not allowed to have as many carriers as you want.

So my exercise here is to see what other people think cost-effective upgrades to the battleships that I have not thought of already.

What if you still removed the aft main and installed as many missile to missile weapon systems as possible.

The ship would be really out of trim. It would nose down badly. Even if the weight of the turret were kept somewhere on the stern of the ship, Patriot is a land base system that has a terrible time on a moving platform. The Navy has Aegis equipped for anti-ballistic missile, and it works very well to this point. Last I read we had 16 cruisers and destroyers so equipped. The battleships would need Aegis installed (which really can't be) and would only provide a capability we already have in place of a more valuable capability on a unique platform like a battleship. You can't put 16" guns on a cruiser, and they already come on a battleship.

I think four of the ships with about eight different sets of systems on board the world would have a lot better night of sleep with these systems parked off shore, especially if you live with in the range of Kym yun ill.

CGs and DDGs take care of that. The Marines, Army, and Special Forces are the ones who sleep better because a battleship is off the coast. The pirates and terrorists have a hard time sleeping, which is so, so good.

Even though we can upgrade the defenses on a battleship, battleships are hugely offensive platforms. That quality that is rare and makes it an asset.

[Busto963]

Dave,

First, I was wrong about your education, and as a former PE I apologize and respect your education as an engineer. It is great you have a degree in that field.

That said, as a retired SOF officer to a fellow warrior, you are really do not have much to stand on when you try to trade on SOF quals to tell people about joint fires, weapon mixes, weapon procurement etc.. Being SOF is a notable achievement, but gives you no expertise about conventional naval warfare, particularly strike and ASW warfare. You are as qualified on these topics as you are in telling the Army how to run an Armored Cavalry Regiment, or the Air Force how to run its strategic forces.

Worse, you still haven�t absorbed what the experts at naval warfare are saying about A2/AD, AirSea Battle etc. - it isn�t just China, a lot of countries are pursuing these *capabilities* (not necessarily tied to conventional forces) including Iran, NK, Pakistan, India, and of course Russia. Heck you admit to not even reading the doctrine. Most Navy procurement is now oriented at sea control (ASW, or anti A2/AD) and strike warfare platforms. Look at the dollars spent on on SSNs, Aegis BMD 5.0 on the DDGs, BAMs, P-8s, etc..

You've been so offended by my factual statements that you do not address them but instead make personal attacks so bad that you're censored by the moderators.

Oh horse crap! Kindly point to one post that I have made that has been �censored by the moderators.�

And offense is not the word I would use... you have made some good counter points, but on the whole I am laughing at some of the outrageous positions you have set out!

Worse, you clearly do not have a serious professional or technical background to go after people (like when you challenged me reference "danger close)

It's interesting you took it that way. I am surprised. I did not go after you. I corrected you.

Dave, there is a reason you don�t have the qualification � you missed the most important part of directing fires, which is what to do when there is the potential for fratricide (AKA the danger close procedures that you call a �myth�)!

This quote demonstrates your professional ignorance about controlling fires: on Wed Nov 30, 2011 8:45 pm:

�There are a lot of inaccurate claims out there that fall into the "battleship myth" category. busto's quote about an 800 meter danger close area is a new one.�

According to you USMC Field Manual FM 6-30 Tactics, Techniques, Procedures for Observed Fire is FUBAR.

Your first responsibility before flinging high explosives around a battlefield is to account for munitions expended so you don�t kill Americans, our allies, or non-combatants (civilians). Clearly you missed that block in "training", but I guarantee that the first thing any FSCC, or FDC does upon receiving your call for fire, is to look on a map for friendlies. If the FSCC, or FDC thinks you should be following danger close procedures, but aren�t; they are likely to refuse the fire mission, or push an airborne FAC to take over the mission.

I have no hesitation about the emphasis because I spent two-years in Iraq, and during that time I personally know of three different incidents where screwed up fire missions killed, or injured friendly forces, or civilians and the military court martialed four guys for the negligence. Those guys got time in a federal penitentiary for failing to follow protocols and procedures and they were actually trained (unlike you).

And in spite of the engineering degree, you still are not even remotely qualified to make the claims about 16� gun fire effectiveness versus other artillery systems. Your anecdotal evidence is just that; anecdote.

Again, no commander who fought in Iraq (1991 or 2003-2011) felt that he did not have enough fire support. Have you ever seen a battalion, regiment, brigade, division, or corps fire support plan? Could you develop one?

• 1. Why is it that *every army on the globe* has pretty much universally adopted 120mm mortars, 15 cm (152-155mm) howitzers, MRLS rockets in the 122,160, 227, and 300mm calibers to support its maneuver units?
  
  2. What are the sorts of targets that, the frontages, and battlefield depths that battalion, regiment, brigade, division, or corps fire support plans address?
  
  3. Why do most fire missions call for suppressive, not destructive fires?
  
  4. How have distributed fires plans, SP guns, and APU equipped towed artillery systems affected interdiction fires?
  
  5. Why have armies around the globe have rejected large caliber, high velocity, flat trajectory field guns (quite similar to naval artillery) in favor of very high angle fire mortar, howitzer, and rocket systems? (hint: it isn�t just the inconvenience of emplacing large guns)
  
  6. What effect does trajectory have on accuracy, fratricide, fusing, reverse slope target effects, etc.?
  
  7. How have urban environments impacted the application of joint fires and ROE?
  
  8. Why was developing a vertical strike missile like ATACMS so significant for the U.S. Army?
  
  9. Why do armies prefer rocket artillery and even short range non-nuclear ballistic missiles for Division/Corps level supporting fires and counter battery missions?
  
  10. What advantages in warhead types, munitions trajectories, fusing etc. make 122mm-300mm missiles so effective against these types of targets?

When you do the research and answer these points you will find that the 16� gun looks a lot less attractive even in direct support role than you might first think.

1) By your own admission you have no education, or experience as an FO/Anglico/FAC etc. your opinions are based on supposition and anecdote.
2) You are not a strike planner, never done post strike BDAs etc.
3) You are not familiar with ASW (a key component of naval thinking)
4) You are not an engineer, scientist, Operations Research Analyst etc.
5) You have no experience with procurement, manpower, shipbuilding etc.

Actually it turns out that I only mentioned the first of your points. The other 4, you are assuming an awful lot. Don�t forget, �Assuming makes an ass out of you, not me�.

No, it makes an ass out of you.

I was wrong on point 4, but you have conclusively demonstrated that you are not qualified to publicly call BS on the CNO, USAF COS, Unified Commanders, etc. when it comes to ASW, strike or fire support.

Sat Oct 17, 2009 8:58 pm
�These are all old and defeated arguments. So, if you want, I can address them if you want, but they've been addressed many, many times before in everything from congressional hearings and Senate reports to articles and speeches.�

I have asked you several times to provide documentation to your claims regarding Congressional interest in reactivation of BBs - no response. Anyone can look at the unclassified Congressional hearings, and even classified programs have funding lines defined in the National Defense Appropriations. Hint: I reviewed programs and budgets from both the service *and* the appropriator point of view (one of my other careers).

[carr]

..