Who would Win early 1942

[Werner]

During the running engagement, at least one Japanese 18.1-inch shell hit a US carrier, passing clean through its flimsy hull without exploding. Whether the shell was a dud (unlikely) or simply fused for AP delay (more likely), is uncertain, but it was a hit, nonetheless.

Mighty Yamato, when firing at one of our destroyers at 0754 spotted torped tracks bearing 100 (degrees) to starboard. As ordered by Admiral Kurita, who flew his flag on board, she turned to port, first to 60 (degrees), and then almost due north, to evade. Vice Admiral Ugaki, Batdiv 1 commander, who was also on board, called this maneuver "highly unfortunate" because it caught the battleship between two torpedo spreads, four to starboard and two to port, chasing her from astern. She dared not reverse course, but continued in a northerly direction for almost ten minutes before the torpedos ran their course and their tracks disappeared. This effectively took Yamato out of the battle and made her "tail-end Charlie" of the ragged Japanese disposition. (1)

Gambier Bay's first hit was at 0810. It exploded aboard in the after athwartships passage, smoke and flames observed in the after elevator well. It was evaluated as of 5-inch caliber. Ross, op.cit. The battle began at 0646.

The first "significant" or "damaging" hit occurred at 0820, exploding in the engine room. Yamato was still 25 minutes from being back into range with Gambier Bay at this time, providing she steamed directly toward the carriers. E. E. Evans aboard Johnston had other ideas. Yamato was never in this fight. Anyone who says otherwise is guilty of "wishful thinking".

W

(1) Morison, History of US Naval Operations in WW II, Volume XII, pp. 260-1.

[Dave Wooley]

It has to be Yamato , In a stright gun duel Hitting power and staying power count and Yamato had both.
Dave Wooley

[Werner]

It has to be Yamato , In a stright gun duel Hitting power and staying power count and Yamato had both.
Dave Wooley

Dave, read my other posts. A really big gun is worth nothing if the sights are no good.

It appears to me that 10-inch side armor and a few inches of deck armor were sufficient. Except for Hood, no capital ship of WW.II went up with the "bang" you would expect if the citadel were penetrated. Instead they were lost to the accumulated damage to control and command systems outside the armored box.

The extra armor of Yamato is an irrelavancy. North Carolina had plenty enough.

W

[Dave Wooley]

Werner So the Java sea and Savo island were aberrations . Japanese optics were good very good. and in 1942 this would have been a deciding factor. USN radar operators in 1942 were still in a learning curve also in 1942 the IJN gun crews were better drilled and this would also have been a factor.
Dave Wooley

[Werner]

Werner So the Java sea and Savo island were aberrations . Japanese optics were good very good. and in 1942 this would have been a deciding factor. USN radar operators in 1942 were still in a learning curve also in 1942 the IJN gun crews were better drilled and this would also have been a factor.
Dave Wooley

It's not just a matter of optics. The maths are at least as important.

If the Japanese system didn't have these key faults, many battles would have been different. For example, at Komondorskis, the Japanese fired something like three thousand eight inch shells and only scored a couple of insignificant hits. Every American ship was effective and operational after the battle ended. The Japanese ships had to go into dock to repair hull damage and reline the guns.

No wonder the Japanese admiral was cashiered after the battle.

The fact remains that a critical design error makes Japanese gunfire beyond 13,000 yards ineffective. Yamato may as well be shooting at the moon for all the good her guns would do in a long-range gun duel.

I will give you the standard challenge I offer the unbelievers: produce a list of Japanese gunfire hits beyond 13,000 yards. Such a record is not difficult for German, British or American ships of WW.II. Why should it be so tough for Japanese ships considering the very large number of surface engagements fought in the Pacific?
W

[Dave Wooley]

Werner put it another way had the Yamato been available for the Malay landings and subsequently faced Pof W and Repulse what in your judgement would have been the outcome?
Dave Wooley

[Werner]

Werner put it another way had the Yamato been available for the Malay landings and subsequently faced Pof W and Repulse what in your judgement would have been the outcome?
Dave Wooley

A battle decided by Japanese aviation.

The British ships' fate was as sealed by a deployment without air support as was Yamato off Okinawa.

Let me ask you: same setup, but Halsey and TF38 with 12 carriers are in support. Now?

In a simplified "ships only" engagement, I believe the maneuverability of two British ships and their rate of fire imply strongly that at the end of the engagement Yamato will be a slowly skinking, floating wreck at best. Whether the British lose one or two ships would be the only open question.

It is clear the Japanese ship cannot divide it's fire and that the fire control tower would be an early shock casualty of battle. Musashi's director was knocked out by the shock of the first torpedo hits. We can never know about Yamato. The British probably would not experience similar problems between two ships. Both had experience in Atlantic battles to shake out the bugs. All Yamato and her sister ever did was swing about their buoys serving as floating office blocks for staff officers. After 1942 there was not even enough fuel to allow them to go out and practice with the great guns. Essentially by they time they were sunk they were still untested weapons operated by amateurs.

W

[Dave Wooley]

Werner You have stated that Yamato would have been sent to the bottom by Pof W and Repulse. you can't be serious and to suggest that the crews of the IJN were amateurs. words fail me.
Dave Wooley

[Werner]

I bet no crewmember or officer in Yamato had more than 90 days' practice. Further, the ship had never been tested by hits.

In December 1941 the British Navy had been at war for over two years. Both ships had seen combat. The differences in preparation are marked.

How else do you explain Musashi's fire control system succumbing to a single torpedo hit as late as October 1944? The crew was very experienced at spit and polish, but never had meaningful combat exercise or experience. The ship was still an untested system, kind of like Prince of Wales in May, 1941.

I fail to understand this illogical and counterintuitive adoration for Yamato. Would it be easier if you thought Kirov whenever you thought of it? Certainly formidable on paper, but when visited off Norfolk in 1989 it was noted that the erector screws for the missile launcher were painted shut. Her crew called her "The Dove of Peace" because frequently none of her combat systems were operational. A big difference exists between the paper strength and the real power of a vessel. The British and American battleships had fought and acquitted themselves on several occasions. Except for the Kongos which were treated like cruisers after their carrier consorts were sunk, the Japanese battleships never proved a thing.

Kind of like being interested in gigantic sauropods when the real action is happening in the mundane, small coelurosauria, which were evolving into birds. Perhaps more than once.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/Yamato.html

[JWintjes]

Werner You have stated that Yamato would have been sent to the bottom by Pof W and Repulse. you can't be serious and to suggest that the crews of the IJN were amateurs. words fail me.
Dave Wooley

Not necessarily to the bottom. But in a long-range engagement between Yamato and the two RN ships my bets would be on the RN ships - the chances that Yamato gets a hit in her forward superstructure early on in the engagement are higher than those of Yamato putting both ships out of action early on.

Remember, ship-to-ship action doesn't necessarily have something to do with actually sinking your opponent. Rendering him incapable to inflict harm may be just as well - the Bismarck is a case in point here.

Jorit

[RNfanDan]

Also, people keep complaining KGV had "weak" 14" guns. How bad were they and does the number not make up?

Vlad:

The British 14" guns were not "weak" by any means, and the shellfire of the KGV class could still punish most enemy capital ships severely. However, the 14" shells these guns fired were comparatively lightweight (1590 lbs) for their caliber. The main problem in the earlier part of the war, was that the quadruple mountings of these 14" guns were plagued with mechanical "bugs" and personnel training problems. The mountings were very complex, and required many actions to be performed in precise order. It was not until after 1943 that these problems were largely resolved.

[Anonymous]

In a stand up fight a Gato Class fleet boat could sink any of them

And a Weapon class could sink a Gato in ten minutes. And a loch could do it in twenty.

[Vlad]

Thanks for that little explanation.

the mechanical problems were evident from the engagement between Bismarck and PoW. I was getting at the fact they were 14" when almost everything else of that time period was 15" or 16". Anyway that now makes sense.

[Werner]

In a stand up fight a Gato Class fleet boat could sink any of them.

And a Weapon class could sink a Gato in ten minutes. And a loch could do it in twenty.

After WW.II the best of the USN commanders and their subs were exercised against the best British and American ASW units. The result was that the ASW groups were very roughly handled by the American subs.

A commission (Nobska) was set up to evaluate the liklihood large Soviet submarines could behave similarly. The conclusion was they would and could.

This led to a huge post-war ASW program centered around destroyer conversions, dedicated large ASW carriers and new large hunter-killer ships and subs.

The technologies of modern submarines (teardrop hulls, sound isolation, nuclear propulsion, radical propellors, passive SONAR) are all requirements derived from the first Nobska Conference. The requirement was for a leap beyond the Type XXI and XXIII based submarines, large numbers of which were assumed to be under construction in the USSR. They expected a Russian surge capability of over 300 subs by the mid-fifties.

W

[JWintjes]

And a Weapon class could sink a Gato in ten minutes. And a loch could do it in twenty.

After WW.II the best of the USN commanders and their subs were exercised against the best British and American ASW units. The result was that the ASW groups were very roughly handled by the American subs.

While that's right, the Weapons weren't exactly WW2 standard ASW material. Actually, as ASW platforms they are pretty much the pinnacle of WW2 RN ASW construction, already pointing towards the development of the later P frigates. And if pitted against a standard USN fleet sub, I'd say the odds would have been in favour of the Weapon - double squid packs quite a punch and was the most potent ASW capability in its time.

Jorit

[wr]

And a Weapon class could sink a Gato in ten minutes. And a loch could do it in twenty.

After WW.II the best of the USN commanders and their subs were exercised against the best British and American ASW units. The result was that the ASW groups were very roughly handled by the American subs.

A commission (Nobska) was set up to evaluate the liklihood large Soviet submarines could behave similarly. The conclusion was they would and could.

This led to a huge post-war ASW program centered around destroyer conversions, dedicated large ASW carriers and new large hunter-killer ships and subs.

The technologies of modern submarines (teardrop hulls, sound isolation, nuclear propulsion, radical propellors, passive SONAR) are all requirements derived from the first Nobska Conference. The requirement was for a leap beyond the Type XXI and XXIII based submarines, large numbers of which were assumed to be under construction in the USSR. They expected a Russian surge capability of over 300 subs by the mid-fifties.

W

It was the US ships that suffered, the RN ships did muich better, with the Weapons at the top of the tree against the Gatos. Sorry about that.

[JWintjes]

the Weapons at the top of the tree

A question if I may - are there any indications that the Type 16 conversions had developmental links to the Weapons? Somehow I find information on th Weapons a little hard to come by (apart from March etc).

Jorit

[wr]

the Weapons at the top of the tree

A question if I may - are there any indications that the Type 16 conversions had developmental links to the Weapons? Somehow I find information on th Weapons a little hard to come by (apart from March etc).

Jorit

Just a cheap limited ASW conversion job. No real links to the Weapons or the Gallants.
See "The Postwar Naval Revolution", by Friedman, for an outline.
See Friedman's forthcoming volume on British Destroyers for a more in-depth coverage.

[ddp]

the british would have lost the repulse as you don't send a battlecruiser against a battleship & win. between the pow & yamato, it depends on how they would be situated to each other as in broadside, crossing the t or what.

[Filipe Ramires]

Werner, a honest suggestion from myself and you are completely free to take it out anyway. Don't follow only US sources, specially those taken immediatelly after the war. Morison's books (with all the respect to the Admiral) and specially JANAC are plagued with faults that have been disclosed after they were released. If you can get the hands on the English version of the Senshi Sosho (the japanese version of the Pacific War - over 100 volumes, 14 years to be completed, released late 70's I guess) or any other decent book that also takes into account japanese testimonials. For starters, Kurita never made a statement on Samar after the war and only got an interview with some one many years after the war.