Who would Win early 1942

[wr]

Back to the original question. Given the constrainsts of no radar directed fire control beyond what the USN or the RN had in 1942 (still pretty much a poke and hope IMO) the victor im my opinion would be just who could control the range of the engagement. I think that the optical phase of fire control was pretty much even. After all we are dealing with the universal laws of physics and the behaivor of light. The question is just what do you do with the data after aquiring the data. In a shorter range slugging match I would still go with Yamoto (this would almost have to be a situation in which they stumble into one another) At longer range IMO Bismark holds a decided edge all else being equal. Of cours that is provided that her opponent decides to stay in the fight. perhaps for this poll the ships should of also been listed with their maximum speed.

"Pretty much a poke and hope'. see above.

Bismarck sighted visually by Rodney at 08.43 at a range of 14 miles.

First salvo from the Rodney on the Bismarck at 08.47 hours at a range of 25000 yards.

Second and third salvos at 08.48, HITS OBTAINED!

These very early hits were pivotal.

The above hits were because of the use of type 284 radar, which had come into use in 1940.

I believe that the above data speaks for itself.

PS as my maths is poor, could someone please calculate the number of miles to target on 25000 yards when the first hits were made? THank you.

The American officier who was serving on the Rodney at the time "on loan", must have been impressed.

This is the type of information that Morison should have used but did not, although I understand why. Without technical details one cannot really understand the whys of what happened. Morison wrote a good overview of the Pacific war which can be used as a basis for something more comprehensive. Where is the American author to do this?

[ARH]

14.2 MILES

[JWintjes]

"Pretty much a poke and hope'. see above.

Bismarck sighted visually by Rodney at 08.43 at a range of 14 miles.

First salvo from the Rodney on the Bismarck at 08.47 hours at a range of 25000 yards.

Second and third salvos at 08.48, HITS OBTAINED!

I guess that would have brought Yamato in some predicament, wouldn't it?

Jorit

[Werner]

"Pretty much a poke and hope'. see above.

Bismarck sighted visually by Rodney at 08.43 at a range of 14 miles.

First salvo from the Rodney on the Bismarck at 08.47 hours at a range of 25000 yards.

Second and third salvos at 08.48, HITS OBTAINED!

These very early hits were pivotal.

The above hits were because of the use of type 284 radar, which had come into use in 1940.

I believe that the above data speaks for itself.

PS as my maths is poor, could someone please calculate the number of miles to target on 25000 yards when the first hits were made? THank you.

The American officier who was serving on the Rodney at the time "on loan", must have been impressed.

This is the type of information that Morison should have used but did not, although I understand why. Without technical details one cannot really understand the whys of what happened. Morison wrote a good overview of the Pacific war which can be used as a basis for something more comprehensive. Where is the American author to do this?

And how fast was Bismarck moving? Was she evading the shells? Or was this more of a peacetime exercise with the exception that the floating target was firing back?

As for Morison, 5,500+ pages is hardly an overview". Perhaps you're thinking of the abriged Two Ocean War?

Morison's work also has the benefit of an 1942 authorization by President Roosevelt which gave Morison and his team access to the people, places and records at the time of the battles. It is the official history of The USN in WW.II. Consider it a "report to the people".

W

[JWintjes]

I am not familar with Funkness gear, but I assume that it is electronic in nature.
There is I know a volume on German radars and associated gear but I never saw it and never asked to see it.
I did go over a fully detailed set of Bismarck plans that had been marked up by the DNC's department showing some of the hits that the ship had taken from KGV and Rodney along with notations. The sort of material that some on this board would give a lot to see. I did not take notes.
There was in the NMM many tears ago, several boxes of French documents that had been captured by the British at Toulon. David Lyon (now deceased) was good enough to translate some of these for me, and some of the data I used in the Cruiser book. All good stuff.
I realise that these words are removed from the original topic, but they may be of small interest to some.
My favourite in respect of non RN material was going through the bundles of detailed German ship plans held at Naval Historical (MOD). God knows where they are now.

Mr Raven,

thanks a lot for this valuable pieces of information - I guess on a future research visit to London I'll have to spare some time going to the NMM.

Jorit

[Tracy White]

So Werner, you're saying no one should bother with something more in-depth and revised?

[Werner]

So Werner, you're saying no one should bother with something more in-depth and revised?

No, not at all. What I will say though is that because of the global and thorough nature of his work, 99% of all the authors who followed have simply relied on his books as their primary sources and have only reworked the prose, perhaps adding a small amount of information as they go. Of the balance, a large fraction have a specific reformist agenda and have distorted facts to fit the profile. A very small amount of additional original work has found it's way to the public since Morison.

One note on Japanese sources: many, including Fuchida have revised history in order to replay WW.II in a light more favorable to themselves or to the Empire. This is a well-used tactic in Japan. Look at the complaints of their neighbors regarding revisionist textbooks. I would regard these sources with more than a degree of skepticism.

W

[wr]

"Pretty much a poke and hope'. see above.

Bismarck sighted visually by Rodney at 08.43 at a range of 14 miles.

First salvo from the Rodney on the Bismarck at 08.47 hours at a range of 25000 yards.

Second and third salvos at 08.48, HITS OBTAINED!

These very early hits were pivotal.

The above hits were because of the use of type 284 radar, which had come into use in 1940.

I believe that the above data speaks for itself.

PS as my maths is poor, could someone please calculate the number of miles to target on 25000 yards when the first hits were made? THank you.

The American officier who was serving on the Rodney at the time "on loan", must have been impressed.

This is the type of information that Morison should have used but did not, although I understand why. Without technical details one cannot really understand the whys of what happened. Morison wrote a good overview of the Pacific war which can be used as a basis for something more comprehensive. Where is the American author to do this?

And how fast was Bismarck moving? Was she evading the shells? Or was this more of a peacetime exercise with the exception that the floating target was firing back?

As for Morison, 5,500+ pages is hardly an overview". Perhaps you're thinking of the abriged Two Ocean War?

Morison's work also has the benefit of an 1942 authorization by President Roosevelt which gave Morison and his team access to the people, places and records at the time of the battles. It is the official history of The USN in WW.II. Consider it a "report to the people".

W

What matters are the number of words
5500 pages x 330 words per page = 1.8 million words. To be generous let us say 2.0 million words. Not an excessive amount for the subject in hand.
He was the first and he did a good job. But there is so much more to be done.

Bismarck - even if the ship was stationery, to hit at 14 miles on the second and or third salvo ain"t bad baby.

I nned a drink.
.

[Werner]

Have you read the two million words of Morison in question? I have, several times. I have also read very many of the other "histories". It is blatently obvious that Morison was copied by most of them. A few don't even bother to redraw the graphs and charts. One in particular is a hand drawn chart given to Morison by Admiral Mikawa. This exact chart is reproduced in countless other documents, yet you never see it footnoted.

There are plenty of reasons to criticise Morison, particularly for his liberal egalitarianism (which was the ethos of the 1940s) and his blatant support for Democratic Party operatives within and without the Navy, but the history narrative is beyond reproach.

W

[wr]

Have you read the two million words of Morison in question? I have, several times. I have also read very many of the other "histories". It is blatently obvious that Morison was copied by most of them. A few don't even bother too redraw the graphs and charts. One in particular is a hand drawn chart given to Morison by Admiral Mikawa. This exact chart is reproduced in countless other documents, yet you never see it footnoted.

There are plenty of reasons to criticise Morison, particularly for his liberal egalitarianism (which was the ethos of the 1940s) and his blatant support for Democratic Party operatives within and without the Navy, but the history narrative is beyond reproach.

W

I assume that you are referring to me.
Morison did a good job.
We go on.
If Morison had covered everthing there would be nothing to discuss.,
There is much to discuss.

I need two drinkie poos.

[MartinJQuinn]

Werner So the Java sea and Savo island were aberrations . Japanese optics were good very good. and in 1942 this would have been a deciding factor. USN radar operators in 1942 were still in a learning curve also in 1942 the IJN gun crews were better drilled and this would also have been a factor.
Dave Wooley

The Japanese won that the Jave Sea battle due to poor Allied communication, poor Allied leadership and superior Japanese torpedo technology. Their shooting was abysmal - IIRC it was something like over 800 rounds fired and only 3 hits scored? As for Savo Island - it's akin to shooting fish in a barrel.

The flaw with the "1942 - who would win" question is you are comparing steel hull to steel hull. You aren't taking into account the training, the experience and most importantly, the make up of the men who sailed those ships.

I'd bet the PoW and Repulse could have given the Yamato a run for her money...that's if Yamato was allowed to come out and play! The British weren't afraid to put ANY of their ships into harms way. Can you say the same about the Germans who weren't allowed to engage capital ships, or the Japanese who hoarded their Battleships like trinkets in the Inland Sea? I'd say the Italians gave the British - forgetting the u-boats - much more a headache than the Kreigsmarine ever did.

All that being said, based solely on which ship I'd lay my money on, I'd probably take my chances in the North Carolina.

[Filipe Ramires]

The Japanese won that the Jave Sea battle due to poor Allied communication, poor Allied leadership and superior Japanese torpedo technology. Their shooting was abysmal - IIRC it was something like over 800 rounds fired and only 3 hits scored? As for Savo Island - it's akin to shooting fish in a barrel.

Yes but torpedo firing was also very poor during the all Java Campaign for the japanese. They had excellent torpedoes and good tactics to make them out still they fired dozens of Long-Lances during the day phase of the Java Sea Battle and only one found her mark which was on Kortenaer. Electra was shot up to pieces by Jintsu and her following destroyers. This all battle, specially the one between the heavy cruisers, was fighted at a considerable distance to the point that Doorman couldn't use the light cruisers to fire the japanese heavy ones because they were out of range most of the time. Takagi was a submarine school admiral so he didn't trust much on artillery or didn't know properly how to use it therefore he keeps the distance and sends the little guys to charge. It's a real mess this particular battle and it haves many things remained to be told over it. As for Savo, it was an almost point blank range battle, specially during the second phase.

The flaw with the "1942 - who would win" question is you are comparing steel hull to steel hull. You aren't taking into account the training, the experience and most importantly, the make up of the men who sailed those ships.

I completelly agree here with you Martin and if there was Navies by 1942 that had true and good experience those were the Royal Navy and the Nihon Kaigun.

I'd say the Italians gave the British - forgetting the u-boats - much more a headache than the Kreigsmarine ever did.

Headache indeed but nothing else since I don't recall the Italian Navy ever winning a naval battle during WWII against the RN! Don't forget that a single movement of a German capital ship would made the RN throw out a lot of ships on her hunt (Graf Spee, Bismarck, Tirpitz and Scharnhorst are good examples).

[chuck]

"Italians gave the British - forgetting the u-boats - much more a headache than the Kreigsmarine ever did."

-Were this true, it would be easy to understand because the Italian fleet was 2-3 times the size of the Kriegsmarine surface navy, depending on the measure. But it is not true. 7 British battleships had to be committed to the hunt just 1 battleship and 1 heavy cruiser out of the Kriegsmarines already puny total force. That is more than would ever be needed or committed at any given time, during the entire 4 years of mediterranean war, against the whole entirty of the Italian surface navy.

In October/November 1941, the British were prepare to deploy 1 modern, 1 middling, and 1 obsolete battleship to confront, trap and destroy all Italian BBs that might be tempted to sortie. Later they would need 2 modern battleships to respond just to the notional possibility of Tirpitz coming out.

Due apologies to fans of Italian navy.

[Werner]

The December 2005 edition of U.S. Naval Institute Naval History features an article titled "What If?" by James E. Valle, Professor of Naval and Maritime History at Delaware State University. In this article he posits the outcome of battles pitting Tirpitz vs South Dakota, and Yamato vs Iowa. This article is closely aligned with the arguments I have made in this forum.

I encourage all to read it.

I particularly draw your attention to his opinion that the armor of all these ships exceeds that necessary to protect the vitals from shellfire, and the decision will be rendered instead be defeating the enemy's ability to fire back.

W

[Tracy White]

Werner needs his own Ditto heads.

[Werner]

Some people hate to lose.

Don't be a sore loser!

This discussion would make more sense if everyone detached their emotions from the subject. For some, insulting the perfection of Yamato is like insulting your wife or mother. That is just plain illogical. The Japanese had less experience in warship design than practically any other player. Look at the refits necessary to make satisfactory units out of the cruisers. By the time they were done they had worked in an additional 30% of displacement in hull stiffening, bracing, buoyancy compensation and so forth. I imagine for the money they could have built two ships if they had started from experience.

Why would the super battleship be any different? An examination of the torpedo defenses of Yamato reveal a ship protected no better than a "Big Five". The only resistance she offers is because of longitudinal compartmentation within the machinery spaces and elsewhere. Looking at Skulski's plans it is no surprise they both capsized.

One thing the USN learned is that any penetration of a watertight bulkhead, for pipes or fittings or cables compromises the integrity of that boundry. The 1966 refit of Midway required a complete rewiring of the ship because experience showed ships of her generation leaked profusely through electrical cables when flooding. Kentucky and Illinois were to be the first USN ships with leak-proof electrical wires. It is reasonable to assume the Japanese would and did experience progressive flooding across watertight boundries once the torpedo defense system was breached. A ship thousands of miles from drydock with a flooded machinery compartment was as doomed as Lutzow at Jutland, with life measured in hours. Additional bombs and torpedos only hastened the inevitable.

W

[MartinJQuinn]

"Italians gave the British - forgetting the u-boats - much more a headache than the Kreigsmarine ever did."

-Were this true, it would be easy to understand because the Italian fleet was 2-3 times the size of the Kriegsmarine surface navy, depending on the measure. But it is not true. 7 British battleships had to be committed to the hunt just 1 battleship and 1 heavy cruiser out of the Kriegsmarines already puny total force. That is more than would ever be needed or committed at any given time, during the entire 4 years of mediterranean war, against the whole entirty of the Italian surface navy.

In October/November 1941, the British were prepare to deploy 1 modern, 1 middling, and 1 obsolete battleship to confront, trap and destroy all Italian BBs that might be tempted to sortie. Later they would need 2 modern battleships to respond just to the notional possibility of Tirpitz coming out.

Due apologies to fans of Italian navy.

I have no allegience to the Regia Marina (though they did have some cool ships) but the Italians were not shy about sending their ships out to confront the British or to protect their convoys to North Africa. Did they always use them wisely or coordinate with their Airforce well? No. But I think it's a bit of a myth that the Italian Navy was as incompetent as the Army.

In regards to Tirpitz - I think the British held him at almost mythical status, considering what Bismark did to Hood. Churchill in particular was obsessed with getting "The Beast" at all costs. If the Germans handled their ships with the same aplomb that the Brits did, Hood might not have been on the only Royal Navy heavy unit to be dispatched by the guns of the Kreigsmarine.

[JWintjes]

But I think it's a bit of a myth that the Italian Navy was as incompetent as the Army.

I'm all for myth-busting, but then the army should be treated fair as well - while the Italian army may have displayed utter incompetence in higher ranks (especially about logistic), it's a myth they weren't up to their opponents. If you read through the reports of RAC crews during the Cyrenaican campaign, you'll find their surprise at the Italian gun crews sticking to their guns literally to the last man.

Jorit

[wr]

The December 2005 edition of U.S. Naval Institute Naval History features an article titled "What If?" by James E. Valle, Professor of Naval and Maritime History at Delaware State University. In this article he posits the outcome of battles pitting Tirpitz vs South Dakota, and Yamato vs Iowa. This article is closely aligned with the arguments I have made in this forum.

I encourage all to read it.

I particularly draw your attention to his opinion that the armor of all these ships exceeds that necessary to protect the vitals from shellfire, and the decision will be rendered instead be defeating the enemy's ability to fire back.

W

I looked at the thing. I have never been impressed by Professors of Naval history. Especially when they have nothing better to do than promote themselves at taxpayers expense.
He will probably atain tenure and become a talking head on the history channel; God help us!

[Werner]

I believe he already has tenure.

If he found Yamato trounced Iowa would you be more charitable toward him?

W