Who would Win early 1942

[chuck]

Anti commerce raiding by submarine was considered against the Bushido tradition. .

Yet machine gunning surviving merchant seamen was not.

[Werner]

Yes, curious.

I thought the treatment of prisoners was brutal because these men, by surrendering, were without honor.

[Filipe Ramires]

Hmmm....well, not all did that.... only a few isolated cases of submarines took such actions (I-27 being one of them I believe).
I believe we have been through this before....hum....I sense a disturbance in the Force...

[Werner]

You also have Tone in 1942 and again in 1944. I think the activity was more widespread than we have been led to believe.

For example, I have recently heard about thousands of British and Australian POWs in Borneo who were forced to march overland in late 1944. About 10-20% were killed en route because by that stage of the war they were too weak for the journey. When they arrived on the northern coast the balance were massacred to hide the atrocity which occurred during the march. Of all the thousands, only six escapees survived to tell the story.

A Japanese guard who killed Australians who fell said in the TV interview he was happy to do so because he was 'protecting their honor by killing them.'

[bengtsson]

Yamato was such a waste of resources by a nation that already was so far behind the USA's industrial capacity. Any waste was unforgivable from the IJN view point. Escort vessels were for sure a much better use, ASW destroyers like USN DEs or RN Frigates and a standard mass produced Carrier design along with naval air forces. If Japan was going to fight the USN, it couldn't afford to build the Yamato super BBs. Our submarines ran riot in the last two years of the war. They faced a very weak ASW force. By the way, does anyone know if Japan fielded a useful active sonar/asdic set in these last two years? Japan was truely not defensive minded. See a navy that staked much on it's ability to field naval air power against surface ships, but didn't really try to produce decent ship board AA weapons like modern 20mm/40mm automatic cannon. Planned to conquer resources at great distances from the homeland and fielded an almost non existant asw escort force until the last year of the war. Granted they never had a chance against the USN in the long run, but in war it is always stupid to make things easy for you enemy by lack of forsight.

Bob B.

[Filipe Ramires]

Early in the war most of the IJN escorts were equipped with a primitive hydrophone called Type 93 which had a range of 1.000 yards with the ship going at 8 knots....a very bad performance. Later in the war they had more a proper sonar (which I can't find the type now reading here) which had a slightly bigger range of 2.200 yards at 6 knots. Such equipments would give a big gap (blind-time) in the run for the target (sprint).
Depth charges were also of very poor performance. Early in the war the Allied submarines just had to go a bit more down to escape them...this if they have the depth to do it (didn't work in shallow waters).
About AA guns they had a major gap between the common 25mm guns and the heavy guns (3.9'; 5'; etc) lacking a weapon � la Bofors style with a intermediate killing power.

[bengtsson]

Japan's ASW efforts in WWII remind me alot of the Allied ASW effort in WWI. Very late to appreciate the need for a rational ASW force and weapons. The American submarine force really faced little better than a WWI ASW defence. Equipped with a decent active sonar, the Japanese escort vessels would have found it not so hard to echo locate the very large USN fleet boats given reasonable sound conditions of the water. Big boats make big echos. Japan's other great need was long range ASW aircraft, the real force to kill u-boats or keep them under. Escort Carriers would have been nice, but I doubt Japan had the industrial ability to build these at the same time they tried to match USN fleet Carrier strength. At war's start IJN never even had an ASW command or a force of escort vessels beyond a few Shomushu (type A). Four ships is a poor ASW force to start a war with if you plan to run large numbers of ships from distant resource rich regions to the homeland.

Bob B.

[Filipe Ramires]

ASW was quite outdated in fact in the IJN. Still they made a few improvements on their own. They developed some sort of MAD device for their planes which would drop a flare or a dust cloud over the submarine when it's magnetic signature was spotted. Still, don't have much infor on this. Also, they even developed special shells against submarines...the so called Type 0 shell.
About the ASW command the first one was created in late 1943 with the 1st Escort Squadron under the command of Vice-Admiral Nakajima Torohiko (10 DD's; 8 Kaibokans; 3 minesweepers; and a few SC and AMC's only). Only late 1944 the so called 1st Escort Fleet was created under the command of Vice-Admiral Fukuji Kishi and four other rear-admirals and equipped with sixty different types of warships capable of anti-submarine warfare: four Fleet-Destroyers ; forty-five Coastal-Defence ships (Kaibokan�s); four Minesweepers; two Sub-Chasers and five Armed Merchant Cruisers (Special-Gunboats). The 901st Naval Air Flotilla in Takao (Formosa) employed 170 aircraft of different types to engage this mission also.
These are small quotes of a research I did on the subject some years ago.

[RNfanDan]

Yamato was such a waste of resources by a nation that already was so far behind the USA's industrial capacity.

It's easy to take this view, from the unfair advantage of hindsight. The Japanese understood only too well that they couldn't match the US, quantitatively. They chose the classic approach of qualitative superiority of smaller numbers, to compensate. They also believed, for many years, that a decisive battle with the the US Pacific Fleet would take place close to their homeland, in a big-gun showdown of Tsushima or Jutland proportions. When viewed in this context Yamato, Musashi and Shinano, together made perfect sense. There was not a battleship afloat in the 1930's, when the class was designed, likely to survive an encounter with any of them.

Japan was (truly) not defensive minded. See a navy that staked much on it's ability to field naval air power against surface ships, but didn't really try to produce decent ship board AA weapons like modern 20mm/40mm automatic cannon.

Again, the Japanese approach would have been, "what aircraft?" It was inconceivable to them, that their ships would be subjected to massed air attacks; after all, from where would they originate? US carriers would be at the bottom of Pearl Harbor; there would be no US airbases, outside possibly Australia, to threaten their Empire; war with America would be overwith, in their plan, before the US could build-up a "TF58". Thus, their perceived need for heavy AA, simply didn't exist.

(Japan) Planned to conquer resources at great distances from the homeland and fielded an almost non existant asw escort force until the last year of the war. Granted they never had a chance against the USN in the long run, but in war it is always stupid to make things easy for you enemy by lack of forsight.

Remember, Japan wanted not to invade, or even to make war on the US, deeming (correctly) that war was only necessary to prevent the USN from interfering with Japan's aims. Their plan was to buy just enough time with the attack on Pearl Harbor to quickly grab what they needed (oil, rubber, raw materials) in the southwestern Pacific and, before the US fleet could recover and spoil the party, sue for peace with America.

The scariest part (for the US) is, it would have been relatively easy for the Japanese to eliminate the rest of Pearl Harbor as a forward base, even though they missed all of the carriers. No oil farms, no shops, no drydocks = No Doolittle raid, no Guadalcanal, no Coral Sea, and no Midway. They came this -><- close to pulling it all off. Fuchida and others practically begged for a third attack, and it was fortunate for the US that Nagumo declined. Ironically, one of the major reasons the IJN didn't want to hover for long near Hawaii, was its concern over----oil!

[bengtsson]

Granted I do have the hindsight advantage, and advantages don't come much better than that! I agree with much of what you said, it explains pretty well some of the IJN view of a coming war with the USN. I still hold to the fact that some important IJN Officers Yamamoto and other aviation minded officers, at the time, saw Yamato as a huge mistake and waste of resources. I'll refer you to "The Reluctant Admiral" by H. Agawa.
"Yamamoto himself was strongly opposed to the plan [to build super BBs]. He sought to demonstrate , with detailed figures, that if only the amount of money and material required to construct the Yamato and Musashi were divereted to the improvement of Japan's naval aviation, the fighting power of the IJN could be improved immeasurably". There is more on this issue in the book, of course, but you get my point. I just want to call attention to the fact some top IJN officers saw the true direction of Naval Warfare in the coming Pacific war. Others still believed in the battle line as you point out.

Bob B.

[bengtsson]

ASW was quite outdated in fact in the IJN. Still they made a few improvements on their own. They developed some sort of MAD device for their planes which would drop a flare or a dust cloud over the submarine when it's magnetic signature was spotted. Still, don't have much infor on this. Also, they even developed special shells against submarines...the so called Type 0 shell.
About the ASW command the first one was created in late 1943 with the 1st Escort Squadron under the command of Vice-Admiral Nakajima Torohiko (10 DD's; 8 Kaibokans; 3 minesweepers; and a few SC and AMC's only). Only late 1944 the so called 1st Escort Fleet was created under the command of Vice-Admiral Fukuji Kishi and four other rear-admirals and equipped with sixty different types of warships capable of anti-submarine warfare: four Fleet-Destroyers ; forty-five Coastal-Defence ships (Kaibokan�s); four Minesweepers; two Sub-Chasers and five Armed Merchant Cruisers (Special-Gunboats). The 901st Naval Air Flotilla in Takao (Formosa) employed 170 aircraft of different types to engage this mission also.
These are small quotes of a research I did on the subject some years ago.

Yes, interesting. One of my main naval interests is the escort of convoy problem faced by the RN, Italian Navy, German Navy and the Japanese Navy. Very complicated subject. Have you read the section on Japan's ASW efforts in "The Japanese Navy in WWII, In the words of former Japanese naval officers" section 14 "Why Japan's ASW failed". ?? I have heard of the IJN effort to use a mad device in their aircraft, but know little about it.
Bob B.

[kennylibben]

i bet 1 sub could take them all out.

[Vlad]

i bet 1 sub could take them all out.

how many torps did Yamato take before she sank? 11 was it? how many bow tubes does a Gato have? think of how many times it would have to reload before it put enough torps in the ship to sink it (accounting for duds/misses). even with "only" 27 knots Yamato could be miles away. before the second salvo was in the tubes.

[Werner]

There's a big difference between aerial torpedos and submarine torpedos.

Yamato would probably be doomed taking four submarine torpedos in the central Philippines, thousands and thousands of miles from the nearest drydock. Face it, she would have to go to Kure or Singapore for repairs. Based on the experience of Musashi she would suffer slow flooding and capsize long before she reached safety.

Musashi suffered cumulative flooding from the first hits which ultimately sank her; the later hits on the other side actually slowed her capsize.

The "theoretical" top speed of 27 knots also assumes a clean bottom, plenty of fuel and no shock damage. No doubt four torpedo hits would seriously reduce the performance of the machinery. Several Japanese warships had their machinery put totally or substantially out of commission by shock damage from submarine torpedos.

[kennylibben]

see... i win.

[Filipe Ramires]

Yes, interesting. One of my main naval interests is the escort of convoy problem faced by the RN, Italian Navy, German Navy and the Japanese Navy. Very complicated subject. Have you read the section on Japan's ASW efforts in "The Japanese Navy in WWII, In the words of former Japanese naval officers" section 14 "Why Japan's ASW failed". ?? I have heard of the IJN effort to use a mad device in their aircraft, but know little about it.
Bob B.

Hmm....good topics you have choosen indeed. One of me main naval interests is in fact WWII submarine warfare so it's obvious that I keep some knowledge on escorts also. Very complicated subject indeed. About the source you spoke of I've heard about it but never got the chance to read it so far. I am currently reading the US reports in Japan after the war ended and does show some information on the subject. Campbells Weapons book also gives some good technical data on the weapons used by the IJN. Regarding the submarine campaign against the japanese merchant lines there is a wide range of sources and books. One I did enjoy the most was Clay Blair Jr. "Silent Victory".
I'll try to dig here and see if I can find some more stuff on the MAD device. Taking some stuff to read on my holidays!!!

Filipe

[Filipe Ramires]

There's a big difference between aerial torpedos and submarine torpedos.

Warhead power, range, size...you name it. Eventually you could get more hits with a bunch of planes (this if they manage to drop the torpedo in a proper aim and way) then with a submarine which would surelly fire them at much more distance to avoid ASW forces in the area.

Yamato would probably be doomed taking four submarine torpedos in the central Philippines, thousands and thousands of miles from the nearest drydock. Face it, she would have to go to Kure or Singapore for repairs. Based on the experience of Musashi she would suffer slow flooding and capsize long before she reached safety.

No ship I can recall ever survived 4 torpedo hits in open sea...Yamato and her sisters were no exception. Shinano was sunk in such way but with a couple more torpedoes I believe (even being a carrier at the time).

[Filipe Ramires]

Have you read the section on Japan's ASW efforts in "The Japanese Navy in WWII, In the words of former Japanese naval officers" section 14 "Why Japan's ASW failed". ??

Silly me...this is what happens when you have nearly 40�C around here and you don't get much sleep!!! I have such file and I was saying before that I didn't have it!!! I will read it during my holidays....also taking sections related with airborne radar, sonars and asdics, etc.

[PetrOs]

Hmm, why there is no Sovetski Sojuz class ships for vote? ;o)
If Germany would not have invaded USSR in 41, first ship of this class would have been ready by late 42. It would be quite a potent opponent for any other battleship afloat by that time.

Being comparably fast at 28/29 knots (different sources), huge with 60000 tons standard, 65000 tons full load, strongly armored at 375-420 mm inclined belt and 155 (upper armored) + 50mm(main) deck, 3x3 16" guns, 6x2 6", 6x2 4", and 8x4 37mm (design, in reality it would have got much more AA guns, most likely of 20, 25 or 37 mm caliber), it carried german-originating optics (a clone of bismarck class fire control,the plans for which were bought 39 or 40), which would have allowed it to fight on equal terms with all other candidates, at least until very potent radar systems appeared on the other ships.

[Werner]

Hmm, why there is no Sovetski Sojuz class ships for vote? ;o)
If Germany would not have invaded USSR in 41, first ship of this class would have been ready by late 42. It would be quite a potent opponent for any other battleship afloat by that time.

It would be very interesting to speculate about the training and shakedown these ships could have had. With very little tradition in operating a surface force and the necessity of operating under the nose of the Luftwaffe, I suspect the crew would be the weak link in these ships, with mechanical reliability coming a close second.

Even Germany, with a resonable naval tradition, was let down severely in these two areas during WW.II.